Linkzelda

Members
  • Content Count

    1980
  • Joined

  • Last visited

Everything posted by Linkzelda

  1. Use your mind's voice if you're in a situation where you don't want to speak aloud. Same effect, but speaking aloud, and I say this loosely without any evidence, would help imply some kind of feedback loop going on when the mind sees the person taking the initiative to speak it out.
  2. You'll find submissions that do a better job to amplify that feeling of things being a game changer, but nonetheless, I'm glad my submission did do something. Which means I should probably work on it, but I'm too lazy to bother.
  3. It's not so much as metaphors being apparent in the submissions, IMO, but whether or not they can elaborate on the probable mechanics behind using it. Like, to figure out where the method is going, and seeing if the mind can be spurred to create more symbolism and such based on the silver lining(s) that it radiates around to create the scenario where things seem more potent. Even with guides that do that, nothing beats the experiential accumulation one becomes aware of over time after spending so much time in speculation figuring out what it is that makes XYZ so efficient for them. It wouldn't be too surprising for a tulpa to utilize metaphors and such as I would imagine it would fit the mentality behind treating them as sentient; someone who can have just as much clarity with cognitive and meta-cognitive tasks for whatever goals they may have in mind. It puts things on an equal playing field where the host isn't the only one that has this unchallenged reigning of using those abilities. Though, I think that kind of inclusiveness between host and tulpa is due to the great efforts they take to come to terms with each other, and understanding one another.
  4. People can have sexual fantasies in their lucid dreams, and wake up not having a care in the world that the experiences with the dream characters was nothing more than a fading memory. The clear limit is that most of the experiences intended with that guide is going to be psychosomatic, and not really anything physical. Unfortunately, because of this, it will lead to an indifference in considering a, for a lack of better wording, part of yourself that you externalize as a sperm dumpster only to make one contemplate on existential issues after the deed is done. Bet the guide doesn't cover that.
  5. Oh, woah. I forgot this thread existed. I was interested one time, but was too busy. Boy, will I have a novel to tell you all in the future. Might be a few months from now. Anon, whatever you think is embarrassing, we, though I can't speak for the community itself, have become so desensitized to the collective experiences and anecdotes that 'cringe worthy' doesn't seem to be a 'thing' compared to a few years back.
  6. It's not really a crazy idea to want to have our legacy implanted in some shape or form before we come to terms with our impermanence and mortality with this reality. The experience each and every one of us has with our companions in question within our heads is for us to embrace, and advance our self-progression through them, and others. I just question, or bring awareness of these yearnings not for the sake of objectifying anyone, but hearing out the reasoning from others. Who knows, these perspectives could add more padding that I could use as a supplement. Maybe this ends up with reaffirming convictions we cling onto, but I'm a believer that having strong convictions means a person has the strength of heart. My constant questioning is only a testament that I find these experiences beautiful in their own right. When I try to be blunt and concise as I competently can (still working on this), I end up appearing a bit confrontational. But, breaking the 4th wall here, I don't really get a kick in having any intention to bastardize anyone. It only stagnates the need to learn other perspectives.
  7. Maybe the numbers have a symbolic representation between you two's relationship. 100% means you're full on, 0 is a neutral, and negative is the host's time to shine. As for figuring out the spot in the brain for the switch, I'm sure that's going to involve a model over where it could be, which would essence, deal with symbolism. But, I don't think that's a bad thing if given enough context.
  8. 6-9-2017 QWS 4 Hours 4 Minutes [video=youtube] https://pastebin.com/eCYvf85Z
  9. 6-8-2017 QWS 1hr 41 Min [video=youtube] https://pastebin.com/eCYvf85Z
  10. When it comes to physicality, like someone who may have distributed pictures of their girlfriend online, and it went viral and through adult mediums, yes, it would be boiled down to two POV – the girl who would lose all trust and respect for the person they were with that they shared the pictures with, and the act of defiance and ridicule of the individual who did it. If it’s a tulpa that has a form that was derived from the concept in mind, fictional or relatable to someone who has/is existing, it’s mostly just something dealt with privately because if they were to admit this traditionally in the same context I mentioned above, that would raise concern as the people they’re trying to reach out to would only see the physicality of the body they share (to make that less confusing - I mean if a tulpa were to actually talk face-to-face to someone like that; it would be a futile effort, though). If it was a person(s) that had the intention to create erotic material of the actual form that may have had some deviation in it, in other words, the collective consensus the tulpa and host seem to be okay with, then yeah, it would be kind of concerning. Though, regardless of the beginning, IMO, when someone exposes an image anywhere online, they cannot assume other people wouldn’t have some affinity to make erotic material. That’s creating a small sample size assuming the picture of their form, deviated or not, was only distributed in areas they allowed it to be in. Physicality is different because one can’t really say they were copyright infringing vs. a concept a tulpa derived from that seems similar to their form, but isn’t exactly like them. If it is, then it just portrays that deviation, at some point, can end that whole objectification in the first place. If it is to be taken militantly to legal standards, then the tulpa being derived from the form of someone/something that existed would be an issue of transformative works, and whatever limits the copyright holders would have of that. Of course, people can’t sue someone for someone else who assumes there’s another presumed, sentient entity in their head. Regardless, if it’s going to show up on the index of a search engine either way, wanting to censor the distribution would be analogous to the whole censorship and controlling of the Internet feud via sharing private information to corporations, and such that’s been going on lately.
  11. Interesting. It's clear that when we all use qualia, we tend to break it down not only to things it may be, but things that it may not be as well. Instead of me answering to your replies, I'll make more threads in the future in which we can actually go into discussion about this. But, give me a few days, and feel free to discuss in them like anyone else. Also, the back-office metaphor should literally be taken as such, but if one doesn't want to believe there are occurrences and such that are unconscious, and what have you, then okay.
  12. Hey, War: Sorry for not seeing this any sooner. I guess 'treating a tulpa as sentient' tends to give the impression of 'pretending,' or just having 'benefit of the doubt.' And I think the whole 'treating as sentient' was a shift from the 'assume sentience from the start' is that there were previous cases in the past of people just being lazy after assuming sentience. But, that was back then when there weren't that many guides, and people didn't have referents to continue fostering that conviction of there being sentience. I would agree, personally, that I would be assuming sentience vs. 'treating' as such. If anything, 'treating' seems to be a placeholder until the person has an experiential collection of assurances over time that eventually makes them realize, for themselves, that they can assume sentience of a tulpa like they assume sentience of any other person. Maybe because one, like a user mentioned before, has to put up a mirror, metaphorically speaking, and wonder that if the mind can spur things to instantiate qualia and such for the host, then what's stopping it, the brain, from doing the same for the tulpa in question?
  13. Luminesce: I was fixated on the title of the thread, not really the person that started it. It wasn’t my intention to question Lucilyn as that would be an attack. It’s just the concept I’m focused on. I was just comparing to see differences and similarities. I was seeing how your idea of qualia, and the need to prevent the implication that it’s the same person vs. someone that’s conscious in their own right (e.g. tulpa). Let’s take experiences in lucid dreaming where one encounters dream characters that seem to appear sentient. They think and act as such, and one has to question if they can apply the same logic that qualia has to be this split of exclusivity, or qualia is an inclusive thing. If it’s the former, then it’s a form of dualism of there being a split, and potentially unchallengeable exclusiveness of having individual subjectivity. But, it raises the request that if one, or the other cannot share that POV (e.g. how one sees this reality), especially in context of switching, then how can switching even be possible? It’s one thing to acknowledge a representation of different POV, but it’s another to acknowledge whether or not both parties in question can transition in and out of those altered states of awareness. If the tulpa cannot share the first person POV typical in visualizing this reality of phenomenal events (e.g. via our eyes), then this would mean the tulpa cannot shift into that POV while the host shifts into the mental phenomena. Think of it this way, if a tulpa cannot share the POV of the body’s eyes to apply context to this reality, then the metaphorical model of how these POVs are transition have their limits to describe accessibility of physical things, in other words, the eyes. If a tulpa cannot, in theory, transition to fixate more on this reality, and become a dominant conscious evaluator of it while the host revels inwardly, then this means they need a new pair of eyes for their own use. But obviously, they’re pinned down to the physicality of the body. The more mental experiences can be whatever the person wants to since those experiences are more malleable than the actual physicality. But if qualia in the sense of events with this reality cannot be shared, and yet can be shared in the ‘bigger’ picture sense that you seem to acknowledge as well, ‘qualia’ gets used in a different context. Which means it’s somehow being used as an umbrella term, and thus the confusion is prevalent. War: With the explanation you provided of things actually being more, or less artificial than the other, along with your inference that self-reflection seems probable even in artificial means: - Even if one is seeing AI and such going through the motions of looking as if they’re sentient, it doesn’t mean they have conscious awareness that’s exactly like our means of being conscious. If this were the case, then there’s an implication of the hard problems of consciousness being solved to the point where consciousness and such can be shifted in and out of anything. In other words, just because your conception of self-modification would be deemed as organic doesn’t necessarily mean that AI will have the same implication of ‘organic.’ - If it could, then it would imply that the matter in which this AI is limited to has the potential to become conscious (e.g. panpsychism and/or proto-panpsychism). Or, at least some kind of subjective ideology where there’s a preference of mind over matter. But one still has to acknowledge how non-experiential matter (e.g. the AI) somehow gains experiential matter (e.g. qualia, and other attributes of sentient entities). - However one twists it, the AI will still be considered an example of p-zombies because unless humanity has mastery over what instantiates their own means of qualia and consciousness, it’s just people being “woo’d” over how there’s an implication of self-modification and other attributes that seem to be apparent in the AI, but shrugging off whether or not there’s a similar ‘backoffice’ that instantiates it, or unconscious totality of processes, etc. Point of view is contingent on a conscious evaluator(s). How does one expect the brain to apply context of this reality without a conscious evaluator? Saying POV isn’t contingent on consciousness and qualia is literally just trampling that whole point of consciousness and qualia being there in the first place. The hard problem of consciousness cannot be shrugged off just by assuming POV being independent of qualia and consciousness. Yeah, it is a metaphor, and I’m not expecting the metaphor to be the realized phenomenon if I acknowledged how humanity has yet to master what instantiates the very same things that allows them to have qualia and consciousness. It’s just to simply state and acknowledge the ineffable occurrences that would be related to the hard problems of consciousness. Yes, those would be part of the many processes that can be chalked up as the backoffice of the mind, i.e., the unconscious totality of processes and such that contribute to qualia and consciousness being prevalent. I’m not trying to go further on this limit with this metaphor into something transcendental. This is just us preaching to the choir over examples of processes, modalities, etc. typical of sentient beings such as us. Those processes you mentioned require a POV, and that POV requires some intertwined occurrence with qualia, consciousness, and anything that instantiates these qualities. P-zombies ends up being a probable construct because you’re splitting POV from qualia. You assume POV can occur regardless of there being foundations of qualia and consciousness. That seems to be the perfect example of a p-zombie that seems to have a POV, but lacks the conscious awareness to apply context and such common in sentient beings. It’s that extreme cut between POV and qualia that causes the confusion in this thread. I get that people use dualism as a metaphor, but when one states POV can be existent without qualia and consciousness, the very same rudiments that allows a POV to even be apparent, then it’s just trampling, or undermining the vastness of what consciousness and qualia are. Those list of perspectives are just several modalities a person can shift into, i.e., altered state of awareness. I agree those modalities being accessible and shifted and transitioned into, it’s just that I don’t agree on POV existing without qualia and consciousness; that’s just an example of p-zombies, and I don’t believe such a concept is even possible to be actualized. It can be conceivable (since we have those processes to create that thought experiment in our head) but it’s just a thought experiment; nothing more, nothing less.
  14. I think we're using qualia to shoehorn more specific things tied down to conscious experiences. With this definition, it's talking about the bigger picture, including those ineffable phenomenon that allows qualia to be. If a tulpa cannot share, completely, of those internal and subjective components going on in the brain, then how is one supposed to believe that they have the capacity of be part of that phenomenon that allows them to be another conscious evaluator? The rooting of this issue is how some may be undermining the full capacity of qualia. That it's, 'oh, just a person's subjectivity,' rather than including that it's also the phenomena in the brain that instantiates it. One has to question if the brain can instantiate a variant; another conscious evaluator. If a tulpa can only 'almost' share those ineffable phenomenon, then this whole tulpa phenomenon becomes a fringe concept between p-zombies, and potential conscious evaluators with an assumed, different POV. When you say no two people can share the same qualia, I get that you're acknowledging a tulpa as a potential label of a 'person,' but I also feel it's because we naturally know that when it comes to person-to-person physically, they can't be the same person (e.g. solipsism, and other subjectivist ideologies that may support that). But, if it's now the state of affairs with mental phenomenon, when we try to use that same physical person-to-person reference, it's causing some conflict because again, 'it's the same person' if it, qualia, can be shared completely (to you). There's a different between sharing, and there being not splitting. Sharing is about having a portion of something. By saying they can't share completely, that means they can't share a portion of those same ineffable phenomenon. It also assumes that a tulpa isn't part of whatever allows the mind to spur the experience of them having the capacity of being a potential, conscious evaluator. Because by your logic, if they could share completely, they would be the same person. When it comes to physicality, people will assume it's the same person, albeit with a few nuances in their behavior (unless they had prior knowledge of there being a tulpa, and having the benefit of the doubt). But internally between host and tulpa, if a tulpa can only 'almost' share, or never completely being a part of those ineffable, mental phenomenon that gives a host their individuality, then treating a tulpa as sentient is just wishful thinking. Undermining the full horizon of qualia is what tramples out the novelty here.
  15. Tulpa: Almost sharing qualia Host: Having full capacity in experiencing qualia, i.e., having internal, conscious experience of things and phenomenon going on. Here’s an analogy about ‘more than, less than’: - For example, something can’t be more artificial, or less artificial than the other. It would be artificial either way. Especially with AI – even if the programming may be better for one AI vs. another, they’re both still artificial; they can never have the capacity that allows us to consciously experience things. - P-zombies – entities that seem to act like sentient beings, but lack conscious experience. If a tulpa gets conceptualized as almost sharing qualia, but not having the potential to have the same capacity of having qualia, i.e., internally subjective conscious experience, then they will indirectly be compared to the host that anyone else would assume has sentience and the capacity for qualia. @tulpa001: - I acknowledge what you’re saying. It’s incontestable that qualia is what separates us from p-zombies, obviously. I wanted to use the backoffice of the mind as a metaphor to focus on what allows qualia to be instantiated, or manifested . In other words, the processes and what have you that is one of the hard problems of consciousness (e.g. how subjectivity comes to be prevalent). - Yes, the metaphor falls short at some point because it’s just a reminder that we all can’t know, until the hard problems of consciousness are alleviated in the future, how qualia is prevalent. That’s what I’m focused on, and when I see the thread that talks about ‘Almost’ Sharing Qualia, I want to focus more on whether or not others believe a tulpa can share the same backoffice, metaphorically speaking, to have their own means of internal, subjective experience. Anything else about qualia and ‘conscious’ experience, I am in full agreeance. - The specific concern, for me, is how we’re splitting the metaphor from the basic term of qualia, and taking qualia out of the equation. I’m just looking at one specific part that somehow allows qualia and first-person POV to come to be, the ineffable processes that have yet to be proven due to the hard problems of consciousness. - Which, when I combined with a general assumption in neurological science, I acknowledge that it is ad-hoc like you mentioned (e.g. potentially baseless since there’s no empirical support related to tulpas). In spite of this, however, I think one can acknowledge that whatever goes on within their everyday cognition is contingent on each person’s mind, obviously. - Thus, with switching, I think what may have been difficult for me to point out is: o Rather than me focusing on just qualia, something we’re aware of, I wanted to introduce the back office metaphor for that ineffable phenomenon that instantiates qualia somehow. I feel that a tulpa is obviously tied down to this as I can’t imagine a tulpa being an other-worldly being. Now, just because they’re tied down to those same neurological underpinnings (which I acknowledge can have different pathways, and what have you), I can’t rely on the mechanical model of that because I acknowledge the probability of a tulpa having the capacity to tap into those ineffable, mental phenomenon, and having their own POV. o Because if they don’t have a different POV from the host, then switching and possession loses their meaning. In other words, if it’s the same POV that one transitions in, then POV is used wrong, and another word must come to aid this conflict. It’s a lack of better wording on my end. My apologies. o In essence, in my little theory: The brain somehow has probable ineffable phenomenon that can create multiple POVs. We don’t know how to empirically explain it due to the hard problems of consciousness still being prevalent to this day. Which means a tulpa may have the probability of having a POV altogether, and being conscious of experiences. In other words, they’re not ‘quasi-sentient,’ or ‘almost sentient’ as the thread seems to imply (e.g. p-zombies). That ‘artificial’ example is used to express how when compared to ‘sentient’ beings, one cannot be ‘almost,’ or just ‘kinda’ sentient as it would imply that p-zombies are not just conceivable, but also having the potential to be actualized. If this is the case, then switching would become invalidated since it revels in the premise of there being another conscious evaluator that can shift from one POV of something to another (e.g. mental to this reality and vice versa) -
  16. 6-7-2017 QWS 3 Hours 20 Minutes [video=youtube] https://pastebin.com/N18TuXA6
  17. To address my concern: - You don’t hold the assumption of the manifestation of a new consciousness, or conscious evaluator, IMO to be more specific, requiring (partially or varying) one’s own personal experience. Okay, I get that. - But you acknowledge that it’s inherently implied that perspective sharing is common with communication and such. Okay, but you also mentioned about one’s individuality being at risk if they were to, in a way, try to ‘become’ the back office of their mind; they would, IMO, lack mastery of this, and yes, they would lose their individuality in a way. - Now, let’s take this presumption, and relate it to qualia. If qualia cannot be shared, in your opinion, but perspective can, it seems to be a false dilemma with splitting these two. - Interdependence is something that has to, IMO, be cohesive and pragmatic simply because: o A tulpa cannot exist out of the everyday cognition of their host that they share the brain with. o The same neurological occurrences, and other phenomenon that we cannot know directly (but only metaphorically and through representational models) are what both parties are tied down to, and have to apply things into context. I don’t believe in anything otherworldly in relation to tulpas as that just raises questions of how whatever phenomenon of said being can somehow get into my head directly (e.g. beetle-in-the-box) o Perspective sharing seems more specific on whether or not a tulpa and a host can access auto-biographical context, i.e., personal and past experiential events going on. I would acknowledge that, for example with switching, that the tulpa becomes more dominant as the conscious evaluator while the host shifts awareness towards mental occurrences (e.g. wonderland, etc.). The question as to whether or not the host can share that perspective, I would say yes depending on how well they can be aware of auto-biographical context. It doesn’t mean the host had to experience if as it was now; the –ness of reality at the present moment, but rather the experiential context now translated into memory. o Which leads to the other dilemma that if perspective sharing is something real, which I would acknowledge, there will be shades of gray in that. But if qualia, a part of the back office of the brain, cannot be something a tulpa can share, then switching, in theory, becomes debunked, and wishful thinking into believing there is another conscious evaluator. o I apologize if I seemed to have drawn a black and white line with perspective sharing, and anti-perspective sharing. I feel there’s nuances and shades of gray in this. But, it’s just the sharing of qualia that bothers me as I would have to be specific on what I actually mean so other terms don’t get shoehorned with ‘qualia’ (e.g. being first person POV – a perspective, sense data, etc.) Note, you’re the one finding the missing link because I was just expounding on the idea you seemed to have supported of there being different qualia (since you felt there can’t be a sharing of qualia). You’re becoming aware that if one cannot share the qualia, one suffers trying to assess the homunculus fallacy on whether or not there’s someone else operating that back office of their mind to suit their own individuality. But, like you mentioned with the computer analogy that can get associated with my back office analogy, one cannot really know these things because they would: - Potentially lose individuality - Not have mastery in assessing the back-office of their mind (because it would lead to infinite regress that the homunculus fallacy is grounded upon) Essentially, I believe there can be a sharing of qualia and perspective, and there doesn’t need to be a black and white of: - Same qualia, different perspective vs. Different qualia, same perspective Also, on a different note: [hidden] - I feel the title of the thread with ‘almost’ makes it seem like a tulpa cannot have the same ‘authenticity’ as the host does when it comes to consciously experiencing the –ness of things (e.g. qualia). Yes, a host has their: o Physicality o Experiential context over time o Genetics, etc. But if a tulpa learns to apply context over time: - They can gather experiential context over time - They may not have been ‘born’ with the same physicality because they’re just tied down to the structuring of that should they get into a state of affairs with something like possession and switching - They may not be ‘rightful owners,’ or have unchallenged authority over the genetics of the host, but that’s not the issue as it’s understandable about the limits of a tulpa. If a tulpa cannot have a capacity to consciously experience things, then they cannot be intertwined with the back office of the brain that instantiates these experiences the host can easily do day-to-day. In other words, they, the tulpa in question, would be a p-zombie. I feel this dichotomy of qualia and perspective is a clear sign of a false dilemma, or a false dichotomy that tramples potential ‘authenticity’ of a tulpa in relation to their potential capacity of being sentient, conscious evaluators as their hosts.[/hidden]
  18. Same qualia, different perspectives. Vs. Different qualia, same perspectives. For the former, if it’s the same qualia, then different perspectives can still be possible since in theory of switching, and even the journey of possession, one has varying degrees of conscious awareness towards something. In regards to possession, maybe a lack of awareness and control over a specific body part. In regards to switching, the host may be fixated in mental phenomenon more than the actual reality they usually engage in day-to-day. Because our conscious awareness can only fixate on so many things, if a tulpa-in-question engages in an awareness of this reality, then all that experiential context is something they get to experience in their presumed first person POV. So, there can still be some sense of duality, but still obviously being tied down to the same qualia. As the qualia emphasizes on internal and subjective components of sense data. Therefore, if there’s a different qualia, then in essence, it’s a different brain altogether. That’s why I feel if there’s compatibility in this, it would lead to a tulpa being some otherworldly being, which doesn’t seem pragmatic. If it’s the latter with different qualia, but same perspective, then it’s undermining how everyone experiences things in certain ways. Granted, there are some obvious consistencies (e.g. seeing a red block, and such), but the ‘-ness’ of something is going to have nuances in some shape or form. If there can be different brains experiencing the same perspective, then it would just lead to ideologies where all of matter and such in the Universe can somehow have a collective, first-person POV. But, with thought experiments like ‘beetle-in-the-box,’ it’s clearly obvious that no one has direct, third-person access into another mind. However, that thought experiment revels in person-to-person, but not internal conscious evaluator(host)-to-other potential conscious evaluator (tulpa). Sometimes, it seems it’s just an arrangement in semantics that creates, IMO, this split between exclusiveness and inclusiveness, and even something in between (interdependence).
  19. I guess that would make sense if the state of affairs didn’t involve the concept of possession and/or switching. However, if one cannot share qualia, which can branch off to conscious experience, applying context to this reality, and such: - Possession and Switching lose their value. If possession can be a precursor to switching, then when one actually has competency to switch with their tulpa, based on the logic behind switching, means that there is another assumed conscious evaluator (e.g. the tulpa). - Yes, there would be a sharing of perspective, but if there can’t be a sharing of qualia, then that means there can’t be a sharing of internal and subjective components of sense perception that would allow said perspective to even be realized to the tulpa-in-question. - By this logic, if the perspective is shared but qualia can’t be, then the tulpa-in-question isn’t truly deemed as someone capable of consciously applying things into context, nor sharing the latent habits and cognitive processes that apply context beyond one’s conscious awareness. In other words, p-zombie. - I feel that in this separation of qualia and perspective, one might be underestimating the vastness of qualia as perspective can merely be chalked up as one mode of conscious reference. Qualia can be deemed as what occurs in the back office of the mind that allows subjectivity and conscious experience to be. If a tulpa cannot have any potential to share, or be part of this, then a dichotomy gets created. - Either this dichotomy assumes the tulpa-in-question is an otherworldly being (which seems unlikely, IMO, as the experiences of creating and interacting with one are exclusive to the everyday cognition and experiences of the host and the totality of their mind). Or, there’s a false dilemma because one feels that everyone has their own qualia, and thus cannot tap into another person’s subjectivity. This is true when it comes to person-to-person in the physical sense; no one has this third person access to another person’s subjectivity. But, if this qualia, in an internal state of affairs between host and tulpa, cannot be shared, and has to be separated, it starts crumbling down into a homunculi fallacy. - Which would be, in short, some kind of entity that can operate the back-office of the mind, but that would lead to infinite regress. And in relation to the topic at hand with qualia not having any potential to be shared within an internal state of affairs, one has to question if qualia is an all-encompassing phenomenon, or some metaphorical splitting that cannot be inclusive.
  20. If a person can imagine the sounds of their favorite song playing out in their head, and can even have that take some dominance in a form of auditory hallucinatory effect, then I would imagine the mind can be motivated to impose a tulpa's voice on top of the host's. As to how to actually do that personally, well, I had an idea to create a guide on something like this, but I hardly doubt anyone would put in the effort.
  21. Qualia involves sense data and conscious experiences, and it's incontestable that qualia is related to a first person POV (assuming the person has conscious awareness, and isn't a p-zombie), so I'm not sure how there's a separation between it, and 'perspective.' If it's not part of the first person POV, then it loses its meaning, and it's back to square one on p-zombies.
  22. 5-27-2017 Quantum Wave Streaming 35 Minutes [video=youtube] [/VIDEO] https://pastebin.com/ny7LCi15
  23. I was planning to make an imposition guide that could be a form of active forcing, more intensive then the image streaming guide I made that was inspired from the Win Wenger guy who coined it. Though, I find myself only, for the time being, being able to do it for at least 2 hours, or so. And that's just doing it verbally as the non-verbal might get a person getting a little maniac.
  24. 5-23-2017 Quantum Wave Streaming Session 21 Minutes [video=youtube] https://pastebin.com/pLkBus4a
  25. 5-22-2017 Quantum Wave Streaming Session 32 Minutes [video=youtube] https://pastebin.com/JBD38G9m