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  1. Narrate as much as you can, and use their name as much as you can. During sessions, use some low frequency binaural beats to try and get your mind slowed down a little bit. The only way I can hear mine is if I'm either near sleep or if I've been listening to the beats and not moving for a while. Even then, true vocality is really, really rare (only happened twice in 6.5 months). Also, while during sessions, focus really hard on making your mindvoice clear and as physically real as you can. Move it around, try and perceive it as if it's across the room. Practicing this helps them manipulate the sound as well. If you smoke weed, do it more often.
  2. don't worry so much. A tulpa can't really die unless the body does, it's more like they've fallen asleep
  3. I started in May, no words as of late. My advice: don't parrot, I've stopped having voices ever since I tried to help
  4. Sounds about right to me. I can't really go any further until I fix the voice problem. And I'm about 95% sure that parroting isn't the way to go. I've been going for 2 months, it isn't any less fake. And I'm pretty sure it hurt their ability to communicate with me as well.
  5. Like I said, it's all speculation, but unless you get the full-blown hallucinations going, communication is sketchy. I'd take a stab in the dark and say those with DID that can't communicate with their alters have this problem. The same problem I'm struggling with. All of that has to do with communication between the right and left brain... I'd look into the theory of bicameralism in psychology if you want to know more. Unfortunately, some people are more prone to psychosis than others, and its starting to look like I'm pretty fuckin resistant :( although, I will say that I've had some success with smoking weed and having successful voices afterward...
  6. Not always a lapse in memory, but for this discussion I'm going to consider those who do, since they are the most extreme case and the most useful for this discussion. And I'll tell you now that if I can prove that tulpae/alters are autonomous from us, I can prove that they have their own subjective experience and 'ego' to the same degree that we do. Just a heads up so you know where this is headed. *** At issue here is whether the unconscious automatisms are you. I'd say they aren't. Even within Freud's theory, the ego doesn't exist in early childhood. However, the unconscious automatisms such as breathing do exist. And, as I've shown a million times here, the ego doesn't even necessarily develop as a consequence of age. The point here is that the unconscious exists first, and you arise from it as a consequence of language -- by the same process that we use to develop a tulpa, I might add. And about whether the unconscious automatisms are associated with you: I want you to ask yourself, truly, if you remember breathing 20 minutes ago. Don't go "oh I must have been", but truly try to remember inhaling and exhaling. The answer to this question shouldn't be hard -- especially if you're familiar with the whole driving-home-without-realizing thing. Sure. Perhaps. But if the original consciousness isn't aware of the actions of an identity, I can prove that it is conscious. We just need to resolve the difference (***) in either direction above. EDIT: Quick disclaimer: I don't want you to think I'm trying to convince you that everyone who says they have a tulpa has one. Unless there is true disassociation, it is as you say: nothing but puppets. Which is why I don't like the direction this community has taken. It takes years for the first identity to develop -- why should it only take days to create the second? Not only that, but to prevent lack of communication between you two you need to induce psychosis. This is all speculation, I don't really stand by any of this particular edit, just a slight rant... and to say I'm mostly on your side, bluesleeve.
  7. This doesn't necessarily disprove the autonomy and subjective experience of each separate personality, though. The big problem with this is the fact that the 'host' doesn't even remember what happened while an alter was in control (at least before integration). A couple of problems I can see we're going to run into: 1) Do you believe in the authenticity of the experience of a person with DID? 2) The definition of identity and consciousness: Your identity is composed of all of the memories associated with you, which subconsciously influences your habits and mannerisms. The identity is only aware of a small set of stimuli at any given time, less than 50 bits per second of information (According to:, in contrast to what is actually received by your brain: 11 million bits per second of sensory input alone. This information (the 50 bits) is what you are conscious of, and is the only thing that registers as 'your experience'. If you've ever driven home from work and not remembered doing it (i have), you were not conscious of that experience. You were conscious of what you were daydreaming. Basically, I need you to know, that about five seconds ago, 'you' weren't consciously breathing, 'you' didn't feel the chair on your ass. Those stimuli and actions were being processed 'elsewhere' by regions of the brain that aren't associated with 'you'. Do you agree with the above? If you answered yes to both 1 and 2, you can be certain that, while a person with legit DID was 'asleep' and an alter was in control, the 'host' was not the one with their hands on the wheel. Proof from the above link: It is often assumed that consciousness is the dominant feature of the brain. The brief observations above suggest a rather different picture. It now appears that the vast majority of processing is accomplished outside conscious notice and that most of the body’s activities take place outside direct conscious control. This suggests that practice and habit are important because they train circuits in the brain to carry out some actions “automatically,” without conscious interference. Since the person with DID did not remember when the alter was in control, at the very least, the action was carried out "automatically" by a different part of the brain. Not trying to prove that tulpa or alters are conscious yet, but I need you to agree that, in the case of DID victims, the original conscious, which we are certain exists, is not involved in the activities of the alter
  8. Quick question, bluesleeve: what do you think about those with MPD/DID? Do you believe that one personality is sentient, while the other is just a puppet?
  9. Slowpoke here. I'd bet just about anyone can make one, but... I think it's a lot harder than many forum users lead us to believe. People keep marching in here and start hallucinating after 2 weeks....and don't leave after they finish. If it were me, and I were done, I'd be long gone from this place. And I ain't no stupid. I'm graduating in 3 years with a math/CS degree, and I never go to fucking class. This should be a joke. The slowpokes are the only honest ones. Let's start a witchhunt.
  10. Been working with that method since it was posted, starting to hear legitimate hypnagogic stuff during the day now. Conscious of my nonphysical body more often... Every so often get this strange feeling that my limbs aren't mine, like it's somebody else. I used to get that feeling when I was a kid, so strange to have it back. Anybody else with results/discoveries?
  11. It's not so much a criteria as it is a necessary condition. Wiki: Metacognologists believe that the ability to consciously think about thinking is unique to sapient species and indeed is one of the definitions of sapience.,+J.+D.,+Shields,+W.+E.,+%26+Washburn,+D.+A.+(2003).+The+comparative+psychology+of+uncertainty+monitoring+and%0Dmetacognition.+Behavioral+and+Brain+Sciences,+26,+317–373.&source=bl&ots=P-ACpSBOHA&sig=jJGAr5P3lbWCXDDjKvMMMdRL7ug&sa=X&ei=Et8uUPb6IKSh6wGIhYGgCg&ved=0CBkQ6AEwAA#v=onepage&q=metacognition&f=false -- page 302: given the link between metacognition and declarative consciousness (Koriat, 2007; Nelson, 1996) the study of animal metacognition can contribute to the study of animal consciousness. Note -- declarative consciousness is related to sapience in that it indicates having subjective experience. -- Page 1: Researchers take humans’ metacognitive behaviors to indicate important mental capacities, including hierarchical layers of cog-nitive control (Nelson & Narens, 1990), self-awareness (Gallup,1982), and declarative consciousness (Nelson, 1996). -- Note: declarative consciousness is related to sapience in that it indicates having subjective experience. -- page 313 --The study of the bases of metacognitive judgments and their accuracy brings to the fore an important process that seems to underlie the shaping of subjective experi- ence What you should get from the above is that a sapient being can think about thinking (metacognition), a being that is metacognizant is certainly sapient, and the two before indicate declarative consciousness and subjective experience -- which means they should be treated as any other person. Without subjective experience, no one is truly 'there' to feel pain. It becomes only a chemical process, with ingrained reactions. The reason I use 'sapient' is because 'conscious' is too vague -- Asgardian and I ran into the same issue earlier. 'Sapient' isn't really a scientific term. It just denotes a being of the highest conscious order (that we know of) that is self-aware and experiences things subjectively. Assuming we use Freud's model -- The line between Preconscious and Unconscious is not really defined -- some memories come easily, some harder, some not at all. And this all changes based on your state of mind, the presence of a therapist, etc.. So, it naturally follows that some parts of the Unconscious/Preconscious whole -- the shallower, easier to reach places -- manifest themselves to the Conscious in a clear fashion. Preconscious 'zones' are defined only by whether or not you can access them -- and since this can change, it stands to reason that the Preconscious is really just the whole of accessible zones (by you) of the unconscious. So, yes, the unconscious can manifest clearly. Just depends on the subject matter. You get deeper as you fall asleep/enter hypnosis/tulpaforce and things make less sense. More is also available. This isn't a critique of Freud's model, it's just a critique of your interpretation of it. So, I fail to see how this invalidates the model. Memories are stored in the 'Preconscious' which is just an accessible zone of the Unconscious. Terminology. You're asking for experimental data in psychoanalysis, brah. Seriously. It is a logical certainty that, in a case where an identity did not develop, all that is left is unconscious (since none of it is metacognizant, aware of mind, and possesses subjective experience). I might add that Freud used 'Conscious mind' to mean a self-aware entity -- since he didn't know of any humans that didn't possess such a thing -- in the highest sense, so don't go using any broad definitions of consciousness on me. This all points to the unconscious not belonging to you; it's more like your boss. Conscious, yes, in a broad sense. But they are not aware of their own existence, as I've demonstrated, and do not possess subjective experience -- they lack metacognition. You may be on to something with the 'indoctrinated into civilization' bit, though. There are theories floating around that say that subjective experience evolved as a result of changes in civilization about 3000 years ago. Wiki bicameralism. First question: We can't create a simulation of it. It is literally, philosophically impossible to simulate it perfectly without creating it. It is less difficult to simulate it imperfectly, but then the simulation will have problems that will give it away. Humanity, with the help of computers, and all of our wisdom, camt even simulate it convincingly. The brain can create it with 5-9 bits of information. That was the point. Second question: in which model? Mine is pretty well fleshed out. Yours has not only the problem of creating a nearly-sapient-acting-but-not-sapient entity that is several magnitudes greater in complexity than our own consciousness, but also: the problem of the entity's inevitable shortcomings. the problem of the feral children and ownership of unconscious
  12. I'm using the definition -- a being is sapient if it has metacognition... the ability to think about thinking. It's an apparently accepted definiton, and it shows a clearly developed awareness of mind. Learning is not sapience. You are confusing how deep your consciousness runs. Your identity, the part that is self-aware, is only the conscious. The reason I say this is because the unconscious mind can exist without you (in feral children, again), and therefore doesn't belong to you. You and the tulpa can share memories and recall because those are in the unconscious mind, and do not belong to you. They may be associated with you, but the unconscious is the one that possesses them. And, as I've said, the unconscious doesn't belong to you. Single unconscious mind, two conscious minds. So there's no problems with the second model. Problems with the first model: the tulpa couldn't act truly sapient (or else contradict the model), and would probably set off red flags. How would a construct of that complexity even get into the mind? We know it is sapient if it demonstrates sapience. How to determine if it demonstrates sapience is much harder, though. I argued in the last post that the mechanism for simulating near-sapience (nearly enough to be mistaken for actual sapience) would be much harder to construct than the actual thing. Also, it couldn't be perfect. As I said, the so called sophisticated models like ELIZA are embarrassingly, obviously not sapient, as well as absurdly complicated. The conscious mind only takes up 5-9 bits of information. Which, honestly, is more likely? Ok. Except that, in this case, behavior is both the criteria and the impression. Not modify in the way that I meant. For all of your examples, there are simply "rules to change the rules". The meta-rules, however, cannot be changed. This would stand true for a non-sapient, nearly sapient acting being.
  13. I see what you're saying, but I believe the language must support the concept of self ("I") before sapience can develop. The feral children (assuming validity of the accounts) had body language and some crude vocalizations, but they never became sapient. If it's functioning within the first mind (meaning the conscious mind) it would require constant attention to operate. So that's out. If it's not in the conscious mind, it must be in the unconscious mind -- this leads to that part of the unconscious mind becoming sapient, since it would eventually have to observe itself to demonstrate metacognitive behavior. The difference really is whether or not the tulpa should be regarded as a being with rights. I want people to be responsible with this. Difficulties in determining the type of behavior exhibited by a machine is not of much interest to me. I know we don't have a foolproof way to determine if something acts sapient (I discussed this w/ Asgardian earlier), but outside of a machine designed to fool humans the answer should be easy to intuit. (speculating, not really relevant) Ironically, if a machine truly were sapient, it probably wouldn't act anything like human -- despite being aware of it's own processes, the machine wouldn't have emotions or demonstrate preference, sympathy, etc since it lacks the neurochemical mechanism to do so. I can prove a tulpa is sapient if it acts sapient, but you're right when you say I can't prove it truly behaves that way. So suppose I've been fooled and I installed something ELIZA-esque into my mind, ignoring entirely how such a complicated entity would develop. I then mistook it's behavior for sapient behavior. This is the only scenario that would allow for an 'illusion' to develop. However... The entity would be unable to modify itself. Self-modification would require observation of self, which contradicts our concept of a non-sapient being. I believe, after long enough, that you would notice. Second, that Eliza shit took two years to program. Here's the 2011 winner for the Loebner prize; the best chatbot the world had to offer -- Not very convincing. The behavior of sapient beings is much more complicated than sapient beings themselves. Just as a matter of feasibility I would say this is impossible.