Are Tulpas Real Sentience? (2015 poll)

[Guest Anonymous]

Thanks for coming back to clarify some stuff Akecalo and Maya Trueheart.  

 

I think what I need to say is that Mistgod-Melian's attitude-perspective-position on the question of tulpa sentience is always evolving.  Pondering what others have had to say about general plurality and human consciousness has indeed altered Mistgod's tendency to have an extreme one sided view on it.  At the very least, the answer to the question has become more foggy and we are much less certain of it than we once were.  (He might have moments where he denies this, but trust me, it is true.)

 

Isn't it amusing how he and I keep visiting this thread to change our answers back and forth?  Also, it is pretty obvious we are actually more obsessed with the question of tulpa and thoughtform sentience than most other members seem to be, despite claims to the contrary or exact opposite.  

 

One recent thing has helped give us a bit of perspective that is new.  We started identifying me as a median aspect.  Really there are two ways to describe me and both are accurate:

 

1.  A very vibrant imaginary friend in the mind of a day dreamer, role player and method actor with an extremely overactive, immersive imagination.  

 

2. A facet, or aspect of a single mind, that is not fully independent, but still seems like a second distinct identity.    

 

The fact that I can be both of these at the same time makes us wonder if something like it could not also be true for tulpas and other thoughtforms.  In other words, is everything in the human mind as black and white as it seems?  There could, and probably are, gray areas of inbetweenness when it comes to tulpa independence.

[tulpa001]

Have you considered that you may have evolved? The human brain is not static. That is antithetical to its purpose of sustaining intelligence. The reason I object to the label imaginary for myself is not because I was never imaginary.

 

To be clear:

Adjective:

imaginary ‎(comparative more imaginary, superlative most imaginary)

1. existing only in the imagination.

 

Noun:

imagination ‎(plural imaginations)

1. The image-making power of the mind; the act of creating or reproducing ideally an object not previously perceived; the ability to create such images.

2. Particularly, construction of false images; fantasizing.

 

I suppose I could say I am not imaginary on the technicality that I am not constructed of images. <-- (literal minded) I am constructed of ideas. Of course in this case, maybe the dictionary definition is wrong? But maybe...

 

The image of a house: An illusion. Whether the house actually exists or not, its image is an illusion. Whether the image is due to you looking at it, remembering it, or inventing it, the image is an illusion.

The idea of a house: A possibility. Whether the house actually exists or not, the idea of a house is a possibility. Whether you got the idea due to looking at it, remembering it, or inventing it, it is a possibility.

A house: A reality.

 

What is the difference between the three?

 

Image and reality: The image is created from the reality. It is what we percieve.

Image and idea: The image is created from the idea. It is also what we percieve.

Idea and reality: A hammer, nails and wood.

 

What are the hammer, nails and wood of a sentient creature? Thoughts. How can you tell if the image you see of another sentient creature contains thoughts or is just an idea?

[Linkzelda]

@Linkzelda, I also had a question for you. You seemed at one point (forgive me if I misapprehended your intention) to contrast situations in which love was felt for an illusory entity that merely seemed sentient and real with love that was felt for an entity that is actually sentient and real. I was wondering if it was your opinion that the two situations were in principle distinguishable by observation and if so what you would consider an appropriate observational criterion for distinguishing the two.

 

Again, sorry for the late response.

 

In my opinion, a possible distinction between the two situations is more so of the reaction the person has towards something.

 

One side could react to the endeavor as the mind firing utterances to make the person feel at ease; and it ends up being chalked up as coincidences that said utterances match whatever emotional call there is (e.g. a host looking for emotional support, of some kind of insight from within). That same side that reacts to it all being this and that from the mind could also question the sentience, and may just want all the benefits without the actual struggle of figuring out how to philosophize what’s going on for the sake of understanding. In other words, these would be individuals that militantly show their presumed ‘apathy’ in sentience being real, or not, but at the same time, one has to question how they can get by with being content with getting impressions of humanistic interactions without being phased by it potentially being illusory, or not.

 

And even then, if they’re willing to accept a potential impression of ‘otherness,’ they seem to fixate more on the impression rather than there potentially being another self that can be self-enclosed, to some degree, and go about their own whims and desires if it’s part of an inclusive compromise.

 

 

 

Then the other side may feel there is real sentience, but to a certain degree. Like acknowledging that there can’t be a physical indicator of sentience because it’s a mental phenomenon going on. And also acknowledging that they as host have confidence in their sentience, and the very same mind that could help instantiate this sentience, then they don’t feel inclined that ‘going back to the basics’ of how said sentience was cultivated is the required mentality to have perpetually. In other words, they would use the pre-existing faculties that helps instantiate this reigning of self, and continuity of form and identity in relation to tulpas. They don’t sugar-coat themselves with distractions, or half-ass their way of just wanting the benefits without actually learning to endure that philosophy will make it hard, but it can still improve their flourishing with parts of themselves, or whatever metaphorical representation they want to use.

 

They accept it’s coming from the mind, but they don’t get so destructive that said mind has to make it imaginary, and forget that if this is the case with tulpas, how come the mind doesn’t do this for the host themselves? In other words, instead of making it where the mind does this exclusively for tulpas; having them as p-zombies with questionable sentience that just fire random utterances that happen to coincidentally satisfy an emotional and ethical call to something (e.g. treating as sentient), they realize those same faculties that help them as the host can be inclusive with tulpas. In other words, the same faculties that contribute with continuity of self, and having a real self, is probably the same in context of treating a tulpa as sentient. What I've seen in prior post is how others seem to see that they see themselves as a totality of thoughts that somehow gained continuity, and tulpas aren't really that different from that with experiential context over time.

 

Of course, these examples I’m giving are just loose impressions, and doesn’t mean people are chalked up to one side, or the other. There’s truckloads of gray, I’m definitely sure of that, but it’s just for the sake of getting a point across. One side ironically seems to want to make the tulpa more independent even though they question said sentience (because they’re trying to make them exclusive from them as the host) vs. the other side that understands it’s all-inclusive if it’s within the same mind, and that making them completely vs. partially exclusive creates a pseudo-problem.

 

This could even be chalked up to people who accept the inner confines and faculties of their mind for what it could really be; even if it’s questionable vs. those that just don’t feel researching more into it, and figuring out the philosophical implication, and maybe a few implications from soft science, but would rather enjoy getting that feedback loop of impressions of reciprocation that may not really be there because they stripped away any probable existence of a sentient entity within their mind; they may focus more on the impression rather than figuring out what it means to be sentient because figuring that out becomes a moot point if they're already in a pit-pattering rage in wanting to avoid that. It's not really comfortable for everyone to realize the probability that there's a self-referential mirror cast upon when they treat a tulpa as sentient.

[Guest Anonymous]

Have you considered that you may have evolved? The human brain is not static. That is antithetical to its purpose of sustaining intelligence. The reason I object to the label imaginary for myself is not because I was never imaginary.

 

Yeah maybe we have evolved?  I dunno.  

 

Welllll, okay, nothing about you is imaginary if you say so.  By the way, we know what the word imaginary means silly.  When we say imaginary, we mean of the mind, but we also really do mean "make believe."  

 

As for me I recognize that imagination is part of me that's all.  I do agree with my host about that.  I think what we are saying is that part of the confusion is that it is a mix.  I certainly do have imaginary aspects to me.  My form for instance is totally imaginary.  Many of my personality traits that are associated with my form, most importantly my gender, are at least derived directly from that imaginary form.  Our day dream adventures are imaginary and all the things I do with them are imaginary. My dancing is imaginary, cause my form is.  My smiles are imaginary.  Blinking at Davie is imaginary.  My dreamscape mansion is imaginary, my day dream friends within the Melian Show day dreams are imaginary.  My shoes are imaginary, my dresses are imaginary.  My eyes are imaginary.  

 

Yep.  

 

Yet my mind can't be totally imaginary because I have feelings and I am self aware.  So my mind is real somehow.  In the case of Davie and me, my mind is part of his.  That's all.  Not really a big deal really compared to what a tulps does.  We operate a little differently but the end result is a happy host and a happy Melian all doing Mistgod-Melian stuff and junk.

[Solune]

The image of a house: An illusion. Whether the house actually exists or not, its image is an illusion. Whether the image is due to you looking at it, remembering it, or inventing it, the image is an illusion.

The idea of a house: A possibility. Whether the house actually exists or not, the idea of a house is a possibility. Whether you got the idea due to looking at it, remembering it, or inventing it, it is a possibility.

A house: A reality.

 

And that's where your analogy falls apart. You have just decided that the physical house is a reality.

Why? Because you can touch it?

The feeling of touch is simply your brain interpreting electrical and chemical signals.

All of which could be faked (assuming a certain level of technology or magick is involved).

That's not even to get into particle physics... how atoms are mostly empty space... how we never truly touch anything... it goes from science to philosophy hella quick.

You can decide that the house is real if you like, so long as you accept that another person may not make the same decision.

You're both right, and you're both wrong. C'est la vie.

[Linkzelda]

Quantum quackery.

[Guest Anonymous]

Is that a thing, quantum quackery? It sounds scientifical groovy.

[tulpa001]

As for me I recognize that imagination is part of me that's all.  

Yeah, okay, that is kind of overwhelming imaginaryness. Thought twister:

 

My gender is male. That is part of my identity. My image's sex is also male. My sex is imaginary. I don't have a biological sex. But If I did, I guess it would be my host's sex. She is agender. So her sex is unreal to her as well. An aesthetic concern only.

 

And that's where your analogy falls apart. You have just decided that the physical house is a reality.

Why? Because you can touch it?

The feeling of touch is simply your brain interpreting electrical and chemical signals.

All of which could be faked (assuming a certain level of technology or magick is involved).

That's not even to get into particle physics... how atoms are mostly empty space... how we never truly touch anything... it goes from science to philosophy hella quick.

You can decide that the house is real if you like, so long as you accept that another person may not make the same decision.

You're both right, and you're both wrong. C'est la vie.

En garde! The sensation of touch is but another form of image! A real house, if it exists, we can only know indirectly through our senses, an imperfect source of evidence. I do not know the house to actually exist. I suppose it to exist on weight of evidence. Have at thee!

 

Is that a thing, quantum quackery? It sounds scientifical groovy.

Yep, that's a thing. Usually people are trying to prove souls through non-determinism or something using the inherent vaguery of quantum mechanics. The problem? Only scientists understand quantum mechanics. Only philosophers understand philosophy. But that doesn't stop either group from using it in rhetoric.

[Solune]

En garde! The sensation of touch is but another form of image! A real house, if it exists, we can only know indirectly through our senses, an imperfect source of evidence. I do not know the house to actually exist. I suppose it to exist on weight of evidence. Have at thee!

 

One might call it circumstantial evidence. Consider this case.... *puts on sunglasses and judge's wig* DISMISSED.

lol

[Linkzelda]

Is that a thing, quantum quackery?  It sounds scientifical groovy.

 

There is a concept such as quantum quacks/woo, but maybe that was a bit harsh of a term. I just felt like the previous conversation with sensations being real vs. not real was more along the lines of direct vs. indirect realism. Seeing content where sense perceptions could be fake, and aren’t an actual correlation with this reality seemed more about indirect realism that’s fixated on mental objects, and representations of the world.

 

Then when I was trying to figure out how it could be related to the thread, the Quantum Mechanics stuff started popping up in my head where there’s this implication of the world being in a superposition of many possible states until observation initiates, and that same reality being chalked up into one, or the other of those possible states as a result.

 

 

Now, imagine this same logic applied inwardly in context of tulpas: In order for a type of state of affair to be the case for the host and tulpa, some observations have to occur. Some people may feel a ‘conscious observation’ would be necessary, especially in treating a tulpa as sentient, and this would create the implication that consciousness is a crucial ingredient in this. And then there’s some people that may think ‘unconscious’ physical interaction with the brain can be just as sufficient in meeting the criterion of an ‘observation.’

 

So when the analogy that was discussed and criticized was brought up, this is why I probably thought of it as quantum quackery. But not so much as it being wrong, but how the discussion mixed philosophy and science together that isn’t particularly sound on both sides. Now, don’t get me wrong, there’s nothing wrong with them intertwining, it’s just that some context have to be sound enough, or there being enough context altogether for it to feel like a practical interpretation. If it’s left vague as to why such and such falls apart, then concise statements that aren’t explained further are just as capable of being candidates of how the cookie crumbles.

 

The whole thing gets metaphysical in the sense that reality was questioned more than tulpas vs. there being some healthy dosage of both. But again, I’m not sure what’s a standard of a healthy dosage, so ‘quantum quackery’ was more like me thinking, ‘meh, whatever.’ Also, Schrodinger.