PETT – Anti-Natalism: Deterrent from Creating a Tulpa

[Linkzelda]

PETT – Anti-Natalism: Deterrent from Creating a Tulpa

 

Disclaimer: I’m playing devil’s advocate with this philosophy, so fixate more on the concept at hand for further discussion, if there can be any.

 

Table of Contents

A1. What is Anti-Natalism?

A2. What is a Normative Ethic?

 

B1. Putting Anti-Natalism in Context of Tulpas - Scenario #1: Newcomer’s Inquisition

B2. Questions for Scenario #1

 

 

 

A1. What is Anti-Natalism?

 

From Wikipedia

"Antinatalism is a philosophical position that assigns a negative value to birth, standing in opposition to natalism."

 

• For the purpose of this thread, we’re taking it in context of creation of thought-forms vs. symbolic representations of procreation/reproduction to achieve that. We could talk about other symbolic ways of creating a tulpa, but you hopefully, you get my point.

 

• Anti-natalism, when applied to tulpas for this thread, is merely about it being a deterrent from one creating a tulpa. I’ll introduce a scenario, but this doesn’t mean it has to stop there. Hopefully, a question of ethics, and the course of action(s) one can take when choosing, or not to create a tulpa can be introduced.

 

• To extend on it being treated as a deterrent, one could imply that by treating a tulpa as sentient:

 

a. There is potential for them to experience suffering in some way if they’re implicitly conceptualized as being able to perceive and feel.

 

A2. What is a Normative Ethic?

 

"Normative ethics is the study of ethical action. It is the branch of philosophical ethics that investigates the set of questions that arise when considering how one ought to act, morally speaking."

 

• To put that into context before we start the scenario, we could refer to guides, and just general discussions of how people go about theorizing a proper course of action to be taken to flourish with a tulpa.

 

• To some extent, we all end up creating our own normative ethics, i.e., how one “ought” to assess themselves with the endeavor of tulpas altogether. Some try to make their course of action(s) sounder than the other, and some get to the point where they feel tethered by it. However, this doesn’t mean they’re not open-minded for other courses of actions to speculate about, but there can be a tendency for dogma to run rampant that blocks those alternatives.

 

B1. Putting Anti-Natalism in Context of Tulpas - Scenario #1: Newcomer’s Inquisition

 

This scenario entails the following, but feel free make extensions on this, or entirely new ones if you want to:

 

• The newcomer hasn’t gone through a course of action in creating a tulpa, but is currently investigating on information for doing that.

 

• They read guide submissions, and threads where there’s a mix of people leaning more on reasons not to create a tulpa vs. reasons to create a tulpa, and figuring out if the pragmatic value localized in each party is sound enough for them to take a step higher

 

• They stumble upon several guide submissions that mention reasons not to make a tulpa, but said submission also tries to balance that.

 

• The submitter assigns negative value towards the creation of tulpa, such as, but not limited to:

 

 

a. Feeling that the emotional investment with fluctuating with skepticism, applying good faith, and such when creating a tulpa may not be for those with of the faint of heart

 

b. Potential anguish may arise, (e.g. existential crisis, apprehension over the meaning of their existence, finding a sense of self to call their own, etc.)

 

c. The individual may be motivated by fleeting thoughts instead of building a structure of a course of action to take to persevere, and can be consistent in spite of things that may come in the future (e.g. losing novelty in the endeavor, feeling the burden on their shoulders when figuring out how they can live with a tulpa). In other words, transitory desires that one refers to like how they live paycheck to paycheck may not be an ideal course of action, and thus may not have a suitable mindset in creating a tulpa.

 

So from the scenario above, let’s say the newcomer makes these inferences towards reasons not to create a tulpa:

 

- Creating a tulpa entails that a moral dilemma would ensue.

 

- This impasse can be avoided if being created can be avoided.

 

- Ergo, anti-natalism may be deemed as a useful deterrent, in context of being within a host’s mind.

 

B2. Questions for Scenario #1

 

1. For individuals that promote anti-natalistic justifications, does this entail that their reasoning is really more of a demand for others, in this circumstance the newcomer, to conform to their feelings about life and suffering?

 

2. While said anti-natalistic statements seem to have good intentions to claim compassion towards the dilemma, should those advocates really be the judge of who exists within one’s internal, private experience?

 

3. Do they have any right to place blame on those that created tulpas, and had a series of unfortunate events?

 

4. What about those that were able to come to peace with solutions, and moved on from those problems? Was it morally wrong for them to make a moral commitment in undertaking the burdensome task of compassionate acts with tulpas?

 

5. Should the newcomer feel that reading the anecdotes of others’ anguish, for better or for worse is sufficient vs. taking the commitment with the seemingly burdensome task of developing a tulpa?

 

6. Do you feel that anti-natalistic statements are thus enforcing a dogma towards the sentiment (e.g. the attitude with suffering and life) vs. the entity, in context of this scenario that has yet to be created? Is there any point in moralizing towards someone who has yet to exist within their cognition?

 

a. An example for those that need context: Let’s say someone wanted to advocate, or be militantly against the creation of some mythological creature. They can invest all they want on how much one should conform to their beliefs on the matter, but no one has done anything moral, or immorally wrong because said creatures have yet to exist.

[NoneFromHell]

While these threads are generally interesting, i think it is probably a bit too much. It feels like we need to pass a test for class, and this will probably keep a lot people away from answering, or even reading the whole thing. Well atleast i will try to go for a statement on some of these.

 

2. Technically no, since it is really a private decision (or problem), which shouldn't be regulated as long as it isn't influencing the surroundings on the outside in a bad way. Of course thinks may differ when you expect that the new being in your head to suffer, simply because you create it. If you truly know that the bad things in its life will overrun its good experiences, there would be a reason to blame, atleast for the tulpa itself.

 

3. No. That justification would be like "You did drugs, so you're the one to blame", which roots out of the knowledge that this can only go down a bad path. I don' think you could really do something like that in our case. Observing the reality shows that this bad path is just one option and people can get a lot out of it, hosts and tulpas. You can't blame people for trying to archive something good, willing to undertake the needed commitment, simply because it turned out bad. You can't blame people building houses, because a storm could rip them apart again.

 

4. Absolutely nothing wrong with that.

 

5. That's a weird question. I think both sides would be equally valuable for getting a good perspective, be that to decide to create a tulpa or not. I think it would be a mistake to take the commitment simply because you feel that you should. You can neither blame those who create a tulpa, and those who decide that they don't want to do so.

 

I leave the rest empty and wait for the final score on my test ;-)

[waffles]

1. For individuals that promote anti-natalistic justifications, does this entail that their reasoning is really more of a demand for others, in this circumstance the newcomer, to conform to their feelings about life and suffering?

 

2. While said anti-natalistic statements seem to have good intentions to claim compassion towards the dilemma, should those advocates really be the judge of who exists within one’s internal, private experience?

 

3. Do they have any right to place blame on those that created tulpas, and had a series of unfortunate events?

 

You're really just asking whether they should really be passing moral judgement; they're anti-natalists, so yes, of course they're going to promote what's apparently morally right and blame people when they do things that are apparently morally wrong. These questions could be asked about pretty much any idea with the same answers.

 

 

4. What about those that were able to come to peace with solutions, and moved on from those problems? Was it morally wrong for them to make a moral commitment in undertaking the burdensome task of compassionate acts with tulpas?

 

Well of course. If they chose to make a tulpa, which at the time had a negative expected value, and got lucky, that's morally irresponsible. If they had good reason to believe they would be atypical, then I guess it's just decision-theoretically reckless. But, again, not actually relevant to the idea itself.

 

 

Let’s say someone wanted to advocate, or be militantly against the creation of some mythological creature. They can invest all they want on how much one should conform to their beliefs on the matter, but no one has done anything moral, or immorally wrong because said creatures have yet to exist.

 

Well, of course. That's pretty much the foundation of natalism vs antinatalism. You have to be thinking about beings that don't yet exist, and talk about their creation. Actually, whether or not the creature exists is irrelevant, because all you're doing is saying, "We expect its life, if created, to be net negative, so creating it is immoral." You have an expected value for creation itself, at which point things are pretty simple. It's just that doing that would be immoral, and not doing it would be moral.

 

 

---

 

 

Anyway, the topic's interesting. But in a more tulpa-specific view, is antinatalism really very plausible here? I don't think you came up with any really good justifications that are comparable to actual antinatalist reasoning. I mean, you're just saying that the host might be mildly discomforted. I think you might be underselling it with

There is potential for them to experience suffering in some way if they’re implicitly conceptualized as being able to perceive and feel.

Well, yeah, you can't really ignore that, can you. As long as you think your tulpas have the capacity for suffering, that's bound to outweigh considerations on the part of the host. I mean, do you really think what most hosts 'go through' is that bad? It's really not like raising a child. You'd probably argue that the host is mildly net positive, but it's irrelevant because it's quite small in comparison, regardless of sign.

 

When it comes to the values of the tulpas' lives, you can already rule out a lot of potential negatives by tulpas not having, well, a body. There's no physical pain (unless empathetic, or chosen, I guess). No obligations (or, shared with their host). And so on. Where I'm going with this is that if you're natalist on humans, you're bound to be natalist on tulpas because, really, there's nothing horrible in the mix there.

 

And that's kind of an issue, right? I mean, now you gotta make lots of tulpas, because it's moral. You gotta keep making them until the marginal value of a tulpa is negative; where the addition of another tulpa makes everything worse, on net. Where do you think that will tend to be? For a mind full of sensible and responsible people, it might be double digits.

[Hierophant]

1. For individuals that promote anti-natalistic justifications, does this entail that their reasoning is really more of a demand for others, in this circumstance the newcomer, to conform to their feelings about life and suffering?

Yes. You're making some claims, like "existential crises are bad", while are crucial to your arguments, and presenting them as premises. But this is not necessarily true - it's easy to argue that existential crises are a part of growing up and maturing, and therefore a positive experience.

 

2. While said anti-natalistic statements seem to have good intentions to claim compassion towards the dilemma, should those advocates really be the judge of who exists within one’s internal, private experience?

No. Thought Police is bad.

 

3. Do they have any right to place blame on those that created tulpas, and had a series of unfortunate events?

They're entitled to nothing more than an "I told you so"(and even that might be pretty asshole-ish, depending on circumstance). Blaming someone for trying out something awesome and having the thing blow up their face is a terrible idea.

 

4. What about those that were able to come to peace with solutions, and moved on from those problems? Was it morally wrong for them to make a moral commitment in undertaking the burdensome task of compassionate acts with tulpas?

No. It doesn't hurt anyone, nor is the person in question acting like a dick.

 

5. Should the newcomer feel that reading the anecdotes of others’ anguish, for better or for worse is sufficient vs. taking the commitment with the seemingly burdensome task of developing a tulpa?

Both are good. I should note that reading some negative experiences with tulpas(specifically Hound's story of how he killed his own tulpa) only reaffirmed and amplified my commitment to my own tulpas.

 

6. Do you feel that anti-natalistic statements are thus enforcing a dogma towards the sentiment (e.g. the attitude with suffering and life) vs. the entity, in context of this scenario that has yet to be created? Is there any point in moralizing towards someone who has yet to exist within their cognition?

There is a point in moralizing towards hypotheticals; that's called thought experiments. It's important and reveals stuff about your philosophical beliefs, preferences and so on.

[Linkzelda]

It feels like we need to pass a test for class' date=' and this will probably keep a lot people away from answering, or even reading the whole thing. Well atleast i will try to go for a statement on some of these.[/quote']

 

Think of it as a participation grade, if you will.

 

2. Technically no' date=' since it is really a private decision (or problem), which shouldn't be regulated as long as it isn't influencing the surroundings on the outside in a bad way. Of course thinks may differ when you expect that the new being in your head to suffer, simply because you create it. If you truly know that the bad things in its life will overrun its good experiences, there would be a reason to blame, atleast for the tulpa itself.[/quote']

 

I feel I’ve created ambiguity when I mentioned that they can have the potential for suffering. Within context of what goes on in our head, the “suffering” itself would essentially be some kind of inner turmoil going on. Nothing physical, as others pointed out later on in the thread, but still, the seemingly burdensome task of figuring out what it means to be sentient can be mentally taxing. Although mental exhaustion may not always equate to physical pain, there could be a brand of self-delusions in place when you mentioned how one could “expect” them to have that potential to suffer.

 

Which leads me to bring the point of treating them as sentient. The individual isn’t necessarily expecting their tulpa to be foaming in their mouths, experiencing psychosomatic experiences, or feeling a sense of anguish 24/7. It’s merely an acknowledgement of the potential, and knowing that it doesn’t dictate the future for the tulpa in question. So to expound on how just creating a tulpa would entail deeper investigation on certain courses of action, it could lead the newcomer into believing that they have to temporarily refrain from referring to their short-term desires of making one, and thus get into deep, introspective thought.

 

5. That's a weird question.

 

Exactly. But, I’m going to emphasize on how certain attitudes and reactions the newcomer could use that may make them think otherwise.

 

Which leads to question #5 on whether or not being prepared mentally along with acknowledging the experiential learning and anecdotes of others is sufficient in decision-making:

- Makes the newcomer deter from creating a tulpa altogether because of how they react when weighing in the good and bad that may come of it, and how others find their own way of coping it.

 

- They see that maybe the potential suffering is actually a useful learning experience for both them and the soon-to-be-tulpa. They realize that perceiving, feeling, even if there may not be potency in the physical sense, is how they can go about developing their implicit sentience. The mentally taxing tasks of compassionate acts of trying to be there for them, and fostering whatever relationship in mind (e.g. comradery) helps them develop empathy. This seems to be a key revelation here vs. just having sympathy for those people, but no experience in doing it whatsoever.

 

 

What I’m getting at with the anti-natalist statements is that in the scenario where others lean more towards the negative assertion of birth (within context of creation of tulpas, and not how human procreate):

 

- Because they may create an agenda for people to conform to the thought that they shouldn’t create a tulpa because of potential suffering, they could just be referring to how they felt during the experience, and don’t want others to feel the same way; like having an obligation to be a hero when what could really entail “suffering,” is merely just being apprehensive about their existence, and questioning how they should assess their lives. But suffering isn’t solely contingent on whether or not a person can reflect on questions; they can choose to give zero shits in speculating about them, or place their own brand of self-delusion that it would lead to excruciating, physical pain. Granted, mental exhaustion is there, but that’s temporary at best.

 

 

You can't blame people for trying to archive something good' date=' willing to undertake the needed commitment, simply because it turned out bad. You can't blame people building houses, because a storm could rip them apart again.[/quote']

 

So essentially, in spite of the potential of suffering, there is also something to learn from those tribulations. And that wanting archive something good, e.g., for a better future for both of them, is worthy enough to go through those burdensome tasks with treating them as sentient. I guess this reminds me of others that admit that while their initial desires for making a tulpa may seem selfish at first, they do normally want good intentions for the sake of continuing to archive something good from the endeavor.

 

4. Absolutely nothing wrong with that.

 

Which leads me to introduce that one of anti-natalism’s premises is to alleviate potential suffering. And people fixing solutions rather than distracting themselves from making a course of action is part of what they would endorse.

 

 

 

 

Anyway, the topic's interesting. But in a more tulpa-specific view, is antinatalism really very plausible here?...

Well, yeah, you can't really ignore that, can you. As long as you think your tulpas have the capacity for suffering, that's bound to outweigh considerations on the part of the host. I mean, do you really think what most hosts 'go through' is that bad? It's really not like raising a child. You'd probably argue that the host is mildly net positive, but it's irrelevant because it's quite small in comparison, regardless of sign.

 

Understandable, as one of the main focuses would be on humans in particular. However, the anti-natalistic viewpoint isn’t constrained on humans alone. It could apply to any sentient being, though, I wouldn’t bother discussing about animals in particular; we’d call those people environmentalists instead.

 

The idea is that even though the reasoning may not resonate with tulpas, it’s just something that hasn’t been challenged since there’s little to no discussion about what goes on inwardly vs. entities that are born in this reality. To question whether it’s plausible for the concept of tulpas is to question to what extreme we go when treating them as sentient beings. The viewpoint isn’t constrained on children, or being treated as children, but whoever could be considered a sentient, volitional entity.

 

Do we objectify the existence of a tulpa as something less of us? Does treating them as sentient lose its potency in how we end up treating them? Do we structure our ethical framework differently if a tulpa isn’t considered someone we need to take precautions to help alleviate future anguish and tribulations? In other words, are they to be treated less than human beings? And are they to be treated as sentient anymore if this may be considered a dead-end, or going too far down the line?

 

When it comes to the values of the tulpas' lives, you can already rule out a lot of potential negatives by tulpas not having, well, a body. There's no physical pain (unless empathetic, or chosen, I guess). No obligations (or, shared with their host). And so on. Where I'm going with this is that if you're natalist on humans, you're bound to be natalist on tulpas because, really, there's nothing horrible in the mix there.

 

And that's kind of an issue, right? I mean, now you gotta make lots of tulpas, because it's moral. You gotta keep making them until the marginal value of a tulpa is negative; where the addition of another tulpa makes everything worse, on net. Where do you think that will tend to be? For a mind full of sensible and responsible people, it might be double digits.

 

Now, you bring up a good point about the physical pain. Clearly, in this case, mental events that are presumed that they were in pain are at best merely psychosomatic, or to even be more cynical, a brand of self-delusion on their end. Maybe they were just referring to past emotional states the host has (e.g. trying to garner empathy) to express themselves in some way, even though they may not really be feeling pain potent enough as physical pain.

 

Now, for the part where you mentioned being natalist on humans means one is bound to be natalist on tulpa:

 

- This may imply that we’re predisposed to do so, which mean it might be an intrinsic attribute, or at least one cultivated in a subjective sense.

 

I don’t necessarily, for the sake of playing devil’s advocate, agree that being natalist for humans entails being natalist for tulpas. For all I know, I could be a natalist when it comes to humans since I cannot control, or influence substantially the existence of those future individuals brought into this world. However, when taken inwardly, I would assume that I have a bit more reigning capability into structuring how I go about treating a thought-form as sentient, and could be an anti-natalist.

 

My action-to-id, e.g. any actions I take to foster their presumed sentience and sense of being, cannot be influenced by anyone else other than what goes on in my head. I would even go so far into believing that they can’t, via hypnosis, substantially change that since it comes down to me wanting that to be the case, and that is merely just self-hypnosis in the end (just throwing an example). And to potentially prevent a cognitive dissonance with so many future tulpas, i.e., having someone that’s part of my psyche/whatever metaphorical representation people may use., I may favor humans being procreated in context of them having the opportunity to revel in quotidian lifestyles while I set constraints on how many tulpas I have for the sake of flourishing mentally, and not letting things blow out of proportion.

 

However, this doesn’t mean the anti-natalist would presume more tulpas equals stripping away one’s very sanity. It just becomes more burdensome to some degree even if a person went through methods to be emotionally dexterous.

 

And that's kind of an issue' date=' right? I mean, now you gotta make lots of tulpas, because it's moral. You gotta keep making them until the marginal value of a tulpa is negative; where the addition of another tulpa makes everything worse, on net. Where do you think that will tend to be? For a mind full of sensible and responsible people, it might be double digits.[/quote']

 

It may entail something moral, but not as something that needs to be taken as a normative ethic, i.e., one ought to make more tulpas because it’s a moral thing to do (e.g. balancing some net gain, or loss). There’s a big difference in being liberal about people doing it, and one thing to make it into a potential dogma that they “ought” to do it. That’s the thing with natalists—they make the demand for others to conform to their emotions on the matter, which may cause suffering in some way while the anti-natalist makes no demands. At best, it’s just a “I told you so,” but they’re just buzzwords.

 

The anti-natalist will not necessarily be predisposed into destroying whatever tulpas they may have since the dissipation, albeit a mental experience, still might have a psychological sting and sense of agony either way; not physical, but the thought of it may cause negative emotions to arise. It doesn’t mean the anti-natalist wouldn’t work towards alleviating potential suffering for their tulpa should there be an experience of suffering, anguish, and such. That’s different from treating them as sentient to where suffering is all that they will exist as, and wanting to create a self-fulfilling prophecy that this would be their ultimate purpose.

 

If that were the case, then the anti-natalist is shooting themselves in the foot.

 

I mean' date=' do you really think what most hosts 'go through' is that bad?[/quote']

 

It’s not so much of the anti-natalist feeling a sense of agony and pain at the prospect of there being suffering, but rather the suffering itself. They could simply just ignore potential inner turmoil, but the indifference towards that doesn’t mean it goes away. It’s just ignored, and potentially repressed/suppressed, and it may come back to haunt them, but it’s probably shifted into a form of apprehension to where they can be like “meh, whatever.”

 

Our judgement doesn’t matter either way—whatever pain they may experience (in context of mental), is bad either way. People can make an opinion that the pain can be good, but that’s just their opinion. Their opinions don’t alleviate the issue, but rather, dodge the potential issue.

 

 

Yes. You're making some claims' date=' like "existential crises are bad", while are crucial to your arguments, and presenting them as premises. But this is not necessarily true - it's easy to argue that existential crises are a part of growing up and maturing, and therefore a positive experience. [/quote']

 

I glanced over the OP, and I haven’t introduced an existential crisis as being excruciatingly bad, and I wasn’t using it as a trump card either. I used it as an example of what the newcomer would react and speculate about. I cannot control what emotions may arise in them acknowledging potential existential crises since they can assess whatever anguish anyway they can with their soon-to-be-tulpa. I would agree to your statement of said crises being a heuristic for potential growth if the host, in this scenario, has tools of assessment in fostering that course of action being done.

 

But, it’s not like people are predisposed to figure out ways to assess these issues without experiencing the apprehension before. An analogue for this could be for someone that may be younger, and may not have had a developed schemata for assessing these things. However, that just leads to another discussion with ageism in particular, but I won’t revel in that.

 

Both are good. I should note that reading some negative experiences with tulpas(specifically Hound's story of how he killed his own tulpa) only reaffirmed and amplified my commitment to my own tulpas.

 

So through the suffering of others, the sympathy is augmented, and creates a stronger conviction to persevere in cherishing their existence within your mind. Fortunately, in your case, you reacted to it a bit more intelligibly than those that might feel they would end up in the same path as the individual mentioned above. But it raises questions on whether or not that acknowledging those cases would make one predisposed, i.e., an intrinsic reaction in creating stronger convictions of sustaining the existence of their tulpas.

 

But I digress, it supports the notion that these matters are dripping with contingency.

 

 

There is a point in moralizing towards hypotheticals; that's called thought experiments. It's important and reveals stuff about your philosophical beliefs' date=' preferences and so on.[/quote']

 

Good point, but do you have an examples of thought experiments we could talk about? I have another scenario I could crack open eventually, but just curious since I don’t have to be the only one to do that.

[waffles]

It may entail something moral, but not as something that needs to be taken as a normative ethic, i.e., one ought to make more tulpas because it’s a moral thing to do (e.g. balancing some net gain, or loss). There’s a big difference in being liberal about people doing it, and one thing to make it into a potential dogma that they “ought” to do it.

 

Well, I know what you're saying here but you're wrong. Yes, people who hold ethical views don't tend to impose them on other people, but it's still normative. There's no difference between saying that an action is moral and that it's normative; what's what morality is. If you believe in antinatalism, you don't confine that to yourself. You think it's a moral standard that everyone should uphold. That you don't go out and evangelise is incidental. It's contingent on how certain you are, how much good you could do by spreading it, how inclined you are to doing it, etc.

 

They're not demands based on emotions (unless you've done the ethics wrong), they're demands for conforming to what you see as the correct (note, correct) thing to be doing. That doing anything else would cause more harm than good, and that doing the opposite is an ongoing preventable global torture (or murder, depends on your side) indicates that you really should be telling other people to conform, if you do believe your position strongly.

 

It doesn't really help anyone to point out that you don't have to impose your morality on others, because, as with the "should you judge" series of questions (they might be the same ones, more or less?), it's not much to do with the ethical ideas at hand. How much a position should be imposed is just a function of the things I said above, which all combine into

• How much you could help the situation by imposing it.
  

I guess it shouldn't be surprising that asking questions about ethics gives you consequentialist answers.

 

More importantly, the actual ethical ideas at hand aren't affected by this question. The question of natalism vs antinatalism is not affected by whether you should tell your friends about the answer at parties. Or run billboard ads telling people to have/not have kids, or whatever. You figure out what's morally correct, and then you work out how best to get everyone to do that.

 

Besides which, depending on your position, the question could be purely empirical. Unless you do weird things like saying "life is intrinsically awesome/terrible", in this day and age you're bound to be looking at the expected ethical gain/cost of a live, in terms of suffering/happiness. And in that case, natalists and antinatalists would agree on what they want (to maximise gain/minimise cost), but disagree on what option achieves that. Of course there are complications, like whether you can actually compare happiness to suffering and add it all up. But given the way people usually argue about that kind of question, they get treated as empirical, or at least logical, so you can still convince people of your position. And it makes sense to say that one is 'more right' than another, with respect to some vague humanist ideal.

 

TL;DR: all ethics is normative ethics, kind of. At least, there's no "What we should maybe do except let's not actually tell people to do it" branch of ethics.

 

 

I don’t necessarily, for the sake of playing devil’s advocate, agree that being natalist for humans entails being natalist for tulpas. For all I know, I could be a natalist when it comes to humans since I cannot control, or influence substantially the existence of those future individuals brought into this world. However, when taken inwardly, I would assume that I have a bit more reigning capability into structuring how I go about treating a thought-form as sentient, and could be an anti-natalist.

 

Not sure what you mean here. You "could" be an antinatalist, but that doesn't have any bearing on "should". Unless you're saying that having those capabilities means your tulpas are gonna have worse lives, or something?

 

But what you say later, I agree with. Yes, you're not under any obligation to have so many tulpas you collapse under the weight. You'd be hard-pressed to find natalists who value birth so much they would do it in absolutely any circumstance. The sane model of natalism I have in my head, where tulpa lives tend to have positive value, would just tell you to have as many as it takes to get to the point where an additional tulpa life is net negative.

 

Though, 'preferring' to have human lives 'instead' is a bit weird, because really, you can totally do both. If you're natalist on both, you should just try to maximise both.

 

Also, the corollary of "human natalism -> tulpa natalism" is "tulpa antinatalism -> human antinatalism". So as long as you're still on board with the "tulpa life > human life" idea, you can't really be antinatalist on tulpas and natalist on hosts. I guess you might be using these terms a little more softly; you're referring to a position where you're in a specific situation and are (anti)natalist in that specific situation, which refers to whether you think procreation is a good idea in that specific situation. Meanwhile I (and I think the usual usage) would refer to (anti)natalism as a position, that's really a general attitude across all situations.

 

 

 

It’s not so much of the anti-natalist feeling a sense of agony and pain at the prospect of there being suffering, but rather the suffering itself.

[...]

whatever pain they may experience (in context of mental), is bad either way.

 

Sure, it's "bad", but I'm asking "How bad?" An antinatalist position based on the idea that suffering outweighs happiness in a typical life looks pretty weak if the best example of suffering you have is mild existential dread. And a position of "any suffering at all is too bad to consider" is similarly unintuitive, and you're going to struggle to justify it against a position where actually maybe happiness is good too.

[Linkzelda]

TL;DR: all ethics is normative ethics' date=' kind of. At least, there's no "What we should maybe do except let's not actually tell people to do it" branch of ethics.[/quote']

 

I agree on the part that ethics entails some deriving from rudiments of normative ethics as a heuristic for whatever stance(s) a person is wanting to defend, or go against; even for the sake of creating an ethical theory, and what have you. However, I won’t mention these types in detail (e.g. applied ethics, virtue ethics, and even implications of the utilitarian ethics you mentioned in some of your posts) since you’re giving good contrasts with natalist and anti-natalist, so I thank you for this since this was the point of the whole thread.

 

The only question I have in mind with the “What we should maybe do except let’s not actually tell people to do it”:

 

- What about it being reframed the other way around as – “What we should maybe do except let’s not actually tell people to do it” – in the sense of not telling them in a tonality as if those ethical stances are to be considered universal truths. Since by rejecting there being branches of ethics that would analyze the statement, or at least cohesively reconcile with it, one would be acknowledging that normative ethics is absolved from applied ethics that may want to apply those normative ethical theories towards certain circumstances to see if it’s right or wrong for us to do (e.g. individuals coming to the conclusion that they shouldn’t actually tell people to do it, i.e., they would prefer that they ought not to do it; it’s still a rudiment of a normative ethic, but it can be reconciled in some way with other ethics that I rather not go in detail since we’d be deviating from anti-natalism entirely).

 

TL;DR: I feel there are branches of ethics that could make an inference that “what we should maybe do, except let’s not actually tell people to do it.” Something like applied ethics, which takes normative ethical theories for specific circumstances can be a gateway towards that inference. However, I won’t get into that since we would be talking about those types of ethics instead of mostly anti-natalism.

 

It doesn't really help anyone to point out that you don't have to impose your morality on others, because, as with the "should you judge" series of questions (they might be the same ones, more or less?), it's not much to do with the ethical ideas at hand. How much a position should be imposed is just a function of the things I said above, which all combine into

• How much you could help the situation by imposing it.

 

Right, applied ethics. No argument there.

 

 

An antinatalist position based on the idea that suffering outweighs happiness in a typical life looks pretty weak if the best example of suffering you have is mild existential dread. And a position of "any suffering at all is too bad to consider" is similarly unintuitive' date=' and you're going to struggle to justify it against a position where actually maybe happiness is good too.[/quote']

 

Well, I believe there can be an anti-natalist that would use premises on the idea that one should maximize happiness (e.g. positive utilitarianism), and another having more preference in minimizing pain (e.g. negative utilitarianism). Of course, someone could use concepts from both, but when thought experiments, and other circumstances are introduced, the corollary is not always that one-way. This is how the ambiguity stirs up a bit (e.g. someone seeking to minimize pain if it entails some form of pain to be burdened upon temporarily, or someone wanting to maximize pleasure/happiness if it entails to temporarily initiate significant pain and suffering).

 

Also, anti-natalism doesn’t necessarily entail something of fatalism, which may be based with negative connotations (e.g. the inevitability of suffering one would experience in the reality they exist it). Someone may utilize anti-natalism in conjunction with fatalism, and other “oh doom and gloom” philosophies, but in context of this thread, I won’t be talking about a tulpa’s determined fate whatsoever. Telos is a completely different story, and everything you stated would’ve demolished fatalism philosophy completely.

 

Damn, sorry about that. I got so into the conversation because you made it interesting. I was more focused on the potential, but I guess others seem to lean towards it being an inevitability instead.

 

Sure' date=' it's "bad", but I'm asking "How bad?"[/quote']

I agree that you’re right, when you question “how bad?” in context of scenario #1 where the newcomer is merely on an inquisition hunt for information on tulpas before making a decision to create one, or not. The inference made is that existential dread seems to be the highest at the time for that individual. Which, as you stated, isn’t really all that bad since existential questioning is just a reflection, and doesn’t equate in a person foaming in their mouths, or wanting a lobotomy from excruciating pain. This (the summary you made) is good; it seems that existential dread, once the person realizes it isn’t a big deal as it’s cracked out to be, anti-natalism loses its potency, somewhat.

 

However, what about a different scenario where the dread leads to something more intense?

 

Scenario #2

 

Let’s assume a worst case scenario:

 

- Let’s presume that the host did in fact create a tulpa. They went through the whole trial-and-error, developed experiential learning, and used the course of action of treating them as sentient.

 

- They developed to the point where they can try out possession, and gradually augment their competencies in being proficient in switching.

 

 

- Let’s say the host created certain justifications as to why they should do a long-term switch, or dare I say, a permanent switch with their tulpa.

 

- Granted, both parties have their apprehensions, and trying to reach a compromise, and even considering anecdotes of those that tried doing some like this.

 

 

- Both parties eventually agree that the host’s conviction to do a long-term, or permanent switch is pragmatic in the sense that the tulpa feels confident that they can manage quotidian, i.e., day-to-day, activities. Whether or not the host actively participates in supplementing, or being a major influencing in supporting co-existence is up to the individual.

 

- The tulpa, now taking dominion of the host’s body, and even presumably being capable of consciously experiencing perceptions from that, can be viewed as diving deeper into the realm of what it means for them to be treated as sentient.

 

- This would entail that they now have the capacity to experience the joys and pains of life, but now that the host isn’t reveling in consciously experiencing those perceptions in context of this reality, do you feel the questions can be answered differently? I know you just referred to specific questions I had in mind, but do you think they would have the same bleeding effect to the other questions for this scenario?

 

 

And if you want an extension to this:

 

- Let’s presume the host and tulpa end up agreeing that the long-term switch, or permanent switch, has not been flourishing in context of fulfilling quotidian activities. They make their peace, and fixate more on deviating away from permanent switching. The tulpa is presumed to have had their own share of pains and joys of life, and the host, or tulpa, now question whether or not they should create another tulpa with the added acknowledgement of what went on before with the switching attempt.

 

Thoughts? (Not specifically catered to you, but anyone else that may want to jump in).

[waffles]

- What about it being reframed the other way around as – “What we should maybe do except let’s not actually tell people to do it” – in the sense of not telling them in a tonality as if those ethical stances are to be considered universal truths.

 

Well really, I think that's the same thing. Not "universal truth" but something you think is correct. Sure, there might be a balance to be struck with how assertive you want to be; in my experience, people aren't nearly as assertive as they should be, and I'd rather they were more so. I find it hard to take, say, a vegan seriously when they're OK with me eating meat in front of them. Because I'm, like, chewing on baby animals, and they just don't want to be condescending and morally superior and everything. And most people would say that the average vegan is too assertive.

 

I guess what I'm saying is that I don't feel like you should hold back when it comes to what tone you're speaking in. It's only consistent with, you know, actually believing the thing you're talking about. But I guess if you've had different experiences, like you're used to people moralising to you in the streets or in churches or whatever, you might feel differently about that.

 

 

 

e.g. individuals coming to the conclusion that they shouldn’t actually tell people to do it, i.e., they would prefer that they ought not to do it; it’s still a rudiment of a normative ethic, but it can be reconciled in some way with other ethics

 

Sure, it could be that actually going around and telling people about it orally is a bad idea. I think I said as much somewhere. When I say "tell" I mean it more figuratively, like what we were originally talking about. That you should try to enforce your morality in some way.

 

 

 

Well, I believe there can be an anti-natalist that would use premises on the idea that one should maximize happiness (e.g. positive utilitarianism), and another having more preference in minimizing pain (e.g. negative utilitarianism).

 

Yeah, but those aren't completely different. Really, the difference is focus; that is, both sides would agree on the basic premises of utilitarianism, and just disagree on whether pain is, in practice, going to dominate considerations. So, again, a case for negative utilitarianism is going to look weak when the best example of pain you can come up with is mild existential dread.

 

 

 

dare I say, a permanent switch

[...]

- The tulpa, now taking dominion of the host’s body, and even presumably being capable of consciously experiencing perceptions from that, can be viewed as diving deeper into the realm of what it means for them to be treated as sentient.

 

- This would entail that they now have the capacity to experience the joys and pains of life, but now that the host isn’t reveling in consciously experiencing those perceptions in context of this reality, do you feel the questions can be answered differently?

 

I don't see how this is a 'worst case' scenario, or even a bad case. It seems to be better than not having a tulpa, anyway, just in the sense that both parties apparently agreed that permaswitching would be better. You're saying that here the tulpa definitely becomes sentient in the full ethical sense, and the host goes into the grey area that you put a tulpa in; well, that's really just a straight trade. If anything, this is pretty much the same as a non-switched scenario, except, as I said, the inhabitants seem to have reckoned that it's better this way.

 

And I don't really know what's different in the extension. I guess it didn't work, but, what? Nothing bad really happened there. I don't see how you could construe that either for or against natalism, really.

[Linkzelda]

Thanks for the responses, waffles, means a lot. A lot of contrast for others to see.