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The Knowledge Argument – Mary’s Room (The Color Scientist)
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#31
 
RE: The Knowledge Argument – Mary’s Room (The Color Scientist)
Quote: tulpa001
Well, I may have forgotten parts of this thread, but I can tell you self knowledge is not limited in any way to sentience.
 
Well, if you don’t feel it’s limited in any way to sentience, then perhaps my usage of sentience ended up being an umbrella term for consciousness. Though, I figured the word sentience would imply conscious valuators such as us. Therefore, to think that self-knowledge isn’t exclusive to sentient beings seems like a non-starter type of question because its downplaying how self-knowledge required a self to be aware of it, or even a self that has an unconscious totality of feelings, predispositions, memories, and such.
 
So, I’d say this logic of yours is flawed, unless you have some belief that self-knowledge can be extended upon other things, e.g., panexperientialism, and what have you.
 
Quote:tulpa001
 
Consider this one question to see what I am saying. Does colour exist only in the person? Or does it exist objectively?

Reflecting on the original thought experiment, I believe the word colour is, perhaps used flexibly. A little too flexibly, referring not to one phenomenon, but two, depending on the sentence in which the word appears. In one sentence, it is a property of a person. In another, it is a property of the world.
 
I thought it was too obvious for me to acknowledge the brain’s representation of color vs. the portrayal of color that isn’t contingent upon conscious valuators such as us. In other words, I’m not sure how the premise is flawed, whether through the thought experiment, or through someone else as what I’ve noticed in other posts that support physical knowledge of something is that they’re denying the phenomenal events of experiencing the color; as if the phenomenal events are nothing more than a byproduct of physical instantiations, i.e., occurrences.
 
And with philosophy of mind worldviews like epiphenomenalism that dictates mental events as being casually inert while acknowledging a physical world, i.e., physical events cause mental events, but not the other way around (a one-way dualism). This worldview would acknowledge that there’s physical instantiations to process the experience of viewing color with our physical eyes, obviously, but it’s not really something to actually go against the thought experiment. This is why I felt that link another poster before sent was a person that couldn’t see they’re secretly supporting the thought experiment, but they’re somehow destroying it, and thus I couldn’t see any connection as to which side they’re on.
 
Because usually, physicalists would state that there’s no new experience for her. But, we seem to acknowledge that there is a new experience inwardly, for Mary. And just like the person before us talked about, they would agree to this as well (the mind having some new novel experience of color being visualized), but they instead try to destroy this novel experience of Mary’s. And somewhere along the line of their logic, they went back to the idea, like in the link, that Mary is merely a poster girl for the physicalist reduction of things. Which only begs the question, like I mentioned before as to whether or not phenomenal events are identical to physical events, like exactly.
 
If that were the case, then it would imply ideologies that support matter having the potential to be conscious in some way (e.g. panpyschism, panexperientialism, etc.)
 
 
Quote:tulpa001
 
To elaborate in great detail, what counts as physical knowledge? Why does what it means to experience colour not count as physical knowledge about colour? If we go full reductionist here, I don't think we will have a problem demonstrating that the experience of colour is yet more information about colour of a physical nature.
 
I’m not denying the objective existence of light waves of colors. It goes without saying that these occurrences go by with, or without conscious valuators, i.e., the Universe is an objective reality. So, even when asked about physical knowledge involves intertwining subjective knowledge of color as having physical knowledge is just chalked up to where in the brain where knowledge and memories of certain things is stored. But, knowledge can’t be instantiated physically as it’s merely a concept; a means in language to describe what’s going on in this objective reality.
 
In order for there to be physical knowledge, which is different in acknowledging physical instantiations of something, implies that the Universe has potential to be aware of itself. But, we acknowledge the Universe is objective from this line of thinking, and thus subjectivist notions like panpsychism and such get thrown out of the window. This is why I feel the question you posed doesn’t make any sense to discuss about as it’s contorting the usage of word without realizing the limits of them (e.g. knowledge being exclusive to self-aware entities like us; conscious valuators).


(This post was last modified: 04-22-2017, 04:27 PM by Linkzelda.)
04-22-2017, 04:25 PM
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#32
 
RE: The Knowledge Argument – Mary’s Room (The Color Scientist)
You say I'm not being logical. But I'm being literal. I cannot be sure that you are though.

I am saying that there are other questions related to knowledge of the self than how it is possible to know the self. Your perspective appears to only acknowledge one aspect of this that is not literally self knowledge itself: a metatheoretical knowing of the self.

Self knowledge is actually the substance of this process. As a form of information, it is subject to the same operators and transformations and models as other types of information.

Where is the line between self knowledge and other types of knowledge? The exact same line between a person and everything outside the person.

All things that are properties of persons are self knowledge when known about by the person in question. All things that are properties of other things are never self knowledge.

(04-22-2017, 04:25 PM)Linkzelda Wrote: I thought it was too obvious for me to acknowledge the brain’s representation of color vs. the portrayal of color that isn’t contingent upon conscious valuators such as us. In other words, I’m not sure how the premise is flawed, whether through the thought experiment, or through someone else as what I’ve noticed in other posts that support physical knowledge of something is that they’re denying the phenomenal events of experiencing the color; as if the phenomenal events are nothing more than a byproduct of physical instantiations, i.e., occurrences.
I shall attempt to explain this flaw using a transformation into formal logic. Original:
Quote:Premise P1: Mary has complete physical knowledge about human color vision before her release.

Therefore

Consequence C1: Mary knows all the physical facts about human color vision before her release.

Premise P2: There is some (kind of) knowledge concerning facts about human color vision that Mary does not have before her release.

Therefore (from (P2)):

Consequence C2: There are some facts about human color vision that Mary does not know before her release.

Therefore (from (C1) and (C2)):

Consequence C3: There are non-physical facts about human color vision.
How the argument is structured if colour is one phenomenon:

P1: Mary has complete physical knowledge about A before her release.

C1: Mary knows all the physical facts about A before her release.

P2: There is some (kind of) knowledge concerning A that Mary does not have before her release.

C2: There are some facts about A that Mary does not know before her release.

C3: There are non-physical facts about A.

How it is structured if colour is two phenomenon:

P1: Mary has complete physical knowledge about A before her release.

C1: Mary knows all the physical facts about A before her release.

P2: There is some (kind of) knowledge concerning B that Mary does not have before her release.

C2: There are some facts about B that Mary does not know before her release.

C3: There are non-physical facts about A. (does not follow)

Now, I don't mean to strawman here. The above analysis is not a perfect counterargument. I'd have to shore up a few gaps.

The most obvious gap is if you believe that A and B are the same phenomenon. However, then I say that you have to address the difference I have noted between how I define A and how I define B.

A is a set of properties about the world.

B is a set of properties about Mary.

If we accept that Mary's self knowledge of how she'd experience colour is nothing more than information about what colour is, then this needs to be reflected in our construction of premise P1, which does not hold as constructed in the original thought experiment.

Namely, Mary does not have all physical knowledge about A. There is an entire category of information missing. Information about the sensation of colour. This is information that is included in B, above, but missing from A.

This information can be learned into our colour scientist. But it is rather science fiction like. Basically, Mary would have to be a superhuman supergenius. She'd need access to a brain scan of impossible resolution of someone else who has experienced colour. She'd need to read this brain scan into herself and construct a perfect simulation of this other person's mind. Then she'd need to reverse engineer the sensation of colour and extrapolate how it would feel in her original nervous system.

Then, and only then, can we say that Mary has learned all physical knowledge there is to be found about colour.



You ask if I deny the phenomenal events of experience. I say to you I don't know. In an analysis of my counterargument, it seems to me completely neutral to the issue. It deconstructs the earlier thought experiment based on a structural flaw in the thought experiment itself.

I suggest instead, that perhaps that phenomenal events of experience exist, and they are generated through emergent processes from physical events.



Now, to be fair, I thought the link the other poster sent was, well, more sophist than the arguments it was arguing against. I strongly felt the irony.

So my reply was essentially: "Yes, I too think argument is flawed. But your counterargument is worse." Though I said it diplomatically.



(04-22-2017, 04:25 PM)Linkzelda Wrote:  
I’m not denying the objective existence of light waves of colors. It goes without saying that these occurrences go by with, or without conscious valuators, i.e., the Universe is an objective reality. So, even when asked about physical knowledge involves intertwining subjective knowledge of color as having physical knowledge is just chalked up to where in the brain where knowledge and memories of certain things is stored. But, knowledge can’t be instantiated physically as it’s merely a concept; a means in language to describe what’s going on in this objective reality.
 
In order for there to be physical knowledge, which is different in acknowledging physical instantiations of something, implies that the Universe has potential to be aware of itself. But, we acknowledge the Universe is objective from this line of thinking, and thus subjectivist notions like panpsychism and such get thrown out of the window. This is why I feel the question you posed doesn’t make any sense to discuss about as it’s contorting the usage of word without realizing the limits of them (e.g. knowledge being exclusive to self-aware entities like us; conscious valuators).
Okay, this is well written, but misinterprets what I said.

Physical knowledge is not knowledge that is instantiated physically, but knowledge about the physical universe. All knowledge exists, obviously, inside a knower of some sort. This gets complicated, however, with computers, which bridge the gap between a knower and and objective machines like the universe.

So we substitute the word information instead of knowledge to examine the information contained by the universe. Though, this technicality may be a step too far, and irrelevant to the thought experiment of Mary the colour scientist.

But, I think the thought experiment can be divided into two. One based on information and one based on knowledge. Yes, the thought experiment is written in terms of knowledge. But the objective is to make a statement about the nature of information. That there is not one type of information that exists, (physical) but two (physical and phenomenal).

Now, about that claim of panpsychism being thrown out the window there. I think panpsychism would survive the notion that the universe is objective. It is a much harder theory to deny than just saying that.

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04-22-2017, 09:47 PM
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#33
 
RE: The Knowledge Argument – Mary’s Room (The Color Scientist)
Quote: But, I think the thought experiment can be divided into two. One based on information and one based on knowledge. Yes, the thought experiment is written in terms of knowledge. But the objective is to make a statement about the nature of information. That there is not one type of information that exists, (physical) but two (physical and phenomenal).

IMO, there isn’t a need to divide the thought experiment between information and knowledge because it seems that we acknowledge that these words are exclusive to conscious valuators such as ourselves. I would even say this division distracts from the bigger question as to how matter seems to, through a physicalist’s lens, construct itself in a way that allows subjectivity and qualia to be experienced. The thought experiment boils down to qualia and subjectivity, not information and knowledge as the latter two isn’t something the Universe can revel in.
Quote:So my reply was essentially: "Yes, I too think argument is flawed. But your counterargument is worse." Though I said it diplomatically….
As for the response in my counterargument being worse: I’ll pull up what probably was a flawed counterargument. I’ll start with what I quoted you in post #31:
Quote:tulpa001

Consider this one question to see what I am saying. Does colour exist only in the person? Or does it exist objectively?

Reflecting on the original thought experiment, I believe the word colour is, perhaps used flexibly. A little too flexibly, referring not to one phenomenon, but two, depending on the sentence in which the word appears. In one sentence, it is a property of a person. In another, it is a property of the world.
And then I responded with:
Quote:
I thought it was too obvious for me to acknowledge the brain’s representation of color vs. the portrayal of color that isn’t contingent upon conscious valuators such as us. In other words, I’m not sure how the premise is flawed, whether through the thought experiment, or through someone else as what I’ve noticed in other posts that support physical knowledge of something is that they’re denying the phenomenal events of experiencing the color; as if the phenomenal events are nothing more than a byproduct of physical instantiations, i.e., occurrences.

And with philosophy of mind worldviews like epiphenomenalism that dictates mental events as being casually inert while acknowledging a physical world, i.e., physical events cause mental events, but not the other way around (a one-way dualism). This worldview would acknowledge that there’s physical instantiations to process the experience of viewing color with our physical eyes, obviously, but it’s not really something to actually go against the thought experiment. This is why I felt that link another poster before sent was a person that couldn’t see they’re secretly supporting the thought experiment, but they’re somehow destroying it, and thus I couldn’t see any connection as to which side they’re on.

Because usually, physicalists would state that there’s no new experience for her. But, we seem to acknowledge that there is a new experience inwardly, for Mary. And just like the person before us talked about, they would agree to this as well (the mind having some new novel experience of color being visualized), but they instead try to destroy this novel experience of Mary’s. And somewhere along the line of their logic, they went back to the idea, like in the link, that Mary is merely a poster girl for the physicalist reduction of things. Which only begs the question, like I mentioned before as to whether or not phenomenal events are identical to physical events, like exactly.

If that were the case, then it would imply ideologies that support matter having the potential to be conscious in some way (e.g. panpyschism, panexperientialism, etc.)

- The sense experience that is qualia; being risen from stimulation of the senses by phenomena, is a type of an endowment to us as conscious valuators.

- When you mentioned the word color is overused in a flexible manner, you acknowledge that it was maybe the thought experiment chalking down phenomena, where qualia would be arisen and experienced. But, it goes without saying, IMO, that the word ‘color’ is precisely used as tool towards the word ‘qualia’ in how conscious valuators such as us can experience the ‘ness’ of something. In this case, the ‘ness’ of a color. So, when you mentioned that format of one and two phenomena, it’s just stretching out other sense data (e.g. touch, taste, smell, etc.) And even those other senses, other phenomenon, can’t solely be chalked up through physicalist reduction because to ‘sense’ these things has yet to be empirically calculated.

- My response towards that is that I’m not here to criticize that in any fashion as, like I mentioned before, it’s really color being used for one phenomena, but isn’t exclusive to just that alone. The thought experiment revels in the ‘color’ because it’s one in which physical reduction seems to start reaching its boundaries. And that boundary is assessing how the ‘ness’ of a color is experienced within a conscious valuator’s cognition can’t be chalked up just by physical reduction. Now, that physical reduction is perfect in analyzing the operations of the mind as it’s processing that color, but ultimately, that physical reduction cannot extract physically, i.e., hands on, to decode the ‘ness’ of how that color is experienced.

- There’s no doubt in my mind that when it comes to wavelengths of color, that’s something empirically solved. Divide the empirical application vs. the ‘ness’ of something (that’s exclusive to sense-data, and now we see another bigger question:

o If this ‘ness’ of something, a knowledge to describe the redness, blueness, yellowness, etc. of a color simply through physical reduction alone (e.g. empirical reasoning and application via the Scientific method, epistemology of Science in general, etc.), then this means that technically, we should have direct, third person access to another person’s subjectivity. Which raises the question – Can a physicalist reduction be so confident in understanding another person’s beetle-in-the-box, i.e., their qualia and subjectivity?
-
o This is why that article link that chalked up Mary as actually being a poster girl for physicalist reduction is just ironically disturbing. It’s just using Mary as a cover-up for the limitations of the physicalist reduction of qualia and sense-data; endowments towards subjectivity.
-
o The missing data is the sense-experience that is qualia which can’t be chalked up through physical reduction. To think it’s missing physical knowledge of something is to imply that qualia and physical instantiations going on (e.g. some arrangement of matter in the brain, or whatever) are identical to each other; that it can be mapped out physically exactly.
-
o That missing data is a testament to how epistemological grounding has its limits when applied via a materialist/physicalist’s lens. This isn’t saying epistemological strives are bad; far from the contrary, IMO; it’s a useful tool in getting somewhere, at least in conceiving a knowable world. The objective with this thought experiment is to not make a statement about the nature of information, but a statement about the nature of qualia, i.e., the –ness of something.

If we correlate this to the tulpa phenomenon, if physicalist reduction could empirically analyze and quantify qualia; the –ness of a something; the sense-experience of something, then it should be very easy to just test another person in whether or not ‘other continuities of self’ can be instantiated within the same brain. But, that’s wishful thinking in one of the hard problem of consciousness being solved, which is how matter would arranged itself in a way to experience subjectivity and qualia.

Quote:Now, about that claim of panpsychism being thrown out the window there. I think panpsychism would survive the notion that the universe is objective. It is a much harder theory to deny than just saying that.
________________________________________

Panpsychism is in relation to all matter being conscious to some degree. If being conscious is exclusive to sentient beings such as us, and panpsychism were to hold some grit in that, the Universe would be supported by subjectivist ideologies. In other words, it gets thrown out of the window for objectivity because by nature, it would be a subjective instead.

Questions like ‘is a rock conscious?’ or ‘is that leg on the table capable of being conscious,’ would, IMO, just make p-zombies possible. If that’s the case- that thought experiment, philosophical zombies, would actually prove physicalism to be true, and it would join the sidelines of it to be criticized, and hello Occam’s razor.


(This post was last modified: 04-23-2017, 03:32 AM by Linkzelda.)
04-23-2017, 03:27 AM
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#34
 
RE: The Knowledge Argument – Mary’s Room (The Color Scientist)
Err, you don't have any counterargument. You are on the side of the original argument. You responded to my counterargument. I was talking about the other counterargument in the link.
(04-23-2017, 03:27 AM)Linkzelda Wrote: As for the response in my counterargument being worse:
Okay, so I'll just ignore this part as a misunderstanding.



Now, to the more interesting stuff.
Quote:IMO, there isn’t a need to divide the thought experiment between information and knowledge because it seems that we acknowledge that these words are exclusive to conscious valuators such as ourselves.
Knowledge is defined in terms of a knower, which may be the same thing as a conscious valuator. Though there is a debate to be had here. However, information is not defined in this way, so we cannot agree there.

Quote:The thought experiment boils down to qualia and subjectivity, not information and knowledge as the latter two isn’t something the Universe can revel in.
The thought experiment concerns physicalism, a type of monism. Think about this. If physicalism is true, then qualia and subjectivity also boils down to information and knowledge.

You could say the thought experiment is trying to claw its way up from a world of just physical stuff and expose a world with more to it than that. And that is why information and knowledge are bound so tightly to this argument.

Quote:- When you mentioned the word color is overused in a flexible manner, you acknowledge that it was maybe the thought experiment chalking down phenomena, where qualia would be arisen and experienced. But, it goes without saying, IMO, that the word ‘color’ is precisely used as tool towards the word ‘qualia’ in how conscious valuators such as us can experience the ‘ness’ of something. In this case, the ‘ness’ of a color.
Actually, let me go beyond that even further. Our colour scientist, Mary, yes? She studies colour from a black and white room and knows a lot about colour. She knows everything physical about colour.

I say, she knows nothing about colour at all. There is no physical information at all. Colour is only the physical sensation we call colour. And she has no knowledge of that at all.

Do you see the what I am getting at? There is no physical information about colour at all. It exists entirely within the mind.

Any attempt to talk about colour as something else introduces a second object by the same name.

This is obviously a discussion made more difficult by the presence of both information and meta information. Which is information about information.

Discussing knowledge tends to do that. What is knowledge? It is when a person knows information. We've got more than one of these meta-things here. We also have sensation. What is sensation? It is the experience of information. Is knowledge and sensation the same thing? Absolutely not. You can know something without experiencing it, and you can experience something without knowing it.

But, this thought experiment goes even beyond that. It does something really twisty with how it presents knowledge, information, and sensation. I say, it is getting this stuff confused, in fact, and not being logically rigorous enough to separate them.

"physical knowledge of colour" What is this? The thought experiment is unfortunately unable to answer this question. It leaves it ambiguous as to whether this includes knowledge of sensation of colour or not. This is a problem, as after she leaves the black and white room, the thought experiment centres around a sensation of colour.

The experiment's usefulness is inherently absent, as it shoots itself in the foot with too much ambiguity of terms.

Quote:...Which raises the question – Can a physicalist reduction be so confident in understanding another person’s beetle-in-the-box, i.e., their qualia and subjectivity?
Take a look at what I wrote here:
Quote:This information can be learned into our colour scientist. But it is rather science fiction like. Basically, Mary would have to be a superhuman supergenius. She'd need access to a brain scan of impossible resolution of someone else who has experienced colour. She'd need to read this brain scan into herself and construct a perfect simulation of this other person's mind. Then she'd need to reverse engineer the sensation of colour and extrapolate how it would feel in her original nervous system.

Quote:That missing data is a testament to how epistemological grounding has its limits when applied via a materialist/physicalist’s lens.
First you would have to overturn physicalism as a well supported theory.

If this thought experiment had no holes, you could say that. But I continue to maintain that the premises are based on faulty reasoning that seems solid due to semantic ambiguity.

The premises are not true.

Quote:The objective with this thought experiment is to not make a statement about the nature of information, but a statement about the nature of qualia, i.e., the –ness of something.
It does not matter what the goal is if the argument has holes in it. Just saying.

Though, usually the conclusion of the argument is related to the goal? Maybe?
Quote:Consequence C3: There are non-physical facts about human color vision.

Quote:If we correlate this to the tulpa phenomenon, if physicalist reduction could empirically analyze and quantify qualia; the –ness of a something; the sense-experience of something, then it should be very easy to just test another person in whether or not ‘other continuities of self’ can be instantiated within the same brain.
I disagree. Not just on the grounds that there is a really long distance between possible and very easy. It could be impossible to deconstruct this data to usable information, simply for the information being beyond the reach of our instruments. This could happen and physicalism could still be the correct worldview.

Quote:If being conscious is exclusive to sentient beings such as us, and panpsychism were to hold some grit in that, the Universe would be supported by subjectivist ideologies.
I assume this will never happen, as panpsychism seems to necessarily imply consciousness is not exclusive to anyone.

I think what you missed me saying here is that objective reality is compatible with panpsychism. As in things could simply exist independent of any perspective.

Though I also think I miss what you say as subjective ideology is an ambiguous term and it is not clear what it means as you use it there.

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(This post was last modified: 04-23-2017, 05:45 AM by tulpa001.)
04-23-2017, 05:41 AM
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#35
 
RE: The Knowledge Argument – Mary’s Room (The Color Scientist)
I looked over what you were saying, and I think there’s something to be mentioned. You were able to see holes in the argument, or within the thought experiment, especially towards the part that just having a book and mentality of the totality of all possible and future physical knowledge would shoot itself in the foot when taken into account of conscious experience of a color.

The book and Mary represent two mediums of radical materialistic worldviews, mostly eliminative materialism that would end up trampling qualia out of existence in its, the worldview’s, explanation of things. The exposure to light, or whatever wavelength of the radiation of light Mary has conscious experience of cannot be quantified; it’s qualitative information, and because ‘qualia’ is context dependent, I understand why we were kind of jumping around, but I felt we were agreeing at the ‘shoot itself in the foot’ part, but somehow had differences in the result of what the thought experiment is showing signs of.

If you see holes in the premise, I think it’s more of a viewpoint over the fallacies of the physicalist, or extreme materialistic worldviews like eliminative materialism (which may even see qualia as an illusion; but that assumption suffers the homunculus fallacy). If you noticed and acknowledge that applying the scenario to several phenomenon feels peculiar, it’s analogous to how the physicalist/materialist worldviews suffer an explanatory gap towards one of the few hard problems of consciousness.

The thought experiment is kind of like ridiculing physicalism to prove it to be false in being the end-all be-all indicator of explaining everything that goes on in this spatio-temporal reality. But at the same time, this thought experiment talks about phenomenal events, and this introduces worldviews that adopt this ideology, but certain rudiments have some holes in it as well; it’s not perfect, but it falls under the same challenge of having an explanatory gap towards the hard problem of consciousness.

Quote: "physical knowledge of colour" What is this? The thought experiment is unfortunately unable to answer this question. It leaves it ambiguous as to whether this includes knowledge of sensation of colour or not. This is a problem, as after she leaves the black and white room, the thought experiment centres around a sensation of colour.


It’s not meant to answer the question posed about physical knowledge as it’s merely a reductio ad absurdum towards various materialistic worldviews the would downplay qualia. You’re right that it may not be able to answer this question, but the actual question to that is ‘which worldview is also unable to answer this question fully?’ Not the thought experiment.

Quote: It does not matter what the goal is if the argument has holes in it. Just saying.

Though, usually the conclusion of the argument is related to the goal? Maybe
The goal of the thought experiment, to prove physicalism false as being the finality of explaining events such as qualia is essential in portraying holes in this kind of materialist paradigm, and others that may be more extreme (e.g. eliminative materialism). The conclusion is related to the goal, because the goal was to portray the explanatory gap of materialistic worldviews. Whether or not other worldviews suffer the same hard problem of consciousness is for a different thread as the thought experiment isn’t really exclusively endorsing to one, or even two worldviews; it’s just proving physicalism as false as a finality. But, physicalism can be useful to describe processes going on, but the moment it tramples qualia out of the question, and assumes brain processes identical to qualia, which are hinged upon subjectivity and first-person experience of something, then it has holes.

It’s analogous to how with Scientism, the idea that the Scientific method and epistemological virtues can dictate things beyond its own threshold ends up becoming a dogmatism towards anything abstract. The thought experiment is symbolic of this dogmatism, and like in that previous link that tried to deconstruct the thought experiment as Mary actually being the poster girl for physical reduction….it really is her being the poster girl. Because that same poster girl gets downplayed, and her own qualia gets trampled out of the materialistic worldview’s explanation because it can only dodge the explanatory gap.

But, that’s their own version of wanting her to be the poster girl of physical reduction. The other side, that wants to portray physicalism and materialistic worldviews as false in being able to quantify qualia through physical means alone, and shrug it off to where qualia being mentioned isn’t really the qualia they may want to actually talk about; the sense experience/data of phenomenal events going on.

Quote: I disagree. Not just on the grounds that there is a really long distance between possible and very easy. It could be impossible to deconstruct this data to usable information, simply for the information being beyond the reach of our instruments. This could happen and physicalism could still be the correct worldview.

Physicalism still being a potential, correct worldview ends up just being a placeholder until the explanatory gap shortens overtime. The same can be applied to any worldview that acknowledges this reality is materialistic, but understands there could be shades of dualism in there as well. Extreme versions of materialism such as eliminative materialism, would become insufficient in going beyond epistemological applications of the world. It’s pretty much set up to where you have to disagree to what I’m saying because it’s just wishful thinking of a physicalist.

Quote: I think what you missed me saying here is that objective reality is compatible with panpsychism. As in things could simply exist independent of any perspective.

Though I also think I miss what you say as subjective ideology is an ambiguous term and it is not clear what it means as you use it there.
________________________________________

I didn’t miss this notion. I just made an argument that this can’t be the case because with panpsychism, it’s acknowledging all matter, the totality of matter, is conscious in some form (physical, non-physical, etc.)

When you talk about compatibilism with a Universe such as this that can exist with or without conscious valuators, I think you end up conflating the rudiments of free will being compatible in a Universe that may be deterministic in its entropy and chaos. But the moment you think a subjectivist ideology can be included in an objectivist reality, it’s trampling the inclusion of that Universe that would be the totality of matter, and such; a weird dualism. It wouldn’t be an ideology about the Universe, but more so the events of conscious valuators. I’m not sure how the Universe, that we’re confined could even in theory, be rooted on a subjectivist ideology, and yet still be objective from the ideology that’s trying to define the totality that the Universe.

And for those reading this, I’m not talking about ‘Objectivism’ coined by Rand, I mean objectivist ideologies that have worldviews correlating to an objective reality.


(This post was last modified: 04-24-2017, 02:15 PM by Linkzelda.)
04-23-2017, 10:42 PM
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#36
 
RE: The Knowledge Argument – Mary’s Room (The Color Scientist)
Yes, I see what you are saying. Though your last point, I think I can imagine it.

Say that awareness is a basic property of physics, along with things like energy, speed, mass and charge. But it is not one that is easy to understand, like the forces. It has something to do with time. I say this because the passage of time is fundamentally necessary for life. It has something to do with logic and math. I say this because logic and math govern the beauty and the behaviour of those physical principles that give rise to intelligence.

This substance of awareness can be observed as the responsiveness and reactivity of a subject to its environment. So water is aware of the landscape it flows through as it conforms to the channels and riverbeds as it flows.



You are correct about the explanatory gap issue there. Siding with physicalism in the modern world is to take a stance predicting that as the gap shrinks we will only find further evidence in favour of physicalism and never evidence in favour of other theories.



Ah yes, I begin to see. The argument stands against materialistic worldviews that are less flexible. I do think there are formulations of physicalism in particular that survive the argument, though. As I said before, one that holds qualia to be real, and the result of emergent process as an example.

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04-24-2017, 05:54 AM
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