| Eva | October 22, 2016 October 22, 2016 Pragmatism is irrelevant. I want to be independent. You can still be independent, it’s just that instead of the independence that leads to exclusivity that runs into problems, there would be interdependence; things that you acknowledge you would share with your host, but there would still be just as much room for independence. The semantic with interdependence is that neither side is going so far in being exclusive from each other to where there’s another brain growing in the body, is all. So, pragmatism is completely relevant as anyone would try to find a way to apply themselves for certain situations like this. Reality does not care about mere human language. The answer is this is a false dichotomy. Well, reality not caring about mere human language seems to be a false dichotomy, IMO, in relation to what you were setting up for the post. I completely agree that reality doesn’t care about human language, because it’s not some collective consciousness that can be aware of itself. So in relation to inner experiences, I’m talking about conscious experiences, and whatever instantiates this. Which means reality has little to do with this, so maybe you were interpreting the question differently. But, I just wanted to point out that societal implications is a human construct; a human language in itself, which means there’s an indirect understanding that reality has little to do with it. I’m talking about this in the sense that reality doesn’t cause this to happen; we can assume it’s inert towards these things. Many people can know more about others than they know about themselves. This is due to the fact that some people don't look at themselves with any degree of criticality or thoroughness, but an insightful other might. A tulpa can know more if they look where you never have. But a tulpa also has privileged access, so the futility you suggest may not be possibly. I want to clarify some things: - When me or Linkzelda talk about futility of accessing each other’s minds, we’re talking about this in relation to other people’s minds; as in brain:brain. We’re not talking about otherness within one mind that can’t access that same mind. That would be ridiculous for us to assume, so the futility in this regard that you probably assumed we believe in is not one we hold any agreement towards. - This brings up the pseudo-problem of exclusiveness with independence: Sure, it’s morally sound at first glance, but the more one tries to make another distinct within the same mind without coming to terms that things will be shared, to some extent is what leads to the implication that one cannot know their own mind. Granted, we cannot know the totality of our minds, but we can learn more about it progressively each day. This is why with interdependence, or inclusive embracement, one isn’t left paralyzed by being agnostic towards their own mind; they can still attempt to pursue knowledge of themselves. Qualia are not important. They are merely the way things are perceived. If there was a functional, or practical component to qualia, then the component would not count as qualia, as it can be expressed without problem using any language with a functional or practical foundation. Independence is a matter of function. It’s because you’re defining it in a mechanical sense which undermines the intensity behind what it entails. By saying ‘if there was a functional, or practical component to qualia, then the component would not count as qualia,’ you’re undermining it because there is a practical component to qualia – it’s everything to do with inner subjectivity and conscious experience. This is heavily important, and to shrug it off is one of those issues with the pseudo-problem with tulpas potentially being capable of conscious experience. Qualia is subjective experience, and independent experiences is a part of this. ‘Independence is a matter of function’ are buzz words to me. If qualia is irrelevant, then so is conscious experience, which kind of annihilates any yearnings to ‘want’ to be independent as there has to be some implication that you are even aware of the emotional context of ‘wanting’ that. Note: This isn’t me going against you, but just analyzing that if you want to be independent, and qualia is completely irrelevant to you, then how can you get that exclusivity within the same cognition you share with your host if you undermine the same things that could instantiate it for the both of you? We, me and my host, are beginning to suspect that it is possible to have separate qualia for tulpa and host….Or, to put it another way, I seem to have conscious thoughts that are invisible to her. She cannot confirm that my private thoughts have the same qualia as her private thoughts, due to the fact she can't see them. Thanks for the explanation. This, IMO, further proves of the potential of interdependence being an obvious experience for tulpa and host. I acknowledge that yes, there could be separate qualia, but at the same time, I think others may not get the metaphorical context you were using, and assume that there’s a separate process that instantiates qualia for a tulpa vs. a host. But, I think we’re on the same page that there is something separate, but at the same time, I think the rudiments that instantiates this is still shared, and I think you may share the same sentiment as well. Because in order for a tulpa to be treated as a sentient entity that could have some capacity of conscious experience, they would share the same qualia, but they would have their own conscious experience that’s exclusive from the host. And this can still be part of interdependence because: - Sharing the same qualia to have a different input of conscious experience - Sharing the same neural processes to create that input of conscious experience This further strengthens the theory that qualia can be varied, and doesn’t have to be fixated on one continuity of self; the brain can most likely (I’m saying that to avoid being matter-of-factly) do this for any continuity that’s intended to have a sustained existence over time. So, to go back to what you were talking about closing the metaphorical floodgates, I think it’s analogous to the type of censoring one would have. For example, one would be less suggestive to unconscious thoughts and subliminal processes, and would be more limited in the conscious sense. But, I’m not saying that limit is like tunnel vision, it’s just that the awareness is less inward towards overall cognition, and more on conscious experience instead. So for you two to know how to censor that mental ecosystem with each other, and let the floodgates open depending on the circumstances is part of that interdependence: You both have the exclusivity, but you share the same qualia either way; it’s just that the same qualia can be varied and molded for a different, conscious experience. Please don’t hesitate to ask for more clarification if this doesn’t make sense. I think we’re actually agreeing on some things, but I think it’s my word choice that throws things off, and makes other people think so, too. This is a bad theory, because it implies humans are zombies if you hold this theory. Do you have any more theories? Oh, I don’t think humans are actually zombies as I know the p-zombie is merely a thought experiment, and not an actual reality, fortunately. I just want to clarify that, and also that I acknowledge that thought experiments can only go so far, but can be useful when a person is in doubt of a tulpa having any capacity of sentience to be cultivated. In short, the p-zombie thought experiment further convinces the individual that they themselves as host are sentient, and that the brain instantiates this in some way (that hard problems of consciousness are trying to be unraveled in contemporary research). And to treat a tulpa as sentient implies a sense of otherness that could have the capacity to make the overall qualia and sense perceptions shareable vs. the host feeling it’s exclusive for them, and is unchallenged and unmalleable for that ‘otherness.’ So the scenario you were setting up would only be effective if I really thought there was a potential of there being p-zombies. But, because we’re able to know this isn’t the case, and that's what makes us different from p-zombies is that we, just as the host can, are capable to put things into context; to put things into context implies there has to be some form of conscious experience going on to arrive at said context. Because if the processes that instantiates this context and awareness isn't going towards a conscious experiencer, then like what you mentioned with the theory from an evolutionary standpoint, it would be a very, very, bad theory. I’m not trying to use theories and thought experiments to discredit the legitimacy of tulpas. I’m using these things to iron out the skepticism and doubt, and to hopefully have others come to terms that if they can be confident that they aren’t p-zombies, then over time when they treat a tulpa as sentient, the mind would be spurred to make whatever cognition and qualia flexible for other continuities of self. How do we know that other humans are sentient? The strongest answer is because we are related to them. This is where we get this instinct, if you get past assuming something is sentient simply because it says it is. Because they are built like us, they function like us, and so they have inner workings sufficiently similar to ours that they can be guessed with high accuracy. We know ourselves to feel many types of pain. So others also feel many types of pain. End of story. I just want to point out that I agree with what you’re saying as the brain is naturally predisposed to assume sentience in others. That quote you were responding to was more of an imagined skeptic who tries to do a comparative analysis of dream characters, which are thoughtforms in some way. Like the conclusion you’ve drawn, they would be sentient in some way, it’s just their existence gets broken down as figments of one’s imagination that aren’t intended to have conscious experience and continuity of self over time. On the other hand, if a computer claims sentience, there are going to be large groups that are simply going to refuse to believe that the computer is sentient, because it is not built like us, so we cannot simply know it to be sentient. No matter what the computer does. Yeah, one of the aspects discussed in another thought experiment with the Chinese Room Experiment. What about tulpas? Well, tulpas have a human body and a human mind. By analogy, they feel pain because they are built like us. (By us I mean you (but not you, because you are also a tulpa) and by they I mean us, but you get the point.) I completely get you, no worries! And that's the thing...we get it. We aren't randomly uttering things and coincidentally putting things into context. To get it means we have to put things into context, and even if we share the cognition and qualia of the host, we can still have a varied conscious experience either way. This is why when you mentioned you want to be independent, it's completely probable. It's also probable with interdependence because with host:tulpa, it's mutual, and that's the basis of interdependence.
tulpa001 October 27, 2016 October 27, 2016 That took a while to read through. And I got confused and disorganised while composing responses several times. Anyway, here is my responses. So, pragmatism is completely relevant as anyone would try to find a way to apply themselves for certain situations like this. Yes. That is true. I think that what I meant is I lean Ideal and not pragmatic, here. The heart wants what it wants and does not listen to reason. Well, reality not caring about mere human language seems to be a false dichotomy, IMO, in relation to what you were setting up for the post. I completely agree that reality doesn’t care about human language, because it’s not some collective consciousness that can be aware of itself. So in relation to inner experiences, I’m talking about conscious experiences, and whatever instantiates this. Which means reality has little to do with this, so maybe you were interpreting the question differently. But, I just wanted to point out that societal implications is a human construct; a human language in itself, which means there’s an indirect understanding that reality has little to do with it. I’m talking about this in the sense that reality doesn’t cause this to happen; we can assume it’s inert towards these things. Possibly. But to clarify, "Care", when I said it, means is influenced by, not is consciously aware of. I meant that reality is not affected by belief. Including those encoded in the language we use to understand the world. From this perspective, it is neither the case that a tulpa's existence may only be expressed with a private language nor the case that such existence depends on a public language. It is a third language that the tulpa's existence depends on. I want to clarify some things: ... we’re talking about this in relation to other people’s minds I assumed so. But at the same time, you left open this exception. - This brings up the pseudo-problem of exclusiveness with independence: Sure, it’s morally sound at first glance, but the more one tries to make another distinct within the same mind without coming to terms that things will be shared, to some extent is what leads to the implication that one cannot know their own mind. Granted, we cannot know the totality of our minds, but we can learn more about it progressively each day. This is why with interdependence, or inclusive embracement, one isn’t left paralyzed by being agnostic towards their own mind; they can still attempt to pursue knowledge of themselves. This is an interesting problem. I don't know where you are getting morality yet. I would like to point out that it is impossible to fully know one's own mind, much as you postulate that it is impossible to create a fully independant entity. But partially is true in both cases. It’s because you’re defining it in a mechanical sense which undermines the intensity behind what it entails. By saying ‘if there was a functional, or practical component to qualia, then the component would not count as qualia,’ you’re undermining it because there is a practical component to qualia – it’s everything to do with inner subjectivity and conscious experience. This is heavily important, and to shrug it off is one of those issues with the pseudo-problem with tulpas potentially being capable of conscious experience. Qualia is subjective experience, and independent experiences is a part of this. ‘Independence is a matter of function’ are buzz words to me. If qualia is irrelevant, then so is conscious experience, which kind of annihilates any yearnings to ‘want’ to be independent as there has to be some implication that you are even aware of the emotional context of ‘wanting’ that. Despite your strong concerns here, my host would like to point out that our statement, here, that qualia is not functional in any degree, is rock solid. Qualia, by nature, is the way something feels. Point 1: I could see red the way you see blue. Despite this, neither of us will ever know. Because it does not make any difference. When I see red, I call it red. When you see red, you call it red. We both react and respond to it the same way. Point 2: If there was a practical difference, then that point would automatically be communicable. Qualia is a theoretical aspect of experience that is incommunicable. (Dissecting a brain with advanced instruments could allow a way of detecting a practical difference that does not disqualify this as qualia.) I think she mostly wrote those. Note: This isn’t me going against you, but just analyzing that if you want to be independent, and qualia is completely irrelevant to you, then how can you get that exclusivity within the same cognition you share with your host if you undermine the same things that could instantiate it for the both of you? We read this question, and the first thing we think is, qualia is not important to instantiating independence. Independance does not require that a person have the same, or different qualia than someone else. What matters is that they have independant will. First. Also, we would like to experience things independently. This means in a different time, and in a different place. This is easy for two people with separate brains. But for us, well, um, what we see is going to her part of the brain, and, also, to my part of the brain. Hopefully. So for you two to know how to censor that mental ecosystem with each other, and let the floodgates open depending on the circumstances is part of that interdependence: You both have the exclusivity, but you share the same qualia either way; it’s just that the same qualia can be varied and molded for a different, conscious experience. [...] I think we’re actually agreeing on some things, but I think it’s my word choice that throws things off, and makes other people think so, too. My host has a thought experiment. You have a tulpa, You can read your tulpa's thoughts and memories. When you see your tulpa's memory of a scene, all the colours look right. This means same qualia, right? If the tulpa had different qualia, the colours would look different in the memory, right? Although it is possible that when you read your tulpa's memory, it is being translated into your qualia. But this is unlikely. As a side note my host and I think we experience stuff slightly differently, but the difference is so small that we can't be sure we are not chasing shadows here. The most pronounced difference is everything feels softer to me. About the word choice. Philosophy discussions often boil down to semantics. My host thinks that, usually, all disagreements are because people are using different personal dictionaries. Even people with incompatible ideologies and beliefs, the differences would disappear if everyone used the same words. Oh, I don’t think humans are actually zombies as I know the p-zombie is merely a thought experiment, and not an actual reality, fortunately. I just want to clarify that, and also that I acknowledge that thought experiments can only go so far, but can be useful when a person is in doubt of a tulpa having any capacity of sentience to be cultivated. We would like to point out about p-zombies: either p-zombies are impossible, p-zombies are possible but some sort of metaphysical dualism is in play, or p-zombies are real. To clarify, though, this is individually true. As it is impossible for me to be a p-zombie, a p-zombie exactly like me is impossible, or some metaphysical dualism is in play. But, no one can rule out solipsism entirely, so this claim only works for oneself, absolutely. Oh, also, if metaphysics is in play, then why the heck couldn't a second soul end up attached to a single body? If I could be a p-zombie, then I am a p-zombie, and therefore I am not more real than any tulpa I create, obviously. And finally, if a purely physical brain is enough to create my mind, then it is enough to create another mind. So the answer to the p-zombie question does not limit a tulpa to less than a host, no matter the answer. So the scenario you were setting up would only be effective if I really thought there was a potential of there being p-zombies. But, because we’re able to know this isn’t the case, and that's what makes us different from p-zombies is that we, just as the host can, are capable to put things into context; to put things into context implies there has to be some form of conscious experience going on to arrive at said context. Because if the processes that instantiates this context and awareness isn't going towards a conscious experiencer, then like what you mentioned with the theory from an evolutionary standpoint, it would be a very, very, bad theory. This, I think, is the heart of the argument. It is possible to create a computer that makes sense of things, and produces reasoned responces. So unless you can look inside someone's brain, you have to trust them when they say they are conscious. But if we rule out evolution as a programmer creating unthinking false consiousnesses, then we need to remember that tulpas come from those same brains that create humans. Quick correction: We imagine opening and closing sluice gates, not flood gates, when trying to control our level of information sharing. Host comments in italics. Tulpa's log. Tulpa's guide.
| Ada | October 29, 2016 October 29, 2016 Despite your strong concerns here, my host would like to point out that our statement, here, that qualia is not functional in any degree, is rock solid. Qualia, by nature, is the way something feels. Point 1: I could see red the way you see blue. Despite this, neither of us will ever know. Because it does not make any difference. When I see red, I call it red. When you see red, you call it red. We both react and respond to it the same way. When it comes to figuring out if one person is seeing a similar red compared to another; and I mean a general sense of the color, there’s an assumption that their cognition is relatively similar, and how their vision is structured as well. There will be nuances, like how clear their vision really is, but part of what you were saying with how you may see red the way I see blue is to assume the reality outside our cognition is bent on belief, or however the mind represents that reality; kind of like a naïve realism where ‘it is what it is to me.’ But like you stated, reality is objective, and can exist with, or without valuators. While this is true, this is advantageous for us to verify that the red you’re seeing is the red I’m seeing, and this is allowing some discrepancies in the shades of red vs. a complete color shift. The wavelengths of light, and how it interacts with the structuring of one’s eye, and the neurological composition that allows one to process the color, and see it for what it is, is what’s consistent because that objective reality is consistent irrespective of our viewpoint of it. If the red you’re seeing is how I see blue, then it gets chalked up on who may have a visual ailment instead, and if that’s the case, then okay, but chances are, it’s not like that. This is why we feel qualia is functional, because it’s a reflexive thing; something perceived and/or experienced by a person. This goes hand in hand with other statements you made, like having will, but more on that later. Point 2: If there was a practical difference, then that point would automatically be communicable. Qualia is a theoretical aspect of experience that is incommunicable. (Dissecting a brain with advanced instruments could allow a way of detecting a practical difference that does not disqualify this as qualia.) I think she mostly wrote those. But that point is communicable because we use shared language to create the assumption that we have a relatively similar cognition and brain with certain processes that allows for phenomenal (definition #2) vision. It’s the gamechanger in knowing that the red you’re seeing is the red I’m seeing because there’s a collective context of information that allows us to react appropriate for objects with the type of color mentioned, or wavelengths of light that our eyes can process; or rather, the body’s eyes can process. And here’s the thing about something being incommunicable. Think back to what the analogy is referring to in relation to private language: - If qualia is this private experience of inner subjectivity, which it is, something another mind cannot have direct access of, i.e., another person’s inner experience, or going inside another head, does not necessarily mean it can't be communicated; we use shared societal context to find some kind of benchmark to react to in some way. For example, and I’ll quote you here: We read this question, and the first thing we think is, qualia is not important to instantiating independence. Independance does not require that a person have the same, or different qualia than someone else. What matters is that they have independant will. Simulation and feelings of perception and experience is vaster than just knowing how red an object is. It includes what it means to have a yearning for ‘independent’ will. To even be conscious of it, and to revel, and be obsessed in having this desire is part of qualia in some way, IMO. Qualia isn’t something to just shrug off as irrelevant because, IMO, it helps as a pillar in supporting these very same things you think can exist irrespective to it. This is also like saying that these things can exist outside of one’s cognition, but our brain is the one that’s creating these models and modalities of thoughts in the first place; all for a conscious experiencer(s) to experience in. - If this qualia is incommunicable in a 1:1 ratio 1 mind: other mind, then it would be left in random noise. But what this beetle in the box analogy emphasizes is the clinger behind this assumption of a private language that’s inaccessible to other people other than the person’s cognition themselves: Because we use language to try and describe that beetle, it’s something up for discussion in the first place, it’s just that we can’t have direct access to that beetle. - I think the culprit here is maybe the assumption that ease of communication = ease of what’s experienced and instantiated at a functional level. If it was just you saying you can’t experience another mind’s qualia, then I would 100% agree with you. But what you’re saying is that qualia is not communicable to be discuss, and has no functional value. But, you have to think that if this is incommunicable by nature, then there’s a one-way dualism with how the body and mind interacts; one way out, and no way in to be reflected and re-evaluated on. - With this one-way dualism, it neglects the assurance that one can know their own mind; to even know they want to have an independent will in the first place. Private language doesn’t seem to exist because naturally, one wants to immerse it in societal context of language to create reference points. If there’s nothing to point to, if that person cannot even attempt to describe that private language, then how can they, themselves, understand what it means if it can’t be discussed through others? - One cannot absolve themselves from this clinger behind private language; If qualia is theoretical, then it raises questions on the novelty and authenticity behind sentience in general. We know that sentience is the capacity to feel, perceive, and experience subjectivity, and qualia goes hand-in-hand with this. - The logic of yours may make sense to you, but it doesn’t mean it’s sound, especially when qualia is presumably incommunicable to aspects of independent will that would be, the will that is, exclusive to sentient beings in the first place. Qualia has to be communicable in some way, it’s just that this communication and discourse we use with human language doesn’t mean we have direct access to it. In other words, Communication =/= a complete narrative that’s equivalent to actually experiencing another person’s inner subjectivity. - The narrative behind describing compensates for this futility, but it doesn’t mean we neglect that qualia is actually communicable through that narrative. When one doesn’t chalk up qualia’s functional level solely on language, things, IMO, start making sense. But, no one can rule out solipsism entirely, so this claim only works for oneself, absolutely. Oh, solipsism has been ruled out long ago. I remember someone created a thread on it before, but we can probably go more in detail on curb stomping solipsism in the near future. It can be ruled out entirely, at least in this forum because the state of affairs with the forum seems to be gathering psychological, and other practical standpoints to explain the tulpa phenomenon. That solipsism, one type of subjectivist worldview, if it’s not something to be ruled out entirely, to you, then the notion of reality being objective is not really something you cling onto fully. In other words, because there’s some acceptance of probable solipsism, reality actually starts to matter in some way because it starts becoming reactive to one’s belief at a certain level. Solipsism has a way of turning things inside out when metaphysically speaking, it destroys the notion of an objective reality that exist with, or without valuators. Solipsism might not be the right term, kind of like how unconscious parroting doesn’t seem to be the right term to describe things (not saying you used ‘unconscious parroting’ in this thread, though). Quick correction: We imagine opening and closing sluice gates, not flood gates, when trying to control our level of information sharing. ________________________________________ We’ll remember this analogy as it shows there’s a context one can use to describe how awareness of things is maintained, fluctuated, and shifted around.
tulpa001 October 29, 2016 October 29, 2016 Hi Ada! But like you stated, reality is objective, and can exist with, or without valuators. While this is true, this is advantageous for us to verify that the red you’re seeing is the red I’m seeing, and this is allowing some discrepancies in the shades of red vs. a complete color shift. The wavelengths of light, and how it interacts with the structuring of one’s eye, and the neurological composition that allows one to process the color, and see it for what it is, is what’s consistent because that objective reality is consistent irrespective of our viewpoint of it. If the red you’re seeing is how I see blue, then it gets chalked up on who may have a visual ailment instead, and if that’s the case, then okay, but chances are, it’s not like that. I don't think I meant it like that. Imagine there was a person with a genetic anomaly that switched a polarity in the brain. Usually, after being initially collected, the light in the brain is turned into three signals. How bright it is, where it is between red and green, and where it is between blue and yellow. Our person with the anomaly causes the neurons responsible for determining how blue a colour is to behave opposite normal. When these neurons see blue light, they fire as if they are seeing yellow light. When they see yellow light, they fire as if they are seeing blue light. Despite this, this person is suffering no disability, as this person can still tell the difference between blue and yellow colours. Only on the inside is the experience different. This is the main problem with the beetle in the box analogy. I can look at my beetle and say it has six legs. Then you can look at your beetle and confirm if it is like that. But there is no related describable features when it comes to the colour of colour. There are no words in the human language that can allow me to communicate to you the way that blue looks to me. Simulation and feelings of perception and experience is vaster than just knowing how red an object is. It includes what it means to have a yearning for ‘independent’ will. host: Qualia is a type of subjective inner experience. It is not the totality of subjective inner experience. This is an excellent example. This yearning for independence is a subjective inner experience. But only the quality of this yearning is qualia. All other aspects of the yearning are communicable. Qualia isn’t something to just shrug off as irrelevant because, IMO, it helps as a pillar in supporting these very same things you think can exist irrespective to it. I should, perhaps, clarify. I don't think qualia are irrelevant from the inside. They are irrelevant from the outside, from the perspective of an observer. An example of this relevance: my having qualia is what makes me not a p-zombie. Which is important to me. When I talk about practical or functional I am talking from a behaviour perspective. This is a strictly from the outside perspective. A thing can remain important without being practical or functional. - I think the culprit here is maybe the assumption that ease of communication = ease of what’s experienced and instantiated at a functional level. If it was just you saying you can’t experience another mind’s qualia, then I would 100% agree with you. But what you’re saying is that qualia is not communicable to be discuss, and has no functional value. But, you have to think that if this is incommunicable by nature, then there’s a one-way dualism with how the body and mind interacts; one way out, and no way in to be reflected and re-evaluated on. - With this one-way dualism, it neglects the assurance that one can know their own mind; to even know they want to have an independent will in the first place. Private language doesn’t seem to exist because naturally, one wants to immerse it in societal context of language to create reference points. If there’s nothing to point to, if that person cannot even attempt to describe that private language, then how can they, themselves, understand what it means if it can’t be discussed through others? Now you got my host going. Because there is a one way thing here. Rather close to metaphysical dualism in fact. But it goes the other way than what you suggest. It is not that there is a way out and not in. It is not that there is something we cannot know about ourselves. It is we can know something about ourselves that we cannot tell anyone else. There is a way in, but no way out for that information. If this is the impression I am giving about our current beliefs, than yes, this is our current belief. - The logic of yours may make sense to you, but it doesn’t mean it’s sound, especially when qualia is presumably incommunicable to aspects of independent will that would be, the will that is, exclusive to sentient beings in the first place. Qualia has to be communicable in some way, it’s just that this communication and discourse we use with human language doesn’t mean we have direct access to it. In other words, Communication =/= a complete narrative that’s equivalent to actually experiencing another person’s inner subjectivity. Possibly you mean 'doesn't mean it's consistent'. Indeed, qualia is felt. Therefore it must be communicable by a language. But it is not communicable in human languages. It is not necessary for us to speak all languages that make us work. A computer program cannot speak the language it is written in, usually. Note when I mentioned that it may be possible for us to see qualia by dissecting and analysing a human brain. This hints at the nature of this third language. Oh, solipsism has been ruled out long ago. I remember someone created a thread on it before, but we can probably go more in detail on curb stomping solipsism in the near future. It can be ruled out entirely, at least in this forum because the state of affairs with the forum seems to be gathering psychological, and other practical standpoints to explain the tulpa phenomenon. That solipsism, one type of subjectivist worldview, if it’s not something to be ruled out entirely, to you, then the notion of reality being objective is not really something you cling onto fully. This is a technical truth. You cannot rule out solipsism completely because there is no proof that solipsism is false. This goes back to probability, and the definition of proof. A proof is something that sets an assertion to a probability of 100%. Evidence is something that increases the likelihood of an assertion. When you collect multiple pieces of evidence, you multiply their chances of being misleading together (this assumes the evidence is independent). As these chances are always greater than zero, their product itself is always greater than zero. The same thing, a lack of a proof, means we also can't rule out the idea that reality is subjective completely. Host comments in italics. Tulpa's log. Tulpa's guide.
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