PETT – Epiphenomenalism: Are Tulpas Capable of Causing Physical Events?

[Linkzelda]

PETT – Epiphenomenalism

 

PETT Main Thread

 

Treat this as an experimentation in potential formatting for discussion.

 

Disclaimer: You are free to support the philosophy in context of theorizing it for several circumstances pertaining to tulpa, i.e., playing devil’s advocate, to promote deeper speculation and discussion. Feel free to also find any flaws, dead-ends, and things that can bring awareness of explanatory gaps for the mind-body philosophy being discussed.

 

Table of Contents:

 

A1. - What is Epiphenomenalism?

B1. - Dissipation

B2. - Questions in Context of Dissipation

C1. - Possession/Switching

C2. - Questions in Context of Possession/Switching

 

A1. What is Epiphenomenalism?

 

Epiphenomenalism is the view that mental events are caused by physical events in the brain' date=' but have no effects upon any physical events.[/quote']

 

Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

 

Some analogues for this:

 

- Epiphenomenalism can be viewed as a one-way type of dualism vs. a two-way dualism. In other words, physical events can initiate mental events, but not the other way around.

o a. This implies there’s an embracing of dualism.

o b. The mental events do not exert an action, or in other words, future physical events aren’t necessarily contingent on past mental events.

o c. Mental events are an emergent property occurring after physical events have initiated.

 

- Sensations (e.g. sense of a burn, stubbing your toe, etc.) would be a by-product of something that’s contingent of more perplexing physical processes that initiated them.

 

 

As you can see, when trying to put this in context with tulpas, we may have some dead-ends and confusion:

 

B1. Dissipation

The process of a mind fading from existence' date=' becoming less distinct and sentient over time. Sometimes happens to young tulpae starved of attention or stimuli.[/quote']

 

Now, to interpret this definition from an epiphenomenalist’s perspective:

 

- They would agree that dissipation at best, would be purely mental, and that said mental event cannot cause physical events (e.g. an excruciating pain in one’s brain, feeling a “slice” of their brain being cut off)

 

- This would mean that should an individual adopt an epiphenomenalist viewpoint, they would not see dissipation as a stigma, or even ethically wrong in context of the experience being physically hurtful after the mental event has occurred. Now, this doesn’t mean the individual in question would be apathetic towards the fading in and out of a tulpa’s implicit existence, it’s just that they may be in denial of the experience having a physical affect towards them; if anything, they may deem it as symbolic, psychosomatic, and things of that nature.

 

 

 

- However, this doesn’t mean they’re absolved from querying whether or not that tulpa’s presumed sentience has just as much potency as they do, and how they as a host developed an experiential learning of things with this spatio-temporal reality.

 

B2. Questions in Context of Dissipation

 

1. Because this philosophy presumes that mental events are contingent on physical events, and not vice versa, do you feel one would be compelled to make contingencies in the event dissipation is considered from the host and/or tulpa?

 

2. Do you really feel that the actual “process” of dissipation is purely mental that has no casual effect physically?

 

3. Is the “process” of dissipation really a series of underlying physical processes from the brain creating the mental event of the situation? Or, do you feel it’s an experience (e.g., by-product) of the actual physical process occurring? (Feel free to treat your answers as theorizing rather than having to have empirical evidence, and what have you to make it plausible)

 

4. Do you feel an epiphenomenalist would lose novelty towards sustaining the existence of tulpas being treated as sentient, volitional entities if their (tulpa’s) existence is purely mental?

 

5. Do you feel that said philosophy is just an outright denial of the existence of thought in general?

 

 

C1.Possession/Switching

Possession

When a tulpa controls part or all of their host body.

Switching

Letting the tulpa take full control of the body while the host enters a tulpa-like state.

 

Focusing more on switching, since possession could be deemed as a stepping stone for switching:

 

- If the epiphenomenalist agrees with the one-way dualism of mental events being contingent on physical events:

 

o a. They may theorize that the actual shift in awareness from this reality to an imaginative state would entail some physical processes as the underpinnings in causing the mental event. However, a dead-end is introduced on how a tulpa would take full dominion of the body while the host is in a tulpa-esque state.

 

1. They would be skeptical of a tulpa taking control in context of also accessing information, predispositions, and such of neural underpinnings that contribute to physical actions (e.g. walking, typing, etc.). They may even flat out deny possession and switching even being something that can be done in the first place without speculating the ontological presumptions, i.e., the nature of their being, of them as a host shifting towards an imaginative state entering a tulpa-esque bpdy, or mental version of their body, or even whatever body they want to project themselves into.

 

2. They may presume the tulpa-esque body may have more metaphorical connotations than strictly being defined as related to a tulpa’s experience vs. the shift they take to take control of the host’s body.

 

 

3. If they were to still believe in switching being probably, this would raise speculation of their (host) nature of being capable of transitioning from observing this reality to a virtual experiential reality in their mind. They may question if their internal, private experience is really as unique from the rest of their mind. If a tulpa can access those underpinnings in context of switching, it would entail that:

 

• a. The mental existence of a tulpa can make a difference in causing physical events in this reality.

 

• b. The mental existence of a tulpa is undermined as mental, and ends up being treated as having just as much efficacy is causing physical events (re: look up what is presumed to treat a tulpa a sentient). So, the question of mental events causing physical events is either denied, the person being distracted from making an inference, or the person with the epiphenomenalist mindset rejects the philosophy entirely.

 

C2. Questions in Context of Possession/Switching

 

1. If the philosophy implies that mental events cannot cause physical events, what do you feel switching entails about the capability of tulpas in which one treats them as sentient, and potentially volitional entities?

 

2. Do you feel that this expands an opportunity for a tulpa to be part of a map of accessing those neural processes and predispositions in initiating physical events?

 

 

3. Do you feel a tulpa’s implicit internal, and even private experience to some is just as real as the host’s?

 

4. What does this entail about varieties of imposition (e.g. visual, auditory)?

 

5. Would the person adopting this mindset still be convinced that the existence of thought having causation in something being false?

 

6. Would a tulpa really feel assured that they have qualia; an internal, subjective experience as the host does? Does this entail that a tulpa is more than just a mental projection, and more so of someone that has potential in being a volitional entity of implicit sentience? Is our qualia merely an emergent property as well? Should we just throw the acceptance of self out of the window with this mindset?

 

 

If possible, feel free to localize the mindset in different circumstances, even if it may be incoherent, and creates dead-ends.

 

Do you feel the mindset in general can create a flourishing interaction with a tulpa?

[Luminesce]

You sure wrote a lot there, which almost makes me feel bad for replying. You asked for it though so I have to.

 

To be completely honest, as much as it feels wrong to discredit such an explored philosophy, I just don't understand how it could be considered rational. I thought we generally agreed mental and physical events were the same thing? That physical events create what we experience as reality and consciousness, and that thinking is more interactions with physicality, but in the end they are one and the same. The only way you could not think this way is if you believe in a more metaphysical answer, that consciousness is entirely separate from anything physical. And to me, besides being nonsensical, I just don't see any reason you'd choose to believe such in the first place. Why skip over the more likely theory, no matter how undetailed or really explorable it is, for one that defies our current understanding of reality?

 

Unfortunately I can't even discuss half of what you wrote about, because it just makes no sense to me, and it makes me feel bad because (what I see as) assumptions were made in order to explore the subject very in-depth. So much so that while it doesn't make any sense to me, I can't even say with much sureness that it's not logically possible..? Still, my personal view is that there is no separation of mental and physical, and that renders a lot of the questions you wrote about null. Not unworthy of discussion themselves, but in relation to epiphenomenalism. Regardless of my beliefs on how switching or awareness on the tulpa's part works, epiphenomenalism doesn't really come into play because it's still just physical things causing physical effects, being perceived as "mental." But, yeah, writing that sure does sound like it's not any more founded than the other view. Does our current understanding of reality really support the idea that physicality can affect something we call "mental", without allowing the reverse? The idea that physicality creates something non-physical called "thoughts" that are actually persistent enough that we can perceive them flowing and making sense... and yet are completely not a physical phenomenon and therefore cannot interact back with physicality.. I must be missing something integral here, because I can't see how that's supposed to make any sense. Is it implied that we physically come to the same conclusions as we do mentally following the thoughts, and the thought "explaining" why it leads to another runs parallel to the physical process where they're both in sync in the end? Or is it implied there's an extremely small time unit at which the physical aspect contributes to the mental aspect continuously and that each what-have-you time unit is unreliant on the previous, and it only appears to be fluid in our perception of it?

 

Well, I hope I'm entertaining you, because I'm completely lost. I don't think I could follow what I just said if I read it again, and I'm honestly not very concerned with the answer. Like I said, it seems inconsequential to me anyway, but I guess philosophy isn't about coming to solid, useful answers. Just exploring the world of thought. Without a driving motivation, I can't really keep up, but the effort you put into writing the OP inspired me to say something. Too bad that something was sort of a killjoy.

[Linkzelda]

You sure wrote a lot there' date=' which almost makes me feel bad for replying. You asked for it though so I have to.[/quote']

 

You think this is a lot from me? I’ve written much longer, so it’s not a bother. By the way, it’s probably obvious that I don’t agree with this philosophy because it cannot even reconcile with itself when taken in context with tulpas. But it was intended to see that because of the dead-end, others would give their thoughts on matters where one would not be as critical this way towards certain concepts, e.g., switching for instance. Though, it doesn't seem to be an incentive to deeply think on what switching entails.

 

I thought we generally agreed mental and physical events were the same thing?

 

Just to make sure, I was merely playing devil’s advocate in the OP. I have a feeling you think I feel this philosophy is even rational in the first place. IIRC, the PETT main thread mentioned fixating more on the concept at hand vs. the person themselves to avoid personal attacks.

 

That physical events create what we experience as reality and consciousness' date=' and that thinking is more interactions with physicality, but in the end they are one and the same.[/quote']

 

Is it implied that we physically come to the same conclusions as we do mentally following the thoughts' date=' and the thought "explaining" why it leads to another runs parallel to the physical process where they're both in sync in the end? Or is it implied there's an extremely small time unit at which the physical aspect contributes to the mental aspect continuously and that each what-have-you time unit is unreliant on the previous, and it only appears to be fluid in our perception of it?[/quote']

 

Which begs the question, does the philosophy entail that we cannot know ourselves (I think we know the answer to this)? Note, this philosophy could be treated as someone who was heavily skeptical towards the concept of tulpas, and felt their existence had no casual efficacy in some way; like those who may objectify their presence in the sense that they don’t really exist beyond imagination. In other words, it’s easier for them to lash out on the gaps with conceptualizing tulpas, but when turned around to apply on themselves, it leads to self-stultification.

 

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epiphenomenalism/#SelStu

 

So you being completely confused by this probably supports this notion, so don’t feel too bad. The thing about this philosophy is that it tries to reconcile with materialism and non-material related philosophies (i.e., the end result being a one-way dualism instead of a two-way dualism where physical and mental can go back and forth in explanation). That physical events cause mental events that are an emergent property from that, and yet implying that something immaterial is one room above completely absolved from being casually efficient. Again, it’s a one-way dualism with a one-track mind. Ironically, if mental events cannot cause our knowledge of thought in context of epiphenomenalism, then the philosophy, as I mentioned above, is probably a denial of the existence of thought having any causality with anything. Physical events being the contingent in mental events, and even houses it, but mental events not being able to do the same; otherwise, it would've leaned more towards immaterial-related philosophies.

 

Too bad that something was sort of a killjoy.

 

This was just a warm-up, but I have intentions for things that can be reconciled with; trial-and-error, my friend.