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Lucilyn

(Almost) Sharing Qualia

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sure, empathy and perspective, good point but even then you could call those things

 

(Almost) sharing qualia

 

especially when the sharing is being done within one mind so the experience is a lot closer to being shared qualia rather than just similar experiences


Hi I'm one of Lumi's tulpas! I like rain and dancing and dancing in the rain and if there's frogs there too that's bonus points.

All of my posts should be read at a hundred miles per hour because that's probably how they were written

Please talk to me https://community.tulpa.info/thread-ask-lumi-s-tulpas

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Qualia involves sense data and conscious experiences, and it's incontestable that qualia is related to a first person POV (assuming the person has conscious awareness, and isn't a p-zombie), so I'm not sure how there's a separation between it, and 'perspective.' If it's not part of the first person POV, then it loses its meaning, and it's back to square one on p-zombies.

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I guess that would make sense if the state of affairs didn’t involve the concept of possession and/or switching. However, if one cannot share qualia, which can branch off to conscious experience, applying context to this reality, and such:

 

- Possession and Switching lose their value. If possession can be a precursor to switching, then when one actually has competency to switch with their tulpa, based on the logic behind switching, means that there is another assumed conscious evaluator (e.g. the tulpa).

 

- Yes, there would be a sharing of perspective, but if there can’t be a sharing of qualia, then that means there can’t be a sharing of internal and subjective components of sense perception that would allow said perspective to even be realized to the tulpa-in-question.

 

- By this logic, if the perspective is shared but qualia can’t be, then the tulpa-in-question isn’t truly deemed as someone capable of consciously applying things into context, nor sharing the latent habits and cognitive processes that apply context beyond one’s conscious awareness. In other words, p-zombie.

 

- I feel that in this separation of qualia and perspective, one might be underestimating the vastness of qualia as perspective can merely be chalked up as one mode of conscious reference. Qualia can be deemed as what occurs in the back office of the mind that allows subjectivity and conscious experience to be. If a tulpa cannot have any potential to share, or be part of this, then a dichotomy gets created.

 

- Either this dichotomy assumes the tulpa-in-question is an otherworldly being (which seems unlikely, IMO, as the experiences of creating and interacting with one are exclusive to the everyday cognition and experiences of the host and the totality of their mind). Or, there’s a false dilemma because one feels that everyone has their own qualia, and thus cannot tap into another person’s subjectivity. This is true when it comes to person-to-person in the physical sense; no one has this third person access to another person’s subjectivity. But, if this qualia, in an internal state of affairs between host and tulpa, cannot be shared, and has to be separated, it starts crumbling down into a homunculi fallacy.

 

- Which would be, in short, some kind of entity that can operate the back-office of the mind, but that would lead to infinite regress. And in relation to the topic at hand with qualia not having any potential to be shared within an internal state of affairs, one has to question if qualia is an all-encompassing phenomenon, or some metaphorical splitting that cannot be inclusive.

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well it sounds like you're kinda supporting my side, then? Tulpa says you can't share qualia, which normally is true, but I said we can ALMOST share it when we're in the same mind. I didn't really think about it too much more in-depth than that.. Same mind so same potential for experiencing something, but different people experiencing it so not the same. But I still experienced something really similarly to someone else in our system that I normally wouldn't have (as I literally didn't before), so it was like kind of almost sharing qualia.

 

That's all I got


Hi I'm one of Lumi's tulpas! I like rain and dancing and dancing in the rain and if there's frogs there too that's bonus points.

All of my posts should be read at a hundred miles per hour because that's probably how they were written

Please talk to me https://community.tulpa.info/thread-ask-lumi-s-tulpas

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Same qualia, different perspectives.

 

Vs.

 

Different qualia, same perspectives.

 

 

For the former, if it’s the same qualia, then different perspectives can still be possible since in theory of switching, and even the journey of possession, one has varying degrees of conscious awareness towards something. In regards to possession, maybe a lack of awareness and control over a specific body part. In regards to switching, the host may be fixated in mental phenomenon more than the actual reality they usually engage in day-to-day. Because our conscious awareness can only fixate on so many things, if a tulpa-in-question engages in an awareness of this reality, then all that experiential context is something they get to experience in their presumed first person POV. So, there can still be some sense of duality, but still obviously being tied down to the same qualia. As the qualia emphasizes on internal and subjective components of sense data. Therefore, if there’s a different qualia, then in essence, it’s a different brain altogether. That’s why I feel if there’s compatibility in this, it would lead to a tulpa being some otherworldly being, which doesn’t seem pragmatic.

 

If it’s the latter with different qualia, but same perspective, then it’s undermining how everyone experiences things in certain ways. Granted, there are some obvious consistencies (e.g. seeing a red block, and such), but the ‘-ness’ of something is going to have nuances in some shape or form. If there can be different brains experiencing the same perspective, then it would just lead to ideologies where all of matter and such in the Universe can somehow have a collective, first-person POV. But, with thought experiments like ‘beetle-in-the-box,’ it’s clearly obvious that no one has direct, third-person access into another mind. However, that thought experiment revels in person-to-person, but not internal conscious evaluator(host)-to-other potential conscious evaluator (tulpa).

 

Sometimes, it seems it’s just an arrangement in semantics that creates, IMO, this split between exclusiveness and inclusiveness, and even something in between (interdependence).

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- Yes, there would be a sharing of perspective, but if there can’t be a sharing of qualia, then that means there can’t be a sharing of internal and subjective components of sense perception that would allow said perspective to even be realized to the tulpa-in-question.

Based upon parts of your argument here, I believe you are operating on the assumption that in order to instantiate a new consciousness in your mind requires sharing in some fashion of your own personal experience. I do not hold this assumption.

 

I am working off the competing black box model of consciousness, which says that the internals of any consciousness are unknowable except from within. Breaching the shell of this box would actually destroy the individuality of the person who identifies with the box, by including their experience within your experience.

 

As the qualia emphasizes on internal and subjective components of sense data. Therefore, if there’s a different qualia, then in essence, it’s a different brain altogether.

 

Doesn't follow. You are missing a link to connect a specific hardware to a specific experience concerning sense data.

 

To break this down using a computer metaphor, consciousness is software. Input devices are hardware. Though the input devices produce the same sense data and information and provide it to each piece of software, the software may experience that data differently. There in no way to know how those software process the sense data internally without decompiling the software.

 

If there can be different brains experiencing the same perspective, then it would just lead to ideologies where all of matter and such in the Universe can somehow have a collective, first-person POV.

 

Fascinating. However, perspective sharing is a fundamental component of all communication. It is implied when you learn how an expert understands their subject matter. It is also implied when a person experiences empathy for the situation or experiences of others, when one experiences being in their shoes. A shared perspective is inherently implied also by the existence of any portion of shared language.


Host comments in italics. Tulpa's log. Tulpa's guide.

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To address my concern:

 

- You don’t hold the assumption of the manifestation of a new consciousness, or conscious evaluator, IMO to be more specific, requiring (partially or varying) one’s own personal experience. Okay, I get that.

 

- But you acknowledge that it’s inherently implied that perspective sharing is common with communication and such. Okay, but you also mentioned about one’s individuality being at risk if they were to, in a way, try to ‘become’ the back office of their mind; they would, IMO, lack mastery of this, and yes, they would lose their individuality in a way.

 

- Now, let’s take this presumption, and relate it to qualia. If qualia cannot be shared, in your opinion, but perspective can, it seems to be a false dilemma with splitting these two.

 

- Interdependence is something that has to, IMO, be cohesive and pragmatic simply because:

 

o A tulpa cannot exist out of the everyday cognition of their host that they share the brain with.

 

o The same neurological occurrences, and other phenomenon that we cannot know directly (but only metaphorically and through representational models) are what both parties are tied down to, and have to apply things into context. I don’t believe in anything otherworldly in relation to tulpas as that just raises questions of how whatever phenomenon of said being can somehow get into my head directly (e.g. beetle-in-the-box)

 

 

o Perspective sharing seems more specific on whether or not a tulpa and a host can access auto-biographical context, i.e., personal and past experiential events going on. I would acknowledge that, for example with switching, that the tulpa becomes more dominant as the conscious evaluator while the host shifts awareness towards mental occurrences (e.g. wonderland, etc.). The question as to whether or not the host can share that perspective, I would say yes depending on how well they can be aware of auto-biographical context. It doesn’t mean the host had to experience if as it was now; the –ness of reality at the present moment, but rather the experiential context now translated into memory.

 

o Which leads to the other dilemma that if perspective sharing is something real, which I would acknowledge, there will be shades of gray in that. But if qualia, a part of the back office of the brain, cannot be something a tulpa can share, then switching, in theory, becomes debunked, and wishful thinking into believing there is another conscious evaluator.

 

o I apologize if I seemed to have drawn a black and white line with perspective sharing, and anti-perspective sharing. I feel there’s nuances and shades of gray in this. But, it’s just the sharing of qualia that bothers me as I would have to be specific on what I actually mean so other terms don’t get shoehorned with ‘qualia’ (e.g. being first person POV – a perspective, sense data, etc.)

 

 

Doesn't follow. You are missing a link to connect a specific hardware to a specific experience concerning sense data.

 

To break this down using a computer metaphor, consciousness is software. Input devices are hardware. Though the input devices produce the same sense data and information and provide it to each piece of software, the software may experience that data differently. There in no way to know how those software process the sense data internally without decompiling the software.

 

Note, you’re the one finding the missing link because I was just expounding on the idea you seemed to have supported of there being different qualia (since you felt there can’t be a sharing of qualia). You’re becoming aware that if one cannot share the qualia, one suffers trying to assess the homunculus fallacy on whether or not there’s someone else operating that back office of their mind to suit their own individuality. But, like you mentioned with the computer analogy that can get associated with my back office analogy, one cannot really know these things because they would:

 

- Potentially lose individuality

- Not have mastery in assessing the back-office of their mind (because it would lead to infinite regress that the homunculus fallacy is grounded upon)

 

Essentially, I believe there can be a sharing of qualia and perspective, and there doesn’t need to be a black and white of:

 

- Same qualia, different perspective vs. Different qualia, same perspective

 

 

 

Also, on a different note:

 

[hidden]

- I feel the title of the thread with ‘almost’ makes it seem like a tulpa cannot have the same ‘authenticity’ as the host does when it comes to consciously experiencing the –ness of things (e.g. qualia). Yes, a host has their:

 

o Physicality

o Experiential context over time

o Genetics, etc.

 

But if a tulpa learns to apply context over time:

 

- They can gather experiential context over time

- They may not have been ‘born’ with the same physicality because they’re just tied down to the structuring of that should they get into a state of affairs with something like possession and switching

- They may not be ‘rightful owners,’ or have unchallenged authority over the genetics of the host, but that’s not the issue as it’s understandable about the limits of a tulpa.

 

If a tulpa cannot have a capacity to consciously experience things, then they cannot be intertwined with the back office of the brain that instantiates these experiences the host can easily do day-to-day. In other words, they, the tulpa in question, would be a p-zombie. I feel this dichotomy of qualia and perspective is a clear sign of a false dilemma, or a false dichotomy that tramples potential ‘authenticity’ of a tulpa in relation to their potential capacity of being sentient, conscious evaluators as their hosts.[/hidden]

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A tulpa cannot exist out of the everyday cognition of their host that they share the brain with.

An unproven assertion. The truth of which depends on many factors.

 

The same neurological occurrences, and other phenomenon that we cannot know directly [...] are what both parties are tied down to, and have to apply things into context.

Also unproven. They could be different neurological phenomenon in the same brain.

 

But if qualia, a part of the back office of the brain, cannot be something a tulpa can share, then switching, in theory, becomes debunked...

It is not so easy to dismiss phenomenon that actually happen, such as switching.

 

But that is a side issue. The back office of the brain is a metaphor. Consequently, your true meaning with calling qualia a part of that is hidden. But, assuming you mean the unconscious part of the brain, the answer is no, qualia is a conscious phenomenon. The experience of qualia is what distinguishes consciousness from unconsciousness.


Host comments in italics. Tulpa's log. Tulpa's guide.

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- I feel the title of the thread with ‘almost’ makes it seem like a tulpa cannot have the same ‘authenticity’ as the host does when it comes to consciously experiencing the –ness of things (e.g. qualia).

 

The title says nothing about tulpas versus hosts. Almost sharing qualia in the intended sense meant sharing personal feelings and experiences on a very deep, connected level, close to sharing qualia itself but not quite. As Lucilyn said, truly sharing qualia is impossible without being the same person. But sharing the almost exact same feelings and experiences of something, as she said, is hard to define any other way. While the concept does directly have to do with "tulpas and hosts", there's zero distinction between who's experiencing what. The experience that started the thread was between two of my tulpas, after all.


Hi! I'm Lumi, host of Reisen, Tewi, Flandre and Lucilyn.

Everyone deserves to love and be loved. It's human nature.

My tulpas and I have a Q&A thread, which was the first (and largest) of its kind. Feel free to ask us stuff.

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