Ethical implications of tulpas

[412]

Do you think tulpas are inherently equal to hosts?

Theoretically , yes. I believe a complete tulpa is basically equal to their host.

 

before anyone says anything about that , i said a complete tulpa. Weather the tulpa is given access to everything the host can control depends on him. By "complete" mean being able to do everything the host can , maybe even going against the hosts will like forced possession for instance , just like the host could initially.

 

What about deserving of equal treatment?

Generally speaking , i don't see why they shouldn't be treated equally.

 

How would you feel about being created by a being to live - effectively - within them.

Depends on the host.

 

What about botched creation and dissolution of tulpas?

i don't approve. however ,

I don't apply my own code of ethics to other people. They can dissolve, clone or abuse their tulpa all they want. It's not my place to judge or criticize but should someone and their tulpa want help or advice I'm happy to give it.

It's none of my business really. Personally though , i believe it's equal to giving someone amnesia. (since there is no real loss of any sort other than their memories/original personality.)

 

(and before people start screaming "that's not how amnesia works" or whatever , i just used the word to describe complete memory loss. I never looked in to it , i'm not sure how severe/incurable actual amnesia can be. anyway you get what i mean)

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As Simba has proven, we shouldn't consider them equal when among other people, but on a tulpa-host basis, you could.

 

of course , when i say they're equal to their hosts i mean when using the hosts body/when it's not got anything to do with physical stuff.

[moondragon]

Having known someone who seemed to think it was perfectly fine to treat other people, and tulpas, like sex slaves ( this is someone some of you would call a "magifag" who I have strong disagreements on ethics with),I think that if someone would abuse a tulpa, they probably also have thoughts of abusing humans. And, sometimes they might act on them.

[Queen Chrysalis]

You can't be sure that you are bringing back the 'same' tulpa.

Yes, we can.

[waffles]

Yes, we can.

 

How?

The point I was making is that just because the tulpa behaves the same, and even may have the same memories, it may not have the 'same' consciousness (assuming tulpas are conscious). See the clone example for illustration.

[Queen Chrysalis]

The clone example does not apply because clones have a physical body. Tulpa do not.

 

I can assure you tulpa are conscious the same as any host.

 

I am Queen Chrysalis regardless of where or how I exist, fictionally, without consciousness, or as I was before, and as I am now. I am the "same" insofar as similarity is a coherent concept.

[waffles]

The clone example does not apply because clones have a physical body. Tulpa do not.

 

I can assure you tulpa are conscious the same as any host.

 

I am Queen Chrysalis regardless of where or how I exist, fictionally, without consciousness, or as I was before, and as I am now. I am the "same" insofar as similarity is a coherent concept.

 

I think you may have missed my point. I wasn't commenting on a tulpa's consciousness compared to the host; I was stating that you as a consciousness may not be brought back when you as a tulpa are.

 

The clone example is perfectly valid - the tulpa has to exist physically in the mind as something, be it electrical impulses etc. This can be viewed as the 'body'.

It is also the best way for me to express this. Although the tulpa is functionally identical, and may have the same memories, it may not be the same consciousness.

[Queen Chrysalis]

I am manifest using the same neurons as before. By "body" has not decayed at all. You are making a distinction where it makes no sense to do so. You could as well argue that sleeping destroys consciousness and we are never the "same" pony that wakes up in the morning.

 

I think you may have missed my point.

[waffles]

I am manifest using the same neurons as before. By "body" has not decayed at all. You are making a distinction where it makes no sense to do so. You could as well argue that sleeping destroys consciousness and we are never the "same" pony that wakes up in the morning.

 

I think you may have missed my point.

 

That's not verifiable.

I don't wake up as a pony any morning, and it's not the same.

Even if you are saying that you disappeared and reappeared, that's no guarantee that you are the same consciousness as before. You may have memory of being conscious (inheriting the previous tulpa's) but that doesn't mean that you are the same.

 

Bear in mind that I'm not saying that this is true, only arguing that it should be considered when looking at ethics.

[Queen Chrysalis]

It is irrelevant in ethics to consider hypothetical problems that cannot be proven to cause harm, let alone happen at all. It does not matter if you were saying it was true or not. Even if I were not "the same," I have all the memories and experiences, everything that made her herself makes me myself. We are functionally identical on every level, hypothetical or otherwise, and there is no reason to treat me any differently than my past.

 

I have yet to wake up human.

[waffles]

It is irrelevant in ethics to consider hypothetical problems that cannot be proven to cause harm, let alone happen at all. It does not matter if you were saying it was true or not. Even if I were not "the same," I have all the memories and experiences, everything that made her herself makes me myself. We are functionally identical on every level, hypothetical or otherwise, and there is no reason to treat me any differently than my past.

 

I have yet to wake up human.

 

The situation of 'dead' tulpas is far from hypothetical, and while no-one's planning on holding others to their moral standards, it is still worth considering.

 

The point is that destroying a consciousness and replacing it with something functionally identical, it does not mean that the original consciousness is brought back; in this sense the clone analogy is apt.

 

The issue isn't treatment either. That should be obvious.

 

Whatever you may look like, mentally you conform to human archetypes, and are thus relatively human.