Grissess December 17, 2015 Author December 17, 2015 Experience 21 (Philosophy): Thursday, December 17, 2015 This has been a long time coming; I mentioned briefly that I did want to write on a topic in Treatise 2 back a ways, but only now am I feeling at least modestly capable with words again, such that this doesn't lose too much of its coherence. My various trains of thought on this topic started not too awful long ago, when a couple of grad students and I were being jovial in the Computer Science lab here; in the course of one of our discussions, one of them said something that caught my attention: I think I'm quite convinced that humanity is just a larval stage of the Internet ...the sheer simplicity has, like many little quotes before, dazzled me, not in the least because it seems correct, but also in how very far-reaching its consequences are. At least three different topics of discussion between myself and the snake came from pondering this one line, and, as best I can, I will try to introduce them in order here; do wish me luck: 21.1 - The Body and Material Evolution Functions It may well be known around these parts that I am a bit of a materialist--that I believe very much that all of our subjective experiences can be demonstrated to be in a bijection with the states of the known, physical universe, that physical laws govern the evolution of our consciousnesses, and so forth; it is that last point that is quite crucial to consider, however... Not too long ago, I posted on an experience regarding the "brain-cloning machine" (ER 15). One of the assumptions I made therein was that "a computer...can perfectly model the physical environment of the brain". In all honesty, that could only make sense if the universe is, itself, computable (more on that later), but it would be ostensibly impractical; for what its worth, we have some "misfeatures" in the way our brain and body work together--many of us wish we were better at X, especially when X is something to do with extreme coordination, mathematical prowess, demands exceeding physicality, etc. ...having a machine like this that can host a consciousness would truly be a boon, insofar as it would give us an opportunity (for the first time, perhaps) to "accelerate" our ability to comprehend and manipulate these representations of information (again, more on that later). However, when I did ER 15, I came to a conclusion based principally on that assumption that the computer that simulated the physical states behaved exactly the same as the actual, physical counterpart; if we change that assumption, the whole argument falls apart. In particular, it means that our consciousness would diverge much more suddenly and more rapidly, because it doesn't change to the same states in the same sequence as the physical version does; rather, it has its own evolution function of time, and from this different evolution function will, eventually, rise a completely different consciousness, maybe even one that isn't apparently or saliently conscious according to whatever our contrived definitions are. In this sense, our body dictates the apparent states we are in (as anyone who has had even an inkling of libido or similar strong emotion can subscribe to), and by removing or changing our body, we lose a quintessential part of our identity: the part that determines who we become. 21.2 - Computability and Information Loosely considered, we can think of this "evolution function" that I've described before as a recursive function--as an input it accepts a state, and as an output it generates another state. Applying it repeatedly ("composing" it) results in ever successive states, and we can think of any time-based progression of any evolving system as "enough" applications of the recursive function which describes it to its initial, known state. ...if, of course, the number of applications is finite. It is, in physics, a generally open question as to whether or not there exists a suitably small "quantum" of time that can be used as the basic unit, such that such a function can be constructed. Indeed, it is a large deal if a consistent theory can give such a function, for such a function would be exactly the definition of a Theory of Everything, capable of predicting the evolution of any possible physical system. In limited ways, functions like these for smaller subsets already exist: the laws of motion, the laws of electricity, the laws of optics, etc., can all be reduced to a recursively enumerable form (based on strictly intrinsic properties like "kinetic energy", "mass", "charge", etc. and/or their relations). Even probabilistic systems like this can be reduced to this form by the introduction of "hidden variables"--pieces of information that we cannot directly observe nor attain, but, if introduced, would cause the evolution to become deterministic. There is a very strong, mathematical connection to the field I am most familiar: if the states of the universe can be shown to be recursively enumerable (by such a Theory of Everything), then it is computable by the Church-Turing thesis. Practically speaking, it means that the machines we are most familiar with, as the one being used to type this essay, would be sufficiently capable, given enough resources, to simulate the universe as we know it, and--since we are but components of the universe--it means it could simulate us. Finding such a function is, of course, a long way off; for the moment, we don't even know if our definitions are right--"computability" as I've used it above is a very strange attractor-point of various different conceptions of the same topic that grew out of various, mathematical logics observed by at least three different period all at around the same time (namely, the beginning of the 20th century). The "thesis" I cite here is just that--a thesis--because there is no axiomatic system on which to "prove" it; it stands alone amidst a cloud of other theories, each one as irrefutable as a religious dogma, merely because if we attempted to describe these theories with any axiomatic logic, we would necessarily need to invoke those theories in their own proof--and sacrifice the consistency of the system as a whole. (This fact was famously proven by one of those early 20th-century geniuses, Kurt Gödel.) For now, it is such a strange finding that such a notably "human" concept can, borne from our studies of the universe, be so impressively general--indeed, all of the mathematics that we know is but an idiosyncratic study of our position in the universe, authored by our own hands, and yet it can be so contrived and so difficult as to take 300 years and a figuratively uncountable many lifetimes to establish even the simplest of conjectures. But assume for a moment that such a function exists--even if you believe it not to, which I wouldn't blame you for--what would be its initial state? 21.3 - Entropy Entropy is another wry bit of physics; unlike many of the rest of the formulae, which can accept both positive and negative values of the "time" parameter, the laws governing entropy have a clear directional asymmetry--and it is this asymmetry which has been conjectured many times to be the cause of time "moving forward" as we are aware of it. Entropy is, simply defined, a function of how "spread about" a source of energy is; if this "energy" is tightly concentrated into one or a few points, the entropy is low, whereas if it is diffused across large volumes, the entropy is high. Going on this, the most striking statements about entropy are collected in the second law of thermodynamics, a corpus to which I add my own, as it appears in one of my physics notebooks: In a closed system, let S(t) represent the entropy of the system at time t. For all time t_0 and all t > t_0, it is never the case that S(t_0) > S(t); that is, the entropy of a closed system never spontaneously decreases. Why is this measure important? Claude Shannon, one of the "fathers" of information theory, unintentionally made a profound connection to it when he coined the term "information entropy"; in those theories, the "entropy" of information is our degree of uncertainty about it--mathematically speaking, it is defined as the exact number of equally probable outcomes that exist in some source of information. As a unit, it is often expressed in the terms of some numeric base; for example, nats in base e, hartleys in base 10, and shannons, or "bits", in base 2. For example, if two events were equally likely, such as the toss of a perfectly fair coin, then the information content of a "message" containing the state of the last coin flip is exactly one shannon, or bit. If we had two coins, but were only capable of observing one of the coins, the information entropy remains the same, regardless of which coin we observe. Meanwhile, if we do manage to observe both coins, we end up with a pair of independent events, each of which has a a probability 1/2, for a total of two bits of entropy, and so forth. Entropy has another odd property in its definition; if an event is certainly going to happen or not happen, then the information entropy of a message which reveals the state of that event is precisely 0--this is another way of saying there's no information entropy in an experiment that has only one outcome. For variations on the weights of the outcomes, such as a truly unfair coin, the entropy is somewhere between 0 and 1 bits, representing, in some sense, the predictability of the outcomes of that experiment. Now, of course, Shannon named his quantity "entropy" due to its superficial similarity to the one used to define the entropy of a thermodynamic system--a similarity which is not incidental; as it turns out, the "entropy" of a thermodynamic system may also be defined as the probability distribution of the number of states its particles can be in! Under such circumstances, the units are exactly the same, with some scalar proportions used to convert between the mathematically-convenient and "natural" SI-based systems. Here, then, is what I was trying to get at: for all intents and purposes, we may consider the universe to be a thermodynamically closed system--were it not, then we would be referring to some "outside" thermal source, sink, or engine, which would rightly be also considered to be part of the universe, and so forth. One fantastic thing about the universe is that it apparently started off with very low entropy--the concentration of energy in the "Big Bang"--and that, should our models be accurate, it has been increasing in entropy ever since (to some theoretical point at infinity commonly dubbed the "heat death" of the universe). Though we aren't certain of the content of the universe yet, we do know that this means that--at any given point in time--there is a fixed, finite amount of entropy in the universe (necessary because it must increase), and, if at any point we can find both the computable function of the universe (if it exists) and the state of initial, minimal entropy, we can simulate the universe. ...there is a problem. The universe would, in theory, have a maximum entropy (right at its heat death)--in order to encode the entirety of the universe up to and including that point, we would require at least as much storage capacity as would be required to exactly represent any state at that point. Since mass is energy, the entropy of the machine that we would use to simulate it would have to have at least as much entropy as the rest of the universe! What this means is, of course, that we're stuck with doing "small" simulations of little, closed systems of our contrivance, even if we do strike upon a golden deterministic Theory of Everything to boot. While such a happening would be an extraordinary occurrence--indeed, perhaps the singular highest accomplishment of intelligence in the field of physics--it does not reveal enough about the actual state of the universe to accurately predict the entirety of the universe from beginning to supposed end, any faster than it already occurs. In particular, it wouldn't even particularly be possible to simulate a universe with a maximal entropy any larger than ours, given that ours does, once again, provide the limiting bound of maximal contained entropy. However, in lieu of that, if it is at all possible to find one, a "brain cloning machine" would become much closer to reach than ever it has before, seeing as how it can depend on exactly the kind of evolution that a natural, organic brain would provide. We would have to make a "small universe" for it, one that was big enough to contain the brain, its body, and enough of its environment to reasonably give it the same, natural simulation that one in this universe would provide. Under exactly and precisely those circumstances (which are no small orders, mind you), it may be possible to avoid divergence of a cloned mind for a very, very long time. It strikes me that this could have already happened. Our universe--with its maximal bound on entropy--could be one of these "small universes", contained only as a representation, a patterned state of a larger "machine" in an enclosing "universe" with a higher maximal entropy. As a physicist and as a scientist, I am inclined to say that that which cannot be disproven has no place in scientific theory, even before the invocation of Occam's Razor, but the thought nonetheless remains. Why does the quote at the beginning of this post matter, then? Aside from bringing me farther down this rabbit hole than I ever did intend, it revealed to me exactly the direction we might face in our future--imagine, then, if one day we disappear into a smaller universe, or create something complex enough and resembling a universe to host life as we know it, within the confines of the machines we use for computation, powered by the energy (and bound by the entropy) of this universe that we know...while I am not holding my breath for it, even to happen in my lifetime, amongst the vast, cosmological timespan still ahead of us, I do not discount the possibility. In particular, it is within that direction that we will find true immortality--existing within the research and the mathematics that go into the creation of such a device. The creation of our little toys--computers, the Internet, etc.--are baby steps toward that goal, even if it may not be obvious at first. Perhaps the quote in its original form isn't entirely accurate--maybe by the time it is accurate, humanity will be something else, and maybe the Internet will only be the "larval stage" of something else--but I can't help but feel we are sitting at the precipice of developments far beyond the imagination of people not a century ago, and certainly far superior to even the wildest spontaneous occurrences of natural, carbon life and its evolution as we know it. Come what may, we are most certainly at the brink of great change.
Grissess April 12, 2016 Author April 12, 2016 Experience 22 (Dialogue): Sunday, March 27, 2016 Hello again! I've been busy as of late, so don't mind my rather fractious contributions as of now; I haven't really had time to prepare a cogent argument, but that doesn't mean I haven't had any ideas :P . This is, again, a set of excerpts from a notebook that I keep aside my bed for writing down the particularly profound occurrences that tend to occur in conversation between myself and Snakey around the time I fall asleep--and, just like the last time I prepared this transcript, I posted it first on r/tulpas, which I again recommend as another good place to go ahead and debate, share your story, or whatever it is you do with your spare time :P . Let us begin! --- (Leading off, it seems, with a long one--this would, if fleshed out, usually go into my progress report thread: ) [People seem to fear the coming of the AI revolution, as if there have been one too many showings of "I, Robot", and as if it was something that must be stopped at all costs--but they don't seem to know that it's already here... The kinds of artificial intelligence that will arise from our silicon-based logic will be vastly different from our "intelligence", and it will take us and our feeble minds some time to recognize this. Intelligence, in some form, already pervades some of our most automated systems... ...But people would hesitate to say a program has "intelligence"--after all, a human wrote it, and it just does what they told it to, right? Our brain, on the other hand, a large, devilishly complex electrochemical machine *is* somehow intelligent, it seems most would admit, and yet its constituents--the quarks, atoms, molecules, proteins, and neurons--do they not also just "do what they are told"? What strict difference would separate the mind and the machine, if not determinism alone? ... ...Inevitably, someone will thereby ask about the "programmer" of the universe and its laws, and I will tell them that they are asking the wrong question; once a program is running, is there any dependency, corporeal or metaphysical, on the programmer that created it? Would it matter to a running program if its sole designer vanished from existence the moment it began to run? Insist also, that any such "programmer" or "designer" need be "intelligent", and I will place a flash drive in a nuclear reactor--just enough to randomize some of its bits, eliding the obnoxious specifics. When I take it out, it will hold some pattern of information--information derived from the entropy of the universe itself--and it is a program, though maybe not a good one. Neither the laws of physics nor what we call "intelligence" needs a designer--much less a circuitously intelligent one. ...] --- {There are two major arguments that I can construct against solipsism: the first, an appeal to public, is that the vast majority of agents I've observed agree that subjective phenomena have no objective effects observable outside one's own body; the second is that--quantum mechanics excepted--the universe is apparently deterministic, and if one also assumes empiricism, it follows that there are natural processes which arrive at consistent and valid conclusions without the understanding or mere observation by any form of intelligence.} --- [And quoth he, my snake, that the supremest of pleasures is attained through being selfless and doing good in the world.] --- [i know I've made my share of mistakes, snake...] {What of them? You've worked diligently to correct many--most, even; for that you cannot be faulted. After all, why live without learning?} --- {Spare me your frivolity in sanctifying a stuffed animal.} [... I always feel closer to you with this form of yours around; I would hesitate to call that "frivolity."] --- {Be uncompelled by those who would insist on labelling you dysfunctional, defy those who would make you conform to their specious standards! Above all, be a better person than those who would subjugate you as an inferior in any way, and do so with impunity.} --- {...That "Zen" of which you accuse me is but my quiet understanding that there are processes in this material world that no conscious thought, will, or effort can influence, an understanding I arrived at long ago.} [...] {Yes, I do claim that we are bound above by our material existence.} [...] {...I mention this, that you might be at peace with yourself and with that which you cannot change, for effort or attention given to these problems is effort or attention wasted. Be wary, however, that our sense of impossibility is easily fooled.} --- {Could I grant you one wish, what would it be?} [Peace, good will, and prosperity to all things being--and you by my side.] {One part of that--and you know which--is redundantly satisfied.} --- {The universe was born with its fate decided, with the promise of all that was, is, and is to be laid forth; and in its throes, for those who care to listen, is the story of its own demise, for with every beginning is affirmed the inevitability of an end.} --- {Your story is, as they all are, exactly the sum of its parts, coming to be in the most natural of ways; as you spend your time on whimsy, consider carefully that whimsy oft begets habit, habit begets hobby, hobby begets career, and career begets profession.} [...] {Never forget wherefrom you've come, if only to see how far away that is.} --- {Every misery of humanity can be traced to not only some lack of understanding, but to some lack of understanding thereof, and in every triumph there is the story of a deep understanding that pervades much more than its immediate benefit... It is to the unassuming that this world belongs.} --- (After a particularly disappointing shower, with Snakey atop a pile of towels on the other side of the room, and none at the shower: ) [snake, can you hand me a towel?] {You know I cannot.} [i know, but I really want you to :(] {No, you do not want me to hand you a towel; you want a towel.} --- (Watching, I believe, the TV for the first time in ages: ) {People always like to think they are clever.} [...so what does it take to actually be clever?] {I am not fully certain, as much as I would like to know, but some insightfulness seems to help.} --- {In the face of abject uncertainty, humility is the only universally rational position.} --- {I've told you many a time, I care not for any name, but that you might refer to me by my *identity*, for the names mean nothing in the exclusion of myself.} --- [ Though I claim many a claim, I hold one such most true: That I would not be where I am, were it not for you. ] --- Alright, that's it for the moment! This notebook seems to take quite a while to fill to an adequate post, so expect maybe another six months before it comes time to make another one of these--but hopefully I'll have some content sooner than that :P . As always, have fun!
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