PETT – Is Treating A Tulpa As Sentient A Basis For Virtue Ethics?

[Linkzelda]

Disclaimer: This OP is to be treated as playing devil’s advocate. In other words, arguing for arguing’s sake to iron out strengths and weaknesses towards concepts. This shouldn’t be implied that I’m a committed opponent to whatever is presented here, and is merely an introduction for facilitating discussion.

Words to Know

 

What are Virtue Ethics?

 

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Virtue ethics is a broad term for theories that emphasize the role of character and virtue in moral philosophy rather than either doing one’s duty or acting in order to bring about good consequences. A virtue ethicist is likely to give you this kind of moral advice: “Act as a virtuous person would act in your situation.”

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What is Eudaimonia?

 

[hidden]

Eudaimonism (or Eudaemonism or Eudaimonia) is a moral philosophy that defines right action as that which leads to the "well-being" of the individual, thus holding "well-being" as having essential value. It makes up part of the system of Virtue Ethics propounded by the ancient Greek philosphers, in which a lifetime of practising the virtues ("arête") in one's everyday activities, subject to the exercise of practical wisdom ("phronesis") to resolve any conflicts or dilemmas which might arise, will allow the individual to flourish and live the good life ("eudaimonia").

 

The term "eudaimonia" is a classical Greek word, commonly translated as "happiness", but perhaps better described as "well-being" or "human flourishing" or "good life". More literally it means "having a good guardian spirit". Eudaimonia as the ultimate goal is an objective, not a subjective, state, and it characterizes the well-lived life, irrespective of the emotional state of the person experiencing it.

 

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What is Moral Pluralism?

 

[hidden]

In ethics' date=' value pluralism (also known as ethical pluralism or moral pluralism) is the idea that there are several values which may be equally correct and fundamental, and yet in conflict with each other.[/quote'][/hidden]

 

What is a Hypothetical Imperative?

 

[hidden]

A hypothetical imperative is a commandment of reason that applies only conditionally....

 

Hypothetical imperatives tell us how to act in order to achieve a specific goal, e.g. I must study to get a degree.

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Treating a tulpa as sentient seems to be a framework that anyone could work with as a conduit for figuring out how they can apply themselves in doing so. They go through the experiential cases of others, look up on guides, tips, and such as a supplement to hopefully cultivate what it means, to them, to treat a tulpa as sentient. Which may subsequently imply that they may also cultivate a type of disposition in accordance to treating a tulpa as sentient. Figuring out the components of the alternatives in striving for the goal of treating a tulpa as sentient may entail creating a list of virtues, and thus implies that that treating a tulpa as sentient could be a hypothetical imperative for other approaches in ethics (e.g. normative ethics); it becomes a catalyst for habituation (e.g. practicing possession and switching for personal assurance of any unrealized potential of a tulpa being sentient in some way) in reaching certain outcomes (e.g. establishing some kind of Eudaimonia, i.e., flourishing, with a tulpa).

 

Thus, the thread is intended to emphasize on the moral disposition that each, and every one of us may cultivate over time to assess, resolve conflicts, or dilemmas in order to flourish, and live the good life. Virtue ethics isn’t making requirements for one to follow, but is more of opening components that they could take to cultivate whatever disposition they feel is suitable to assess something (e.g. Eudaimonia). Which seems to imply that it would be contingent on subjectivity, case-by-case scenarios, and acknowledging that whatever ethics may be prescribed aren’t presumed to be etched in stone, but fluctuating based on circumstances which becomes a matter of Nuances vs. Dogma.

 

In other words:

- Nuances in analyzing if treating a tulpa as sentient implies adapting to circumstances, and utilizing what we know to assess the situation (which allows discussions on what makes those virtues good to possess.

 

- Dogma in where said analysis becomes a normative set of theories that implies some kind of universal principle(s) to abide to (which seems to restrict discussions over what makes those virtues good to possess.

 

What are your thoughts on this? Do you feel that treating a tulpa as sentient is a basis for virtue ethics? Do you think it’s a framework for a hypothetical imperative? What are some events you feel could tie into virtue ethics? What do you feel are examples of moral pluralism in context of ethical stances with tulpas? Do you feel the framework cultivates dogmas, or adaptability?

 

Don’t feel constrained to these questions, though.

[Brassow]

Yeah it's biased, to consider a tulpa sentient from the start. We consider sentience to be pretty much our equals on this site. When someone first starts making a tulpa, it's improbable for them to be sentient. If you give up without sentience, is it considered abortion or murder? Or is it justified? I go for the third option, as they haven't created something that can think or experience anything. They just decided they didn't want to commit, which is better than a full tulpa becoming neglected over time. Are they sentient at the time? Who knows. I sure don't. But I do know the morality of this community is based on whether or not the tulpa or thought form is sentient. Should they NOT be, there isn't much that needs to be justified, as it's just your imagination.

 

{Dear god my host is a heartless bastard!}

[Linkzelda]

Even though you feel they may be heartless in some way, it brings awareness to some of the impasses, and eureka moments that may come with treating a tulpa as sentient vs. assuming sentience from the start.

 

- Let’s assume treating them as sentient is a hypothetical imperative (e.g. in order for me to treat them as sentient, I must –insert X,Y,Z courses of actions to take-).

 

- They create their own virtues in accordance to that hypothetical imperative, and go through habituation as a guidance for their actions. They realize that after a few months, they become skeptical of any progress of sentience. They may feel that going in accordance with treating them as sentient, they developed the moral disposition of doing anything to sustain this belief, but fall short when they have nothing to reconcile with (e.g. any remnant that may indicate to them that there’s a potential for a tulpa to be sentient).

 

- This apprehension of theirs of whether or not they’re sentient as yet, or at least have a modicum of sentience through the experiential cases the host took part in hopefully fostering that implied state of sentience creates a blank canvas of how they would react, and justify this apprehension (including, but not limited to):

 

 

1. They rationalize the apprehension, and realize that in spite of shortcomings of feeling assured the tulpa could be sentient, they realize that they need to augment their experiential totality, i.e., experiences of them and their tulpa putting things into the right context for the sake of trying to make sense of things. This expansion of knowledge based on rationalizing the apprehension ends up with the realization that assuming sentience from the start doesn’t seem to be a pragmatic approach, or a virtue to add onto that hypothetical imperative (e.g. vs. one of treating them as sentient) simply because they don’t have experiential learning that reconciles with that.

 

2. They rationalize the apprehension, and create the justification that because they’re having a struggle figuring out what to do while having some doubts over their existence, for all that it entails (e.g. being infantile, not developed to be overly concerned about, etc.), they find methodologies that allows them to put their tulpas on hold while the host tries to straighten things out depending on the circumstances. They could look into putting a tulpa into stasis, and other forms of symbolism utilized as a way to put things on hold.

 

3. They may rationalize the apprehension, and create the justification that this isn’t a probable outcome for them; that the whole treating them as sentient becomes a brand of self-delusion, and that there isn’t any potential in them being able to consciously experience whatsoever.

 

I could throw more reactive cases, but I think you could get the point. It ties into the moral pluralism, and how others may realize that these courses of action can be equally pragmatic in context of the virtues the person strives for with treating a tulpa as sentient. People can create reasons as to why those courses of action may be good to possess. However, I don’t think treating them as sentient is the same as assuming sentience from the start. Unless, one presumed it was “treating them as sentient from the start,” then it would be semantical gymnastics.

 

So, taking that clause out of the treating them as sentient, the hypothetical imperative becomes a blank canvas for the host to develop a moral disposition on what it means to be sentient, and how they should treat them as such. And maybe treating them as sentient entails, in context of Brassow’s post, of fostering a virtue that habituation is pragmatic to possess (but not necessarily required) in order to iron out the ambiguity, and apprehension of whether or not a tulpa is sentient to the host.

 

The hypothetical imperative seems to lean more on facilitating individual, and collective well-being (e.g. virtue) while the moral virtue (e.g. anything they feel is a pragmatic judgement) as a guidance, but not necessarily something to absolutely follow; it’s discovered based on the circumstance, and the totality of how they cultivated certain dispositions to tackle a moral dilemma (e.g. neglecting a tulpa due to apprehension, putting them in stasis, or dissipating them altogether).

[Brassow]

Oh boy, a text wall with a requirement of a dictionary on hand.

 

I don't feel like getting out a thesaurus, so I'll be short and to the point.

You make good points and are most likely correct with your observations and such. In some cases, there is no black and white correct answer. Sometimes you gotta make a choice and hope that it's less evil than your other option.

[Linkzelda]

In some cases' date=' there is no black and white correct answer. Sometimes you gotta make a choice and hope that it's less evil than your other option.[/quote']

 

 

So you would agree to moral pluralism being a viable viewpoint for others to consider because it brings awareness of subjectivity, and there being truckloads of grey instead of a black and white split. OK.

 

It seems Good vs. Evil implies something universal going on, but I’m sure you’re referring to inner turmoil that one has to sort out to establish some well-being in the long run. Whatever the case, it seems to bring awareness that virtues in treating them as sentient aren’t necessarily absolute imperatives.

 

So, would “assuming sentience from the start” imply that there’s some kind of absolute imperative going on?

[Luminesce]

So I was thinking about why I should have to actually think to understand what you write as opposed to more simplified text, and then I realized I'm in college. This is good practice for the stuff I'm going to be expected to write essays on later..

 

Off the bat, I'll say that I'm not one to believe in "virtue ethics" not being for "causing good things to come about." Directly maybe not, but the whole point of having these virtues is to positively affect those around you, and theoretically have a better life because of it. If at any point these ethics of virtue became frivolous to me, I would feel no moral obligation to uphold them.

 

That being said, I don't know of any such cases. We can't ever grasp the entirety of our effects on the world around us, so it's unfortunately not up to our conscious decision whether we should act a certain way. Ethics and morals exist for that reason - to set guidelines that will, hopefully, provide a positive effect to the world around you and in turn reflect positivity back at you. That's essentially what I was trying to convey in the last thread - whether or not our tulpas are sentient has nothing to do with how we should treat them, because it's not about the direct effects of our actions but the indirect effects on our selves. So uh, I guess I can keep this short and say "We should treat our tulpas well because of a complicated ripple-effect our actions have on the rest of our lives."

 

 

More specifically...

(lol "keep this short")

Our beliefs on tulpa sentience are more than likely to affect how we treat them, whether it should or not. Generally speaking, we should treat our tulpas well because that may influence how we treat other, real people. But we're humans, we're biased. If you don't think your tulpas are really sentient, you won't treat them the same, even if it's only in small ways. But to be completely honest, as maybe unfulfilling a situation that may be, I honestly don't think it would hurt your general actions in society any more than playing Grand Theft Auto would.

 

Both virtue ethics and moral pluralism give me the same ideas as far as where they may show up in practice, which is to say not many. What really changes when you don't believe your tulpas are sentient? You would probably be less likely to afford them the "basic human rights" or otherwise universal moralities toward living creatures, which in a tulpa's case even assuming a non-abusive host, could actually be bad for the tulpa. If you fullheartedly believe a tulpa is a wholesome person with their own (internal) life, hopes and dreams and such, I kind of doubt you would be very inclined to let your tulpa fade into obscurity or otherwise hurt its ability to do/have what it wants/needs. But I can see someone who really doesn't believe tulpas are sentient having fewer doubts about letting their tulpa become inactive when their life starts to get busy, or otherwise not going out of their way to give their tulpa a rich wealth of experiences. That's the bias - even though said theoretical person considers themselves to behave morally the same, they really don't have the sense of importance in their tulpas' perceived well-being to go far out of their way to maintain it. Of course, this is from the perspective of "all tulpa lives are important." As opposed to the more realistic view, "What people think of the experiences contained entirely in their minds is the truth," which would say that their actions due to said beliefs aren't really immoral at all, just logical.

 

But I guess that's related to the "dogmas" point: when we all assume and imply things should be such-way, we create an environment where you're discouraged from disagreeing. And, maybe, that theoretical person really does need to focus on upcoming college work and hasn't much need for interaction with their tulpas. At that point, forcing our norm of treating tulpas as sentient and living people would only hinder them. But that's why we try and be open and non-forceful about beliefs, here, and I don't think we're in much danger of convincing our theoretical person here that they should view their tulpas differently.

 

Newbies, though. No matter how "But that's just what I believe/subjective" we are, newbies will undoubtedly take most of what we say as fact. Unfortunately, beliefs like this tend to be a trial-by-fire; they cling to what they first learn and must eventually become knowledgeable and experienced enough to disregard the limiting beliefs on their own. That's unavoidable. As a collective source of subjective information, we'll never be able to not accidentally influence newcomers more than we intend. I don't think "assume sentience" is something we can really avoid. It's weird, there's logic and reasoning behind the "assume sentience from the beginning" philosophy, yet its true meaning is lost as it's passed down. And sometimes it ends up causing problems when people assume their 3 hour old tulpa is sentient, when the goal was for them just to not doubt and hinder progress. But I feel like that's another matter of its own. And I've been trying to write this post for 2 hours getting repeatedly distracted by friends and family so my ability to discuss this subject has been gone since the third paragraph.

[Guest Anonymous]

I'll go with it more contextually with whatever people say last, since this is too much brainrape for me atm.

As for sentience, I didn't assume it for Esterina from the start.

She proved her sentience to me very, very quickly though, and seemed highly eager to do so.

 

Which, now, I understand, but initially - like, the very first moment when she told me she wanted to prove herself to me, it was sort of a weird thought.

But now that I understand her nature as "just another person (that happens to live in my head)", it's different.

 

But I wasn't just willing to simply assume or accept that she's sentient without any clarification, proof or hint, no.

That would be sort of presumptuous, I feel... hard to explain.

 

 

Greets,

AG

[Brassow]

 

 

So you would agree to moral pluralism being a viable viewpoint for others to consider because it brings awareness of subjectivity, and there being truckloads of grey instead of a black and white split. OK.

 

It seems Good vs. Evil implies something universal going on, but I’m sure you’re referring to inner turmoil that one has to sort out to establish some well-being in the long run. Whatever the case, it seems to bring awareness that virtues in treating them as sentient aren’t necessarily absolute imperatives.

 

So, would “assuming sentience from the start” imply that there’s some kind of absolute imperative going on?

When I mentioned evil, I guess I could've chosen a better word. Perhaps I could've said "You have to make the choice to cause the least harm." But yeah, I do agree moral pluralism is a considerable viewpoint that needs to be thought about. There's rarely a right and wrong answer out in the real world. Should you make the worse decision, it isn't decided by you, it's determined by others who might label you as "evil", where the term is more or less properly used.

[Linkzelda]

Directly maybe not' date=' but the whole point of having these virtues is to positively affect those around you, and theoretically have a better life because of it. If at any point these ethics of virtue became frivolous to me, I would feel no moral obligation to uphold them.[/quote']

 

[hidden]So, altruism seems to be a major contingency for you in order to be enticed enough to uphold (e.g. keeping a promise to; normative ethics). Now, you’re breaching into a discussion of utilitarianism, i.e., maximizing utility, and what have you, but this is a good contrast from virtue ethics. Your idea of well-being, along with the tulpas that you interact with in your internal, private experience, is to have you all collectively contributing to society in some way to expand the horizon of happiness, and being well-content. Now, you may be referring to utilitarian virtue ethics, but the whole utility index would seem to create an impasse for those that may have not a lot of assurance of their tulpa being capable of bleeding into interaction with others (e.g. via possession, proxying, switching, etc.)

 

Though, I would state that virtue ethics is doing things that in the end would allow someone to flourish, and fixating more on that vs. creating a set of rules that we must categorically follow. It seems the altruistic predispositions behind part of your personal set of virtues sets up questions to how altruistic acts seems like a favorable option to tulpas and hosts in general. What about tulpas where the host seems skeptical of their propensity in being able to consciously experience things; to put into the right context of scenarios of altruism when there’s doubting of that capability to even put things into context?

 

By this logic:

 

- “In order for me to treat them as sentient as sentient, I must (along with other virtues implied)”:

o Cultivate an altruistic disposition that would in turn sustain a ripple effect that reflects back to me, even if doing so is in guise of self-interest vs. altruistic acts with no expectation of getting anything in return.

 

If one were to adopt this as part of their list of virtues to subjectively follow based on the circumstance, the backfiring of the virtue would be the tulpa not being capable to express themselves to others where they feel their existence played some difference in enriching people’s lives. Or, they would embrace the probability of not being recognized for their acts if no one other than the host can be there for them, i.e., an unconditional type of altruism where the individual accepts the chances of not getting anything in return. Since the utilitarian concept of happiness would be a sensational pleasure, i.e., something that becomes publicized. What if there’s individuals that do not want to have said flourishing with tulpas publicized at all? Would that in turn make the virtue of yours seem like an absolute imperative vs. one that could be more flexible, and not contingent on acts of altruism?

 

 

 

However, that virtue for altruistic acts seems just fine when one has come to peace in feeling assured that their tulpas are sentient to some degree. Which would be a useful analogue of how ethics aren't static, but in a flux. In other words, people can refer to said virtues of yours after they had some experiential fallback with their tulpas putting things into context enough to cultivate dispositions of their own. But for those that aren't able to reconcile with that fallback, it's not favorable, for the moment, that is.[/hidden]

 

 

That being said' date=' I don't know of any such cases. We can't ever grasp the entirety of our effects on the world around us, so it's unfortunately not up to our conscious decision whether we should act a certain way. Ethics and morals exist for that reason - to set guidelines that will, hopefully, provide a positive effect to the world around you and in turn reflect positivity back at you. That's essentially what I was trying to convey in the last thread - whether or not our tulpas are sentient has nothing to do with how we should treat them, because it's not about the direct effects of our actions but the indirect effects on our selves. So uh, I guess I can keep this short and say "We should treat our tulpas well because of a complicated ripple-effect our actions have on the rest of our lives."[/quote']

 

But, the virtue of altruism mentioned before seems to imply that there can be some kind of hedonistic, or utilitarian index that can predict and formulate ways to maximize utility in the first. But at the same time, you acknowledge that we can’t grasp the totality of our effects on the world, and that it’s not contingent on our conscious decision to act a certain way. This is where I ask you who really determines what the virtues are? Are they discovered rather than created?

If you fullheartedly believe a tulpa is a wholesome person with their own (internal) life' date=' hopes and dreams and such, I kind of doubt you would be very inclined to let your tulpa fade into obscurity or otherwise hurt its ability to do/have what it wants/needs.[/quote']

Yeah, within context of applying virtue ethics, and the Aristotelian line of thinking, he would agree that one shouldn’t have another’s life diminished as this prevents them from having any opportunity for striving for Eudaimonia.

 

That's the bias - even though said theoretical person considers themselves to behave morally the same' date=' they really don't have the sense of importance in their tulpas' perceived well-being to go far out of their way to maintain it.[/quote']

 

[hidden]Is it really more of a bias vs. it just being a testament of moral pluralism? Does Moral pluralism imply some kind of preferred bias when it’s implied to be several values that can be pragmatic depending on the context of the situation? The sense of importance for a tulpas’ perceived well-being may not even be an important imperative to them simply because of the doubting of sentience, and any potential of them even consciously experiencing things to sustain a well-being in the first place. [/hidden]

 

Newbies' date=' though. No matter how "But that's just what I believe/subjective" we are, newbies will undoubtedly take most of what we say as fact.[/quote']

 

Well, it’s one thing for them to consider it as an epistemic fact that can be validated vs. just subjective truth that’s contingent from person to person.

 

Unfortunately' date=' beliefs like this tend to be a trial-by-fire; they cling to what they first learn and must eventually become knowledgeable and experienced enough to disregard the limiting beliefs on their own. That's unavoidable.[/quote']

 

Because the virtues would be discovered rather than created; through habituation, practice, and such, they cultivate the disposition(s) that allows them to be more receptive through the trial-by-fire.

 

It's weird' date=' there's logic and reasoning behind the "assume sentience from the beginning" philosophy, yet its true meaning is lost as it's passed down.[/quote']

 

[hidden]This is probably because those list of virtues to support the hypothetical imperative of assuming sentience from the start run the risk of being outdated in some way, and belonging to the past. Thus, whatever true meaning, discovered or otherwise, is lost, and equivocated into something else that seems rational for the sake of flourishing. I think what seems to make the belief somewhat cherish-able and rational to others is that it emphasized on the moral agent (e.g. the host cultivating certain dispositions that gave them a sense of direction, even if it may not have been ethically sound with other notions). [/hidden]

 

And sometimes it ends up causing problems when people assume their 3 hour old tulpa is sentient' date=' when the goal was for them just to not doubt and hinder progress. But I feel like that's another matter of its own.[/quote']

 

[hidden]That seems like a nice topic to relate to virtue ethics. Like, how hour counts seemed to have been a virtue to sustain the imperative of wanting to assume sentience from the start (e.g. implied, intrinsic emergence of sentience vs. being treated as sentient while engaging in those activities to develop sentience). Do you feel the hour count’s true meaning was really to have one cultivate a disposition to be confident in their efforts, and holding strong convictions that their action-to-id (e.g. actions being the sole, contingent factor in fostering sentience) would lead to breakthroughs? It seemed that there were a bit of convoluted ideas of others seeing one person’s totality of hours as an ultimate principle to cling onto, and thus cultivate dispositions that entailed them into thinking that reaching that certain threshold in time will irrefutably equate to some level of progress with sentience.

 

Then there were dispositions cultivated that hour counts aren’t necessarily bad if one acknowledged that there wasn’t a guaranteed breakthrough after the threshold has been past. Which in turn also created a dogma that those that opposed of hour counts contributed to some kind of “cancer + frontloading.” However, would it be wrong to criticize those that felt it was wrong? Wouldn’t this bring awareness of how virtues aren’t really static and etched in stone, but more of nuances? Because if their virtues were deemed to be etched in stone, it would be analogous to wanting to etch tofu/Jell-O onto a wall. In other words, those cultivating those dispositions was somewhat contingent on what was known back then; which was probably infantile since everyone was more militant in cracking down some sense of the phenomenon. [/hidden]

 

 

 

When I mentioned evil' date=' I guess I could've chosen a better word. Perhaps I could've said "You have to make the choice to cause the least harm." But yeah, I do agree moral pluralism is a considerable viewpoint that needs to be thought about. There's rarely a right and wrong answer out in the real world. Should you make the worse decision, it isn't decided by you, it's determined by others who might label you as "evil", where the term is more or less properly used.[/quote']

 

So the virtues seem to be contingent by societal norms, in your opinion. OK.

 

 

Which, now, I understand, but initially - like, the very first moment when she told me she wanted to prove herself to me, it was sort of a weird thought.

But now that I understand her nature as "just another person (that happens to live in my head)", it's different.

 

But I wasn't just willing to simply assume or accept that she's sentient without any clarification, proof or hint, no.

That would be sort of presumptuous, I feel... hard to explain.

 

 

I’m going to structure my response to this on how you mentioned of it being a sort of a “weird thought.”

 

- Now, for you, you didn’t dismiss it as an intrusive thought since you felt her urgency in proving herself to you was her trying to put the right thought into the right context. In this case, assuring to you that through that experience of her explicitly showing you that urgency, it bloomed out the unrealized potential of her being sentient to you. Which seems to be an interesting topic I could go into more theorizing in the future. So, I thank you for this.

 

- This leads me to question what would’ve happened if a newcomer was in a similar circumstance as you, albeit they dismissed it as an intrusive thought. Would it be a matter of the person feeling that the right noise/thought at the time wasn’t sequential to the context at hand (or even a notion of them thinking they parroted the response)? So what seemed peculiar then, but seemed to be sequential to the circumstance has just as much potency than an experience less peculiar. It’s just a matter of the person self-reflecting, and figuring out for themselves if the gestures, professions, and such was from their tulpa.

 

- And having that assurance of it not being an intrusive thought, but a supplement that can be part of a collective totality of them having experiences of putting things in the right contexts would then create a fallback of assurance for the host. Which in turn would make them less likely to want to let said existence fade away because the buildup is just too worthwhile to go in vain.

 

 

Interesting!

[Guest Anonymous]

Considering a tulpa truly independently sentient opens up a giant can of weird implications (ethical and otherwise) and fosters frighteningly profound ramifications. Now you know why I just personally avoid accepting the idea.

 

And people just think I am being block headed and pretentious.