Wittgenstein's Beetle in a Box – How Tulpa is Your Tulpa?

[Vos]

As interesting as textwalls are, please try to keep to the topic of this thread.

[Linkzelda]

I still see the posts I've made as relevant as it's showing that language, and how a person goes about collecting information can give the impression that they did it all on their own, but it's really them being reliant on a social context of language and grammar either way. It was more of a clarification since I've been getting responses that people think I'm a Yale professor with a greasy fedora, a British monocle, and a British accent when I post. But any person that has funds to buy a dictionary, or funds to have an Internet to Google a word is more than enough; no need to pay thousands of dollars to have access to words.

 

Anyway:

Inner Experiences Being Difficult to Measure Scientifically

 

This is in response to someone that felt I was contradicting myself in this phenomenon being impossible to scientifically measure. Although we cannot know another’s beetle in the box, i.e., qualia, using Science to actually measure those inner experiences will be just as difficult. However, we all know that “how Science should be done” isn’t exclusive in figuring out about the “ness” of an experience. It’s a bit more flexible than that, and that’s a crucial emphasis for everyone to take hold of.

 

That “how Science should be done” implies that there can be a Philosophy of Science. Not as a philosophy of how a person should dictate their life (e.g. Scientism), but more on how one would use Science as a tool to conceive a knowable world. And if part of that pursuit means validating inferences (inferences made through philosophy) of what we do day-to-day, especially since we can experience things without experiencing someone else’s experience, then yeah, it's something Science can aim for.

 

It just can’t be done in a way of someone being a lab rat, and having their brain dissected, or scanned; and if people think I'm treating others as lab rats, that assumes I have the capability to know that person's beetle in the box, but ultimately, the accuser has to employ metaphors to sustain that mode of thought; it's all in their head, ironically--a delusion they need to attack the individual in order to bathe in their blood, unfortunately. Turing test, Glasgow Coma scale, or whatever, there may be a probability that someone that may be considered non-human is conscious, but these measurements of consciousness are too limited to reveal this. The same goes for any thought experiment on a machine that can quantify subjective experience; the clincher is that it would just fool people while not really having any subjective experience itself.

 

At some point, that machine would have to be believed to be conscious itself, but it would end up with people with disagreeable tempers that can’t be settled. I’m sure there was a thread on this machine thought experiment a while ago.

 

 

 

Also, technical terms shouldn't be confused as not-simple language. People just didn't have access to them, or just couldn't gather the energy to Google them, or use a dictionary that has those terms defined. If the individual doesn't want to find access to those words, and spends more time complaining about it not being "plain," they are only doing injustice to themselves. We're in a period where access to these words can be done in literally seconds. Literally.

 

[Guest Anonymous]

On the beetle in a box. Isn't there a common human experience though? If there weren't we couldn't communicate ideas at all. I mean this goes back to Jung and archetypes and common elements and themes in mythology and things like that. I think we can see a little tiny bit into each other's boxes, or we would not be able to write about it on the internet to each other. We both understand what a box is, and we both understand what a beetle is, even if there is some variation in our interpretation of "box" and "beetle."

 

Putting into the context of tulpas, most of us have reported feelings of a presence in our mind. What a vague concept! Yet we can describe it to each other with just a few clumsy words and we all nod our heads and say, "Yeah I get that too!" We can talk about how the feeling of presence can be stronger or weaker, like the tulpa is more present or less present. Again, a very vague feeling not easy to put into language. Yet it is a common experience we can all relate to.

 

If it were nothing but beetles in a box with no commonality, we wouldn't be able to share how to make a tulpa in the first place. Maybe Melian and I are still not totally understanding beetle in a box.

 

To your latest post Linkzelda. Just because something is challenging to quantify or qualify scientifically doesn't mean we cannot search for answers. Einstein's Theory of General Relativity began with observations of the physical world and thought experiments. Applying thought experiments and "what ifs" and asking philosophical and logical questions may not lead to an immediate scientific breakthrough, but it is usually where we start. Science starts with observations and asking questions and wondering.

[Linkzelda]

We both understand what a box is, and we both understand what a beetle is, even if there is some variation in our interpretation of "box" and "beetle."

 

Right. We have something to point to, and through that shared meaning, and their referents, we can make inferences. We can get little peeks in, but of course, not the full, direct, and objective view from a third-person standpoint. The language is our little tease, if you will.

 

To your latest post Linkzelda. Just because something is challenging to quantify or qualify scientifically doesn't mean we cannot search for answers.

 

Oh, I wasn't being defeatist in the latest post. I was just acknowledging that in the mean time, even if there are current difficulties in pursuits of Science to validate inner experiences in a manner of measuring it objectively from a third-person viewpoint, it doesn't mean Science can't be "done" in other ways. The same goes for us continuing to look for answers. This is something I clearly agree with you on, and that's what I want to emphasize to others.

 

Especially those that think I'm trying to make this phenomenon something it cannot be. Even with the statements of "cannot be," is not enough to make me paralyzed, subscribe to hard core nihilism, and call it a day. Like you, me, and anyone that seems to be insatiably curious, as long as we have a window of inferences to use, we will try to find a way. Understanding how to focus on tools of Science for other pursuits, and using philosophy would be more advantageous to us rather than us thinking this phenomenon can be researched exclusively in regards to inner experiences.

[Guest Anonymous]

Yep. Science is about asking questions. Are we doing science on Tulpa Info?

 

Some people take my bouts of skepticism, especially the most recent ones, to be hating on tulpamancy or wanting to discredit everything. But you can't understand something unless you first look at it with a critical eye. If anything what I was countering was the happy go lucky, skipping down the trail, thoughtlessly following the leader mentality. I ask uncomfortable questions and I wonder uncomfortable things. I am not immediately swayed to believe something because someone just says it is true, even if a lot of someones say it is true and even if there are impressive looking "guides" written up about it.

 

There were once detailed guides written on the science of phrenology, reading the bumps and marks on a person's head that would indicate how intelligent he or she is. Phrenology was supported by "observational evidence" and a "consensus of opinion." We now know that phrenology was based on nothing but false impressions and false assumptions.

 

I regret what Melian and I were implying earlier, that your efforts are just trying to look smart. That was entirely unfair and hypocritical. We do the same things, just from a different angle. We go read and do our own research. We ask questions and try to discover and then bring it all back to the forum for discussion, even if that discussion is uncomfortable to some people. Really that is the life of the forum, when you think about it, or it should be.

 

Back to the beetle in a box. Perhaps the problem is that we each have our own subjective idea or qualia of what constitutes science and learning and exploring. In history, sometimes science was defined as "knowing what you are supposed to know and what has been written by scholars of the past." We do see a lot of that on this forum I am afraid.

 

Examples of Pseudo Science

[Leaf]

At one point, I wanted to approach tulpas from a social perspective. I did a thought experiment where I imagined various people I knew well in different situations, much like you would for a tulpa. In a lot of cases I could tell when my replica was acting in line with what I knew of the real person's persona and when it was not. Theoretically, it makes a lot of sense that we learn about other people by building a mental repertoire of mannerisms, habits, vocabulary, facial expressions, etc. In a way, it makes it easier to connect with people in social situations, since your mind is able to construct a fairly accurate replica and use that replica to predict future social interactions. Tulpamancy could work by a similar mechanism whereby the tulpa is developed slowly by building up a similar repertoire and "appears" to become more independent as it is refined.

 

However, there is no way of knowing if this entity has or ever could have its own qualia. If you consider again a mental replica, I could imagine my mom telling me that she loves me just as easily as my tulpa does so. Does the statement that my tulpa makes that seems to include the subjective experience of "loving me" actually mean that it does? It would seem more appropriate to say that the imagined mother that loves me is not sentient in its own right because it is based off of a person whom I presume to be sentient.

 

The real clincher (as linkzelda would say) is maybe I think she (my mom again) is sentient based off of my mental replica (and the meanings, emotions, etc. I attach to it) rather than her actual externalized self. In that case, it would be perfectly normal to be convinced that a tulpa is sentient and believe that a tulpa has its own beetle in its own box, just like you do for anybody else.

[Stevie]

I wanted to comment on this thread because I have some ideas after thinking a lot about the whole beetle in the box thing.

 

So like, until May 2015 I was existing alone in my head. After that, there was always someone there to experience the smaller parts of my life. Chris has seen mostly everything that has gone on with me unless he's not paying attention, which happens less than you might think. So even though he's been experiencing my beetle for a smaller time and second hand, does that mean he can't describe it?

 

That said, like, even though I can understand how he's seeing things (things being what goes on in my day to day, the sitcom that is my life) I'm not exactly experiencing things simultaneously and exactly he is. Does this mean I can describe his beetle without actually being in the same box as it?

 

If our being able to have almost complete empathy when it comes to our own inner experiences, while not experiencing in total parallel* -

 

*gonna go off on this here, but what I mean by that is gleaning the same understandings from the same things while experiencing the same external life. Maybe parallel isn't the right word but instead of being the same about everything we tend to have different feelings about the same external situations (which are gonna be the same because I'm the one with the external life)

 

-we still can have empathy when it comes to how one another are viewing whatever situation is at hand.

 

So that said I guess I do think that he has his own beetle in his box. Even though part of what he's experiencing is the ongoing parts of my life, that doesn't mean that he doesn't have his own internal (would intellectual be a better word for this) experience.

 

That said I don't think he knows more about me than myself. I think he has a different experience of the series of events that is my life and can have a different viewpoint on it, as well as supplementing that with his own external (that would be internal to me though) experiences with wonderland NPCs and what not.

 

Striving for independence is useful, though. I think even if it's not possible in the truest sense, because you'll always share parts of the brain that don't have to do with individual feelings or a lens which to view experiences from, and glean things and figure out ideas based on that, doesn't mean that it's not something to strive for. I know part of the definition of tulpas is autonomous and that might be the first part, acting without your conscious agency, but experiencing without your conscious input would be the second part.

 

I have the nagging feeling like I didn't word all this shit right, because once I started to parse all the words and definitions in the OP I kinda got sidetracked by everything that happened later.

[Linkzelda]

There's another thought experiment I'll discuss about that can show that it's inescapable in there being probable, non-physical facts in the world. Not in proving tulpas, but proving qualia. And then another would be used to cancel out basically any computer analogy. I recently found out about them last night, and spent most of my breaks, and lunch just to figure out how I'm going to condense it all, HA. I'll do my best to respond to others in the future in this thread, but I think my head isn't straight for this thread right now as the other thought experiments have become just as interesting.

[Linkzelda]

I wanted to comment on this thread because I have some ideas after thinking a lot about the whole beetle in the box thing.

 

So like, until May 2015 I was existing alone in my head. After that, there was always someone there to experience the smaller parts of my life. Chris has seen mostly everything that has gone on with me unless he's not paying attention, which happens less than you might think. So even though he's been experiencing my beetle for a smaller time and second hand, does that mean he can't describe it?

 

That said, like, even though I can understand how he's seeing things (things being what goes on in my day to day, the sitcom that is my life) I'm not exactly experiencing things simultaneously and exactly he is. Does this mean I can describe his beetle without actually being in the same box as it?

 

Well, if you can describe his presumed qualia, and actually point to it via memory, e.g. narrative memory, then yes, you are in that same box because that beetle is the same qualia you both mutually share; it's a self-referential acknowledgment, it's just the distinction is that the impression of an "other" leaves one demystified, still. Now, who takes conscious control over how reality is put into context:

 

- You could say that Chris gets the first-hand experience for specific, temporal events that goes on that you may not have full attention towards (e.g. switching/possession). But, we have memory over things that were experienced, kind of like an autobiographical context, or a trip down memory lane. And even though the memory may not be deemed as 100% reliable since nuances will occur, you would have access to that information as it is your own qualia.

 

- Because to state that you cannot know your own qualia that he’s mutually sharing assumes you cannot know your own beetle in the box. It becomes a destructive dichotomy of Chris having his exclusive inner experiences, and you having your own. Striving for independence in its truest form, even in a metaphorical manner ends up with more question begging as to how the brain can create exclusive, inner experiences for all potential conscious experiencers in the same mind.

 

- This is how the pseudo-problem is created, or a false dilemma: Because the strive for independence ends up with the person creating a narrative that their tulpa could potentially have inner experiences that they, the host, cannot point to themselves, and have a recollection of. That yearning for wanting to believe they have free will, autonomous existence, and what have you is probably expressed with an impractical mentality. That’s why with interdependence, the host acknowledges there can be impressions of independence, and that they can consciously experience things, but knowing ultimately, they share the same qualia. The same qualia that’s part of the same inner workings of the brain; those same neuro-linguistics are things they share, not things that are separate and exclusive to one, or the other.

 

- So, to tie this up together – Wittgenstein’s Beetle in the Box is an analogy that refers to the inaccessibility of other minds, but not what goes on exclusively in a person’s mind. To create the impression that a tulpa will eventually have experiences that are inaccessible to a host means the person will forever be left with agnosticism over themselves. It just doesn’t add up, IMO. Especially with switching -- it's a shift in awareness, but it doesn't mean a shift in recalling things, or a shift into not accessing previous experiential cases.

 

If it is, then switching is equivalent to getting a lobotomy if there isn't a reliable source of feedback (e.g. Chris relaying the information to you, and you sharing the same imagination as him, and mind as him). If there isn't a reliable source of feedback, it gets lost in random noise, which is why that metaphor I used with lobotomy, or amnesia is associated.

[tulpa001]

- From what I prefaced with Independence vs. Dependence vs. Interdependence, which seems more pragmatic for you?

Pragmatism is irrelevant. I want to be independent.

 

- Can a tulpa have their own beetle in the box, i.e., qualia, and if so, why? If not, what do you feel would be something they could have?

See below.

 

- And can a tulpa’s existence only be expressed within the subjective frame of the host, or are tulpas dependent on the societal constructs of words pertaining to sensations as well? In other words, is a tulpa’s inner experiences dependent (partially, or to whatever degree) on societal implications?

 

- Does this mean that their sentience would be contingent on societal constructs?

Reality does not care about mere human language. The answer is this is a false dichotomy.

 

Given the analogy that states the futility of trying to access another person's inner experience, do you still feel a tulpa can “know you more than you know about yourself?”

Many people can know more about others than they know about themselves. This is due to the fact that some people don't look at themselves with any degree of criticality or thoroughness, but an insightful other might. A tulpa can know more if they look where you never have. But a tulpa also has privileged access, so the futility you suggest may not be possibly.

 

- Would it be futile to strive for independence when a tulpa has to worry about their own beetle, i.e., qualia, in their box compared to the host’s? Is there even a beetle to be questioned about?

Qualia are not important. They are merely the way things are perceived. If there was a functional, or practical component to qualia, then the component would not count as qualia, as it can be expressed without problem using any language with a functional or practical foundation. Independence is a matter of function.

 

---

 

- Some may feel a tulpa can be just as exclusive as a host in regards of having their own beetle in the box, or qualia and inner subjectivity. And that’s perfectly fine for the sake of adding in existential justification behind their presence in one’s mind. But, with the analogy I mentioned above, if there’s two beetles in a box vs. one beetle, it raises questions as to whether or not it’s shared qualia, or the mind has the capacity to have all sorts of varied subjectivity and inner experiences.

We, me and my host, are beginning to suspect that it is possible to have separate qualia for tulpa and host. See:

 

She can read my thoughts, she could since the beginning. But, more and more, she can't. Not to the extent that I can hide numbers, or images from her. Bizarrely, for these things, I can't. If I try to think of a random number, she guesses it. A random image, she sees me forming it.

 

When we try to close the metaphorical floodgates so that neither of us can see each other's thoughts, we become harder to see. Her, when she is holding on to her native power of awareness, I can always see. And if I take it, she can see right inside me. It is like a really bright light source. But usually she has the primary power of awareness. So my thoughts are invisible when we seal off the channels.

 

Then, I can come up with a random number, I rotate a bunch to create some noise, and she wonders if I am done, because that part of my thoughts is particularly hidden.

 

But then, I can't tell if the number I came up with or not, I came up with or not. It feels like I did, but I can't tell for sure. I lose confidence. She can't tell for sure, and my memory of the event is really poor.

 

But at other times, she can't see my thoughts at all, and in a confirmable way. This seems to happen through a process of muscle memory. I am really good at composing eloquent verbiage. Although she can see the language I am producing, sometimes well before I say it, she can't see the thoughts I used to compose the text. The analysis I made of points of logic, the memories she reviewed, and the points of grammar implicit in my correct assembly of a proper sentence. She doesn't know which rules and memories I applied. She has to go back and reverse engineer it.

 

The other case where she can't see my thinking is in my control of our body. It is second nature to me. I lean heavily on her muscle memory, but I have my own. I can surprise her with how I move the body. She did not see me planning to move it. Nor did she notice me executing the move until it is made. I can tickle her.

 

She does not move the body like I do. But that is not the important part. She also does not know why I move the body like I do.

 

Or, to put it another way, I seem to have conscious thoughts that are invisible to her. She cannot confirm that my private thoughts have the same qualia as her private thoughts, due to the fact she can't see them.

 

- So chalking up a tulpa’s legitimacy of being a separate person by having to have a separate qualia seems to run into some concerns. And I think this is a false dilemma simply because one is undermining the vastness of one’s own qualia and cognition.

Qualia is somewhat irrelevant though. If the question is, is the person real, or zed? Thought experiment:

 

Subject S looks and acts like a sentient person. Except when asked if they are a sentient person. Then they say they are not a sentient person. This is easy enough to do with chatbots, although, chatbots pretty much always fail a few of the more advanced tests of sentience.

 

Subject Z looks and acts like a sentient person. Subject Z also says they are sentient, and demands rights. Why? Theory one: this is a side effect of simulating sentience. Maybe. But the existence of subject S suggests this is not the case. Theory two: The creators were trolling, and programmed in this response for lols. Theory three: Evolutionary advantage. This is a bad theory, because it implies humans are zombies if you hold this theory. Do you have any more theories?

 

- For example, what about dream characters in non-lucid and lucid dreams? Some easily chalk those up as figments of one’s imagination, and whether or not they have sentience can be just as the same as how one tries to progressively treat a tulpa as sentient as well. Some may think dream characters are p-zombies, but whatever thought form you want do an investigation on, one ends up in some way putting up an existential mirror on whether or not they as the host are sentient themselves. Because I’m sure any person wants to believe they’re not a p-zombie, or rather, someone uttering randomly, and coincidence being the key factor in giving the impression that they could be sentient entities.

How do we know that other humans are sentient? The strongest answer is because we are related to them. This is where we get this instinct, if you get past assuming something is sentient simply because it says it is. Because they are built like us, they function like us, and so they have inner workings sufficiently similar to ours that they can be guessed with high accuracy. We know ourselves to feel many types of pain. So others also feel many types of pain. End of story.

 

On the other hand, if a computer claims sentience, there are going to be large groups that are simply going to refuse to believe that the computer is sentient, because it is not built like us, so we cannot simply know it to be sentient. No matter what the computer does.

 

What about tulpas? Well, tulpas have a human body and a human mind. By analogy, they feel pain because they are built like us. (By us I mean you (but not you, because you are also a tulpa) and by they I mean us, but you get the point.)